The Art of Captaincy – Part 2: Rugby Tactics

 

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By Bruce J Rankin, 27 Nov 2007 The Crowd is a Roar Guru

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Bruce J Rankin continues his analysis of the Art of Captaincy in rugby union.

In this Part 2 on The Art of Captaincy [read part 1 here], we’ll look at one attribute of successful captaincy: the ability of the captain “to change tactics and play many times during a game without reference to the coach.”

A chapter could be written on rugby tactics, and another chapter on an extension of that – set moves. Time and space do not permit a full analysis. However one of the most basic tactics that often reveals a captain’s ability is: what do you do when you receive a penalty within kicking range? Does the captain take the kick for goal, kick for the corner to maul a try from the lineout, take a scrum, take a tap kick or cross kick to an unmarked wing?

The basic rule is “you always take your points!” It is rare that the other options succeed. The key exceptions are (1) when you’re so far ahead or behind on the scoreboard it doesn’t matter – say 30-40 points; and (2) when you’re into the last 3 or 4 minutes, there is only one scoring opportunity left and you need a try or converted try to win. Yet the number of times Super 14 and even experienced international captains forget this basic principle is remarkable.

Why is the captain’s decision to always take the points so important? Several:

1. It keeps the scoreboard ticking over – either increasing the lead or narrowing the gap;
2. It sends a message to the offending side that they will be punished and should be more careful;
3. It puts a psychological little nail in the coffin in the minds of the offending side every time they have to come back to half way to kick off again;
4. Going for a try with probably a 10-20% chance of success just doesn’t compete with today’s goal kicking success ratio of some 75-80%;
5. Securing the win is the first priority, ahead of bonus point considerations – exceptions are rare
6. It is especially vital in the last 20 minutes of a game, when you’re behind and need more than a converted try to win. If you don’t take the points, the offending side knows it can infringe with impunity, yet not have points scored against them. What about the risk of a yellow card? Defending sides presumably reason it is better to risk a yellow card than give away vital points! Cynical? Yes, but regrettably it happens and it wins games. Ergo – always take the points!

Let’s look at some examples.

In the first year of the Tri-Nations – 1996 – the All Blacks played the Springboks at Cape Town in the last game of the series, immediately prior to the three-test series. It was all South Africa for most of the first half and five minutes after half time, they led 18-6. The comeback was effective. First Mehrtens kicked two penalties. Then with just 13 minutes left Osborne scored down the left wing cutting back to the posts. Mehrtens converted and so the All Blacks led for the first time 19-18. With the Springbok forwards now tiring in the final 10 minutes, prop Craig Dowd drove over, Mehrtens kicked another penalty and the All Blacks had won 29-18.

On interview after the game, Sean Fitzpatrick said, “Yes, it was good wasn’t it? We just kept chipping away.” In other words, through his leadership he did not allow his team to panic, they remained patient, took the penalty points as they came, and finally in the last 15 minutes, when they had control in the forwards, scored two tries. It was no coincidence that, immediately afterwards, New Zealand won its first ever test series in South Africa 2-1 under Fitzpatrick’s leadership.

After the Crusaders had beaten the Brumbies in the 2000 Super 12 final, Blackadder was finally appointed captain of the All Blacks “nine months too late” according to Robbie Deans. Yet in two tests there were key lapses in his tactical skills. In the Wellington Bledisloe Cup test the All Blacks were ahead 23-21 with just 2 or 3 minutes to go, with a scrum feed in centre field on the Wallabies 22. The sensible tactic was for a Marshall-Mehrtens dropped goal which would give the All Blacks a five point lead. Otherwise a 22 drop out would soak up precious seconds while giving possession back to the All Blacks. Inexplicably the All Blacks ran the ball, possession was lost in the ensuing lineout, the Wallabies got the ball upfield, the All Blacks were penalised in the ruck and John Eales, cool as ever, calmly slotted the penalty. Blackadder later admitted “I just put my head in the scrum and left it to the backs.”

A vital lapse.

Two weeks later came the Tri-Nations test between the All Blacks and Springboks in Johannesburg. It was a helter-skelter mistake riddled match with the Springboks uncharacteristically attacking in the backs, to be up 33-13 before half time and the All Blacks recovering to 33-27 at half time. The Springboks continued to attack and led 46-40 with 15 minutes to go. The All Blacks pressed hard into the Springboks 22 on multiple occasions, forcing mistakes and several penalties. Inexplicably, although there was plenty of time, Blackadder declined to take the points and kicked for the corner lineout – all these attacks being successfully repulsed by the Springboks. The score remained 46-40.

And so, in tight contests like these, little tactical lapses by the captain had a major impact on the result.

2001 came with a new All Black captain in Anton Oliver. His deficiencies as a captain were exposed in the Tri-Nations and Bledisloe Cup test in Dunedin, won by the Wallabies 23-15. Firstly a penalty try was awarded against Ron Cribb for tackling Joe Roff without the ball, described in Men in Black as, “a dumb move by Cribb, characteristic of the lack of thought under stress by many of the All Blacks that day.”

A good captain would not have allowed the latter to happen, or at least nipped it in the bud. Secondly, with one minute to go, 8 points behind and no hope of winning, the All Blacks were awarded a kickable penalty. Inexplicably Oliver spurned the three points that would have given the All Blacks a bonus point. Later, to general disbelief, he tried to explain he was “still playing for the win!”

Three weeks later at Stadium Australia, it was the All Blacks ahead 26-22 with 12 minutes to play. Only a try to win! Twice Eales spurned the opportunity to take the points from two penalties and twice the Wallabies failed to score the try. Finally, just a minute to go, another penalty and again kicked for the corner lineout. Followed by the lineout win and Toutai Kefu’s memorable charge to score by the posts. Australia 29-26.

Then came a brief interview with Oliver, All Black jersey out down almost to his knees, socks around his ankles, looking slovenly, his eyes darting everywhere but at the camera. Later on stage for the presentation and John Eales farewell, all he could manage were a few perfunctory remarks to John Eales, saying, “It’s all yours mate.” It was a graceless performance. The contrast with one of the most outstanding international captains of all time could not have been more marked.

We’ll look at a few more examples in Parts 3 and 4.

What about the captain’s ability to vary the type of play? (Attributes 2 and 5.)

Again if you’ll pardon the self indulgence, back in 1989 just two months before he died, my father outlined to me his approach to developing the game plan and tactics for each match in the 1950’s. His rugby brain was as sharp as ever in this “interview” summary:

“Our tactics against the opposition were always carefully worked out for any match we played. We made up our own tactics – we weren’t worried what the opposition was going to do – it was what we were going to do. We looked at their strengths, their weaknesses and their ability and what sort of football they played – orthodox or otherwise. A well trained side played orthodox Rugby and always went to the right place at the right time. Consequently you could play unorthodox rugby against them, because they turned up at the wrong (correct) place, when we were scoring tries going the other way. If you’re against an unintelligent side, you only played orthodox rugby, because there’d always be some silly clot who would turn up at the wrong position at the right time and smother the attempt.”

Today one would include both France and Fiji as unorthodox, unconventional sides, versus unintelligent – but the same principles apply. Taine Randell was clearly incapable of doing this against France in 1999.

The important point is that it is the captain’s responsibility during the course of a game to change the type of play to counter the opposition, if the opposition’s tactics or type of play are succeeding. A top captain, supported by his senior players, will read the opposition play and make adjustments accordingly. This may sound simple, yet it takes years of experience. It’s perhaps no coincidence that six World Cups have been won with captains virtually at the zenith of their careers.

In the last two articles we’ll look at examples of how Australian and New Zealand – Super 14 and international captains have measured up in the attributes, including tactical ability and varying the play:

[Part 1: The attributes]

Part 3: Australian Captaincy – assessment and selection

Part 4: New Zealand Captaincy – assessment, selection and five failed World Cup campaigns

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