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3D analysis: Waratahs' decoys and threats on first phase

Israel Folau will make the switch to outside-centre for the first time. (Photo: Waratahs)
Expert
2nd July, 2014
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2392 Reads

Michael Cheika rightly earns the praise of most of us for turning the ‘Tahs into a real threat in Super Rugby. His assistants, Daryl Gibson and Nathan Grey, also deserve praise.

Gibson is primarily responsible for attack and Grey for defence.

Gibson’s profile on the ‘Tahs website says: “His expertise is attack and continuity around the ruck”. He’s certainly used that expertise very well in his two seasons with the club and they’re playing a fantastic style of attacking rugby.

The phrase ‘earn the right to go wide’ is an often used cliché, but it’s a valid one.

In general phase play it refers to the need to gain ground and draw in defenders towards the ruck to make space for the players in wider channels before the ball is moved wide.

With a team going forward, the defence is continually having to move backwards to make it back to the offside line. That places enormous pressure on the opposition and creates opportunities for the attack.

In this area Gibson has the ‘Tahs attacking with speed, power and strength in contact. He’s certainly achieved the “continuity around the ruck” his profile mentions.

On first phase plays the forwards establish the platform for the team to play wide. Backs can only run successful plays if the ball is provided cleanly by the forwards, hence the importance of establishing a strong set piece.

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With clean ball to work with, the backs get a chance to use the plays they’ve worked on for hours on the training ground. In this aspect, Gibson has introduced a range of plays that the ‘Tahs are running with precision and scoring from regularly.

In the match against the Brumbies last week Alofa Alofa scored from a first phase play after a scrum on the left side of the field inside the Brumbies 22.

Here’s my 3D analysis of that try.

Let’s think about that try in reverse.

Alofa scored in the corner because of a defensive error by Jesse Mogg, made due to the threat posed by Israel Folau with ball in hand.

Folau posed the threat because Kurtley Beale gave him the ball early and therefore allowed Folau time to run at the defence. Beale only received the ball after decoy runners Adam Ashley-Cooper and Rob Horne had stopped the inside defenders drifting early to help cover the wider channels.

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Bernard Foley also helped in that regard by taking the ball toward the defensive line before passing to Beale. Nick Phipps and the forwards did their job by providing clean ball. So it was a real team effort.

Ultimately though, the try was a result of Mogg focusing too much on Folau, and most defenders will get caught out in the same way as he poses such a threat.

The Brumbies had the numbers to defend this play and even as Folau ran to the line they still had the ‘Tahs covered.

When you look at the footage you’ll see the hesitation from both Robbie Coleman and Mogg trying to work out what Folau is going to do. After initially moving forward, they start to back track and shuffle across field in an attempt to buy themselves time to react.

That movement back and across is what’s known as ‘jockeying in defence’. It’s a valid tactic used by most teams but is obviously much harder to use when you’re close to your try line as there’s no margin for error.

In this case Coleman and Mogg could have jockeyed a little earlier so that Mogg could get a little wider to shut down the option for Folau to pass to Alofa.

With Mogg moving across and back he was still in position to drift out to Alofa if required, but once he turned in towards Folau it was all over.

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In this type of situation attackers have to watch the hips and shoulders of defenders and the cue for action is the defender turning in.

The following image shows the critical moment when Mogg turned in and Folau knew he had him and should pass to Alofa.

Mogg Turns In

Of course this scenario is virtually identical to one I showed you from the Wallabies’ second Test against France, when Matt Toomua was inside and Nick Cummins outside. On that occasion they got it right, but it’s not an easy thing to do.

It’s why teams spend a lot of time practising decision making in defence (and if they don’t, they should).

Defensive structures help to get players into position to make tackles, but the individual’s decision making and tackling capability become the critical factor.

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