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The lineout has been the jewel in Australia’s rugby crown for as long as anyone can remember, and all the best Australian teams have historically been built around strength at this set-piece (rather than the scrum).
Think of the two Steves – Cutler and Williams – on the 1984 Grand Slam tour of the UK; of John Eales and David Giffin in 1999; of Justin Harrison stealing the final lineout throw to win the 2001 series against the British and Irish Lions; or, more recently, of Nathan Sharpe and Dan Vickerman.
The lineout has always been the primary platform of attack for the Wallabies. (Click to Tweet)
In 2005 with Wales, I remember poring over reams and reams of overwhelming paperwork detailing their moves from first phase, choreographed by Eddie Jones and orchestrated by their number 10, Stephen Larkham. At that time and in this department, there was always far more work to do for Australia than for anyone else.
Wind the clock on 11 years, and the situation has been turned on its head. Until last Saturday’s game in Perth, the lineout had ranked low in the list of coaching priorities. With two natural number 7s in the back-row and a limited jumper in one of the second-row positions, in Kane Douglas, Australia had been trying to get by with only two primary targets.
It didn’t work, either against England in June or the All Blacks in the first two games of the Rugby Championship. The raw stats from those five matches show that Australia won a meagre 77 per cent or their own throw, while their opponents were close to picture-perfect at 95 per cent. (Click to Tweet)
It is hard to win too many games from that statistical foundation.
Round 4 of the Rugby Championship marked a sea-change in coaching attitude towards the lineout. The three biggest targets in Australia were selected – Adam Coleman (2.04m) and Rob Simmons (2m dead) starting, and skyscraper Rory Arnold coming off the bench at an even larger 2.08m. I suggested this as the best match-day combination as long ago as the end of March.
Moreover, the selection of New South Welshman Dean Mumm at 6 gave the Wallabies no less than three lineout callers, which helped ensure consistency in this area right to the end of the game.
Argentina provided an attractive first-up target for the rebuilt Wallaby lineout. Missing both of their regular locks, Tomas Lavanini and Guido Petti, as well as European-based lineout experts like Mariano Galarza and Manucho Carizza, the Pumas were short on options, with 1.93m flanker Javier Ortega Desio being shoehorned into the depleted second-row, alongside Matias Alemmano.
It was the perfect moment for the Wallabies to regain some confidence in the lineout department.
The following reel shows how Australia grasped the nettle and delivered their first 100 per cent return of 2016 on own ball:
Calling by committee
The Wallabies innovated by ‘calling by committee’ before the lineout set-up, rather than making an audible at the line. In the clip before lineout at 26:26, Adam Coleman consults with Rob Simmons and there is no audible before he wins the ball at the back.
The three players in the ‘committee’ are Coleman, Simmons and Mumm – who comprise the pod at 26:30 and can be seen entering the line together at 58:30, well after the other forwards set up. At 41:50, the talking again happens before set-up, with no vocal call at the line. This system allowed Coleman to benefit from the experience of Simmons and Mumm, while removing one of the triggers defensive teams use to organise their counters.
Consistency of calling
When Adam Coleman leaves the field at 60:26, the captaincy is transferred to Mumm, who promptly shifts to Coleman’s spot at the tail of the line, with Arnold moving into Mumm’s role in the middle.
When Mumm departed, Simmons shifted to the captain’s slot at the tail, with Sean McMahon playing ‘Mumm’ in the middle and Arnold in Simmons’ role at the front.
This was a piece of joined-up thinking which gave Australia consistent quality calling throughout the match and especially in the last 30 minutes, from three of the top four lineout brains in the country. There was no fall-off of the kind experienced in the first Test against England, when James Horwill replaced Simmons.
Premium back ball and first phase attacks
Australia positioned Coleman at the back of the line, and obtained the kind of premium ball which they had previously struggled to win in 2016. Seven out of the ten Wallaby throws were won towards the back half of the line.
The advantage of premium ball can be quantified as ‘one pass’ – it takes one pass less to move the ball into an attacking target area, and consequently gives defenders less time to react. This advantage can be observed in the actions of the end-defender in line and the ‘tail-gunner’ – the man immediately outside him in the defending half-back slot.
When Coleman wins back ball at 7:06, it enables 9 Will Genia to engage the eyes of tail-gunner #6 Pablo Matera and end-defender #2 Agustin Creevy immediately. The angled decoy run of Samu Kerevi opens the hole between last forward and first back a little wider, allowing Dane Haylett-Petty to run through a big gap between #6 Matera and #12 Gonzalo Iglesias at 7:08.
Creevy is the tail-gunner at 10:45, and he is committed to running a very shallow, crossfield line in defence. Compare his movements, and those of Matera to Genia’s from the same starting position at 11:40:
At 7:07 Matera has been drawn straight on to Genia, at 10:47 Creevy is still five metres shy of Quade Cooper as he goes to make the second pass, at 11:40 Genia is right in the face of Puma outside half Nicolas Sanchez. Genia is able to stymie his pass and follow up the loose ball to score.
Quick tempo and ‘walk-in’ lineouts
The speed of the Wallabies’ entry and set-up was also a strong factor in their ability to win clean ball on the front foot. The All Blacks have been ‘walking in’ to the lineout and winning it unopposed for years and it is likely that Mick Byrne’s influence is behind this change of policy.
The set-pieces at 26:30, 42:07, 51:30, 58:33 and 73:15 are the clearest examples of three-man lineout pods walking-in, the hooker throwing at the point of entry, and the receiver simply reacting to the throw. The Australian receiver is up and down before Argentina can get a serious contest off the ground in all but two of the ten lineouts as a result.
The game against Argentina was the first occasion in 2016 where the Wallabies have exerted pressure on the opposition throw:
Although the stats show that the Pumas won 17 out of 19 of their own throws for a 90 per cent win rate, and the two misses were ‘not straight’ calls from the referee, the Wallaby pressure had some significant impacts on Argentina’s ability to play a cohesive attacking game.
Basics defensive structure – double contest in the front/middle
Australia recognised that Argentina tend to win most of their ball from the front half of the lineout, so their basic shape emphasised a double contest in that area: 1-4, 2-6-3, 5-8.
In the instances at 5:55, 11:38, 13:58, 32:05, 48:53, #4 Simmons is jumping off a single lift by Scott Sio to cut off the flat ball to the front, and there is a full pod on #6 Mumm in the middle.
Australia persisted with this idea even when the starters were replaced and McMahon and Arnold entered the fray.
Pressure on the Argentine attack structure and driving lineout
Although Australia didn’t win any steals directly, the constant pressure of two Australian jumpers in the air was often transferred to next segment of Argentina’s attacking game. At 11:40 Genia has a free run at Sanchez around the end of the lineout, breaks up the pass and chases up to score off the loose ball.
At 48:54 the contest forces a loose tap, which destroys the timing of an Argentine back-line move, with Australia turning over the ball via a choke tackle by Reece Hodge and Hooper in midfield.
At 14:00 and 17:15, Mumm’s contest in the air gives him the ‘jump’ on the Puma’s lineout drive, he uses his momentum to drive his body well past the receiver and on to the ball. At 32:07 he disrupts the throw at source and forces the receiver to go to ground. Again, no lineout drive.
Back ball chaos!
The pressure in the front and middle forced Argentina to throw to the back of the lineout on more occasions than they would have liked.
The Pumas’ forays in this are were not impressive – two ‘not straights’ at 27:06 and 59:09 and third potential skewed delivery that could have been called at 46:16, another loose tap at 21:05.
Even though Coleman is not great value in the contest at the tail, the Wallabies reaped the rewards of their aggression further up the line.
Summary
The Wallabies’ new emphasis on the lineout was a welcome refresher of a set-piece which historically has been associated with Australian success.
Although Argentina’s lineout had some distinctly modest components, the change of attitude suggested that the ‘Pooper’ or ‘Pummper’ back-row could work as long as the positions at 4, 5 and 6 are occupied by genuine primary lineout options – and preferably experienced lineout callers.
The support of Simmons and Mumm gave rookie lineout captain Coleman a committee of worldly wisdom before entry and set-up, and the triumvirate gave Australia consistent calling throughout the match. There was no disruption with replacements in the last 30 minutes of the game.
The Wallabies were able to win speedy, high-quality back ball and this in turn helped them commit the Argentine defenders near the tail and allowed their midfield attack to flourish.
Defensively, Australian pressure produced definite dividends. Argentina’s 90 per cent win percentage looks impressive but it does not nearly tell the tale of disruption to their lineout drive and the timing of back-line moves.
Not all referees may be so lenient with the ‘consultation by committee’ before the lineout forms and Coleman may be forced to audible at the line – but for now, this represented a sizeable step forward for Australia in an area of the game that has been weak for far too long.