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The Wallaby back five has taken five steps back

(AAP Image/David Moir)
Expert
20th June, 2017
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8626 Reads

I would blame David Pocock. ‘Poey’ started his six-month sabbatical away from rugby earlier this year, and the Wallaby selectors’ previous ideas of how to construct their back-five forwards appeared to vanish with him.

Getting the right balance of personnel in this area has been one of Michael Cheika’s chief work-ons over the past 12 months.

With Pocock away from Australian rugby until 2018, Scott Fardy off to Ireland and Sean McMahon also looking to take up the concrete offer of riches in Japan rather than endure an interminable stay in the waiting room – the ARU’s ‘pending’ decision about their Super Rugby franchises – Cheika’s plans seem to have been thrown into chaos.

Everything looked to be in hand after the end of year tour in 2016. The discovery of a powerful triangle in the back five, with Adam Coleman and Rory Arnold in the second row, and Lopeti Timani at number 8, took care of ball-carrying and the lineout. Pocock and Michael Hooper covered everything else.

Even when Coleman and Arnold didn’t play in November, Rob Simmons and Kane Douglas proved able substitutes:

Why the Wallabies’ attack is improving

Wales versus Australia – halfway there on attack!

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Only six short months later, Simmons and Douglas are both out of the picture, with Simmons looking for a new contract and Douglas no longer a starter at the Queensland Reds.

Lopeti Timani meanwhile has been slow to recover fitness and form after a long injury break in the meat of the Super Rugby season.

The unavailability of Pocock, McMahon, Fardy and Timani has undoubtedly made selection in the back five more difficult for Cheika. Even so, it is hard to explain why he has moved away so completely from his twin tenets of power ball-carriers and breakdown competitors in these positions.

In June, Arnold has been replaced by Sam Carter as Coleman’s second-row partner, experienced Reds’ number 8 Scott Higginbotham has been picked ahead of Timani, and young Waratah debutant Ned Hanigan has taken over the blind-side role.

The twin open-side theory has been junked in favour of not two, but three players whose main area of expertise is the lineout. The most stringent summer test of the new combination, ironically against a Scotland team that always fields at least three natural number sevens in the forwards, came and went this weekend.

The outcome was a resounding ‘fail’ for Wallaby selection.

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While the Australian lineout has been very good, with the Wallabies winning 94 per cent of their own ball against Scotland and Fiji, no impression has been made on the opposition throw – and the ball-carrying finesse, power and cleanout accuracy from the end-of-year tour have largely gone missing.

The best period of Australian attack on that tour occurred in the first half against Wales. The trio of Coleman, Arnold and Timani generated a success rate of 75 per cent (Timani), 81 per cent (Coleman) and 90 per cent (Arnold) in the ‘tight’ ball-carrying forward pod that the Wallabies favour in that opening period.

With Hanigan and Higginbotham instead in harness with Coleman against the Scots, results were very different.

Positive outcomes (collision wins or quick, two-second ruck deliveries) were down to 30 per cent, and most of the better carries came from Coleman deep in the second half – especially after Arnold had replaced Carter.

Let’s take a look at some of the instances when Australian pod play started to come apart against Scotland’s array of defensive breakdown specialists.

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Natural lineout athletes often have to deal with issues regarding body height in contact. In this example, Higginbotham makes his first carry of the game. His body position is very upright as he is tackled by Scotland number 7 Hamish Watson, and it is still close to vertical as he makes a second effort in the next frame.

The tackler’s actions are important for the defence in these situations. In the process of completing the tackle, he is not subject to the offside law for some moments and can use that window to create ‘legitimate interference’ on the cleanout.

Here, Russell first separates Higginbotham from his main support, Hooper, in the second frame, then artfully runs across the cleanout line of Carter on his way back into the defensive line in the third.

It is a form of blocking of which the New Zealand teams would be (rightly) proud!

With Higginbotham already in a vulnerable position, there can be only one outcome when a jackal as good as Scotland’s John Barclay gets in over the ball – in this case, a turnover penalty.

The problem of high body position in contact was a constant thorn in Australia’s side against a Scotland side featuring four on-ballers with compact, powerful physiques in the form of Barclay, Hamish Watson, Alex Dunbar and Fraser Brown.

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Here the ‘tight’ pod of the two second-rowers plus Hanigan has been completely fragmented. Yes, it’s partly the result of Scottish line-speed on D, but it’s also down to high body positions by the ball-carrier and his cleanout support.

In the following example from the second half, both Higginbotham and Hanigan are higher on entry than the defender (Barclay), and the smaller but lower man is able to get the nudge on in contact:

The result is pressure on Will Genia, a five-second delay in the release of the ball by Coleman, and an organised, high-speed Scotland defensive line on the next phase.

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The pressure on Genia was a real thing. There had already been a warning fired across Wallaby bows about the danger of blocked-down kicks early in the game:

Scotland have flooded the tackle area with four players after a carry by the Hanigan-Coleman pod, and one of them (second row Ben Toolis) is still on his feet and free to make a run at Genia’s right foot as he goes to kick.

The kick was only partially blocked, but it gave notice of the Scots’ intent in that department of the game. At 26:04 of this highlight reel, the block was completed and allowed Russell to score a cheap try for Scotland.

In the next example, Hanigan is bullied off his block on #13 Alex Dunbar, exposing Genia to yet more pressure at the base:

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The match was littered with examples of tall forwards unable to maintain dynamic body positions, or the support depth needed to ‘lean into a hard wind’ – as the Otago forwards always used to be coached to do by the legendary Cavanaghs, ‘Old’ and ‘Young’ Vic.

Higginbotham has already passed beyond the ball-carrier and is unable to find the right angle to prevent Dunbar from driving through on to Genia.

Body height was also a concrete problem in the driving mauls for Australia. With the Wallabies opting consistently for close-range lineouts instead of kicking at goal, they had to make something out of these situations in order to get payback on their investment.

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In the highlight reel at 19:06, the receiver, Carter, is being lifted by Higginbotham (at the front) and Hanigan (at the back). The ability of both players to ‘seal the block’ in front of Carter’s catch is critical if the drive is to gain momentum.

However, by 19:10, Scotland powerhouse Johnny Gray has clearly penetrated the screen and both Higginbotham and Hanigan have been stood up, and are no longer relevant factors in the play.

By 19:22 Gray was right through to the boot of the drive and on to Tatafu Polota-Nau.

It didn’t matter on this occasion, because Australia scored anyway after a floated pass from Bernard Foley to Israel Folau. But it did matter right at the death, with the Wallabies looking for a score to win the game.

In the first frame, Hanigan is already far too upright and he has been split away from the receiver Adam Coleman. The head of Gray’s second-row partner, Toolis, is clearly visible in the gap and Toolis is able to work through all the way on to the ball-carrier Stephen Moore and force the turnover scrum as the ball goes to ground.

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Events on the other side of the ball are a story for another day. Suffice it to say that Hooper was largely on his own (with some support from Karmichael Hunt) when trying to match Scottish output at the defensive breakdown. Although he won three turnovers in the tackle area, the composition of the Australian back five was never likely to offer Hooper the support he needed in that area.

The outcome was a Scotland try scored by virtue of very quick ruck delivery, with five breakdowns between 60:11-61:09 of two seconds or less, and only one ruck contested at 60:50 (by Hooper) in the sequence. It was not nearly enough.

Summary
Critics of Hooper will no doubt seize on the Scotland game as evidence that somehow he is too lightweight to play 7 for Australia.

They would be wrong.

In fact, Hooper was one of the few players keeping Australia afloat in contact, both on the carry in attack and at the defensive breakdown.

The problem was selection in the back five as a whole, and (apparently) a complete change of course from the end of year tour in 2016. Rory Arnold and Lopeti Timani were not selected, despite having proved they could form a potent ball-carrying combination with Adam Coleman.

Their replacements – Scott Higginbotham, Sam Carter and Ned Hanigan – struggled to impose themselves in contact and it was one of the main reasons Australia failed to unlock its offensive potential.

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Looking forward, Arnold and Timani must surely return against Italy, with a choice made between Scott Higginbotham and young Richard Hardwick (if the Wallaby coaching group wants to go back to the two open-side theory) for the remaining spot in the back five.

Michael Hooper is one of the few genuinely world-class Wallabies – it is about time Australia gave him the support he deserves.

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