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In New Zealand’s loss to France, many things went wrong that were beyond Graham Henry’s control.
It was not his fault that New Zealand had easy pool matches against no credible opposition, with Italy and Scotland declining to play full-strength teams in order to save themselves for later matches that were deemed winnable.
He could not control that New Zealand unexpectedly had to face a tournament heavyweight in the quarter-final, as opposed to Argentina or Ireland, teams that have never beaten the All Blacks.
Henry could do nothing about the IRB’s surprising instruction for referees to blow their whistles less (anyone notice how low the penalty counts were last weekend?), thereby promoting the effectiveness of defences, because they are able to operate with relative impunity.
He could not influence that that the IRB seemingly made an experimental refereeing appointment for this vital match, presumably so as to give Wayne Barnes, a 28-year-old described as a “rising star of refereeing”, an early dose of big-match experience.
Nor was it Henry’s fault that he lost key players Dan Carter and Jerry Collins to injury in the second half, just as the French were gathering momentum and New Zealand really needed all its handful of world-class players on the field.
And of course Henry could only look on as 50-50 refereeing decisions – what he has politely referred to as “the rub of the green” – mostly went against New Zealand, not because of bias, but because that’s the way chance works. In particular, on many other days a referee would not have sin-binned Luke McAlister and would have picked up the blatant forward pass in France’s match-winning try, both of which were match-swaying decisions.
As Robbie Deans has said, one cannot prepare for all contingencies.
In terms of what Henry could prepare for, he seems to have made very few mistakes.
His major tasks in taking office were to address New Zealand’s three perceived shortcomings from the 2003 World Cup, these being (1) a forward pack deficient in set pieces and physicality, (2) a 10 lacking consistency, and (3) an inability to cover injuries.
Let’s look at these in turn.
1. The New Zealand pack currently contains two players who are unquestioned as being the best in the world, namely McCaw and Hayman. The captain was last year’s IRB Player of the Year, and this year he has again made the shortlist of 5. Mystifyingly, Carl Hayman did not make this list, even though many people would agree with Roar columnist Garth Hamilton when he recently wondered of the big man “Is it possible to accept that a prop could be the best player in the world?”
Two other New Zealand forwards, Tony Woodcock and Jerry Collins, are at least the equal of all in the world, perhaps even the best. Off the field Ali Williams fully deserves his nickname of “Comical Ali”, but on the field he has shown over the last two years – including at this World Cup – that he is one of the world’s premier second-rowers.
So in the forward pack that Henry built, there are 5 out of 8 who are unquestionably world class. Accordingly, no forward pack has bested this mob over the last few years, wherever it has had to play, including at Twickenham, in South Africa and against the French last weekend.
2. Andrew Mehrtens and Carlos Spencer were both brilliant players but both were defensively weak while Spencer, like so many mercurial players, was also prone to bad days. Therefore Henry purged them, and then he set about developing Carter into a player without weakness. That he achieved, as reflected in Carter being the 2005 winner of the IRB Player of the Year award, and sublime performances like that against the British and Irish Lions in Wellington.
So that’s 2 out of 2 for Henry.
3. This is the crucial one in that it is going to be remembered as the defining aspect of Henry’s reign. Equally crucial is where this perception came from: the inability to replace the injured Tana Umaga at the 2003 World Cup.
The interesting thing is that in dealing with these issues, Henry completely changed his approaches from his days as Auckland and Blues coach in the 1990s.
Firstly, a hallmark of the champion Blues side of 1996-8 – possibly the greatest provincial rugby side of all time – is just how stable it was from week to week. And yet for the last three years Henry has exercised his so-called rotation policy with the All Blacks, so that the side always changed from match to match.
On the basis of the record of the All Blacks over the last three years, it is completely unwarranted to criticize the rotation policy: the All Blacks could hardly have won more tests over this period, and nor could they have won more convincingly. For example, the average NZ-France result, up until last weekend, was 43-8 during Henry’s reign.
Whether or not the rotation policy was correct, it delivered the goods. If anything the problem last weekend was firstly that Henry discarded the policy at the last moment, by neglecting to choose players such as Doug Howlett and Nick Evans who were in red-hot form, and secondly that when it came to the crunch he lost faith in the effectiveness of the policy – how else to explain that he didn’t choose a specialist 13, when the whole point of the policy was that in every position it would give him multiple players with the experience to do the job at hand?
This brings me to the vexed 13 position. I sometimes remark that Australian rugby is a nostalgic search for a new Mark Ella (for example, this is the only explanation for the hype over Kurtley Beale). If this is the case, then New Zealand rugby is a nostalgic search for the perfect 13, another Doug Robertson or Joe Stanley or even Frank Bunce.
Just consider what this position is termed in New Zealand: “centre”. In Australia and most other places it is merely “outside centre”, while in some places teams play left and right centres rather than inside and outside. So by the very terminology one sees that in New Zealand the position is given an extra special, almost mythical significance: it is as if the no. 13 is the “centre” of everything. How the 13 played is one of the first issues that many Kiwis comment on after every All Blacks test.
Switch back to 1998. This author remembers an interview with Graham Henry at Auckland airport. He is relaxed and cocky as he waits to jet off to be “The Great Redeemer” in Wales. At the time the All Blacks are going through a horror streak, in which they lose all 5 tests to Australia and South Africa. What should be done about this?, Henry is asked. Smirkily he responds “Well you need a target man in mid-field, so you’d have to look at Eroni Clarke, wouldn’t you?”
Clarke was one of the cornerstones of Henry’s champion Auckland and Blues sides, and one of the few players in those sides who was not a regular All Black. Built like a brick outhouse, he was hard-hitting on defence, vigorous on attack, and able to get the ball out to his wingers. Sure, he was considered to lack pace, and sometimes his passing was inelegant, and at times he would come out of the line in defence. But what Henry was clearly enunciating is that in the 13 position a team needs a “rock” who is selected week in and week out.
Now switch to May 2007. The first All Black squad of the year has been announced. Graham Henry is asked if Mils Muliaina is considered a centre. The answer is unambiguous: he is first and foremost regarded as a 15 rather than a 13.
So if there is one mistake of Henry’s own making that can be said to have played a major role in his career unravelling as it did last weekend, it is surely that he forgot all his own principles and selected Mils Muliaina at 13 rather than at full-back.
Of course the mistake really began well before last weekend, because over the last two years Henry has played all of Conrad Smith, Isaia Toeava, Ma’a Nonu, Casey Laulala, Luke McAlister and Muliaina at 13, without ever settling on one man for this position. I contend that partly this is because of getting too carried away with the rotation policy, and partly it is because of unrelenting pressure from the demanding New Zealand public to find a “perfect” centre.
Why was this mistake fatal? Firstly because 13 is a critical and tricky position in defence, one that takes some time to become accustomed to. New Zealand played a makeshift 13 against Australia at the MCG this year, and the match was lost because Mortlock made critical breaks down this defensive channel. The same happened last weekend when Michalak set up the match-winning try. Nothing against Muliaina, who all things considered did a reasonable job, but can you see a pattern here?
Perhaps even more fatal is that the selection of Muliaina at 13 took an excellent player out of the 15 position and replaced him with an average one. It is rumoured that the Wallabies take delight whenever Leon MacDonald is named to face them, because he is regarded as a weakness. Against France he did nothing horribly wrong, but it is more what he could not do well: return French kicks, either by kicking the ball just as far, or by running demandingly. By selecting Beauxis at 10 and Traille at 15, it was well signalled that the French were going to kick long and deep, but Henry did not select a player at 15 who could deal with this.
Even worse for Henry is that his predecessors at the last two World Cups made the exact same mistake of panicking at the last moment and trying to turn a full-back into a centre. Did Henry believe, like Napoleon, that he was somehow exempt from the errors of the mortals who went before him?
Join The Roar rugby editor Christy Doran, former Wallaby Matt Toomua and a cast of regular and special guests as they look at the biggest issues in the game on The Roar Rugby Podcast. If you’re looking for great odds on the next game check out Aussie bookmaker PlayUp. Chances are you’re about to lose. Set a deposit limit.