Wallabies have the game plan but not the execution

The kicking strategy did not work. Many are calling for a return to the ball in hand game plan. It’s plain to see now that the game plan is not the core issue.

Any game plan can win you the game, provided it plays to your strengths and your team can execute it effectively. Finding strengths to play to is proving difficult.

The Wallabies running game plan of the earlier Rugby Championship games primarily came unstuck through poor ball retention in attacking rucks, simplistic running lines in attack, and poor realignment in defence.

Had they not fallen down in these areas, the game plan could certainly have worked. In practice, it was beyond the collective ability of this group.

The Wallabies chose a game plan of kicking in their own territory for the first half of Saturday’s Test.

They did this because they believed that they had the kicker, in Nic White, to carry it out effectively. Had he been able to do that, the Wallabies could have played more of the game in opposition territory.

Statistically, that would make it very difficult to be scored against if they trust their defence, while increasing their own odds of scoring points.

This game plan also failed. It failed for the same reason that the other one did – poor execution.

The kicking game plan had two elements.

Firstly, clear the ball and find touch from inside the 22m, trusting a solid lineout to compete on the subsequent throw-ins.

Secondly, put up contestable kicks between 22m and halfway with a heavy chase to either catch, force the receiver to knock it on, or get to the tackle in numbers to force a turnover on the catcher.

There is nothing wrong with the game plan – it is the game plan that the All Blacks successfully used on Australia in the first two games of the tournament.

Let me isolate the analysis to the first half, when all of the damage was done.

First, let’s look at how White did on the clearing kicks from inside the 22m. He cleared five times, finding touch on two occasions – a 40 percent success rate.

The two kicks that found touch made an average of 28m, while the three that did not find touch made 44m. One of those three gave the Boks the primary possession that ultimately resulted in their first try.

The All Blacks, by way of comparison, operated at better than a 60 percent success rate in finding touch with their clearing kicks against Australia.

Clearing kicks that are long but do not find touch provide little pressure on the receiver because the chasers simply cannot get there.

Between the 22m and halfway, White kicked four times.

One of those was charged down. The remaining three kicks had an average distance of 44m, and not one of those kicks had chasing pressure applied.

Let me say now that this is not the fault of the Wallaby chasers – the kicks were far too long to be contestable.

The ideal length for a contestable kick is said to be 27-30m.

In the two Bledisloe matches, the kicks that forced turnovers through either a regather, a knock-back from the chaser, a knock-on from the catcher, or a bounced ball, averaged closer to 20m in distance.

By way of comparison to White, Aaron Smith’s kicks from halfback in the two games against the Wallabies averaged just over 30m in length.

When you kick the ball an average of 44m, you are basically kicking for distance, eliminating the effectiveness of the chase.

But because you are outside the 22m, you cannot afford to put it too close to the sideline in case it goes out on the full.

So you are delivering pressure-free possession to the opposition in field somewhere between their 22m and half way – prime counterattacking territory.

The Springboks used this mainly to drill us back into our 22m using accurate return kicks (both high and low) with plenty of chase behind them, but occasionally they also ran it with some good returns.

Either way, it sent us deeper back into our half on most occasions.

I do not believe the game plan was to kick long between the 22m and halfway – White simply executed these kicks poorly. There was not one kick of contestable distance.

To compound matters, he only found touch with two of his three penalties, tossing away a rare good opportunity for primary possession in the Springbok half in the process.

There is only so much that the Wallabies’ coaching staff can do tactically with the current line-up. Whichever way they play – ball in hand, kicking for territory, using width – the players have not been able to put it into action under Test match pressure.

One final point on the Boks’ second try. This absolute ripper of a try from their own half was a case of masterful coaching by the Boks.

Noticing that the Wallabies use their backs to put speed into their chasing pods on kick-offs (winger, both centres, and both breakaways in a five man chasing pod), they exploited this by using their far bigger tight-five players to receive the ball.

They then monster these smaller players through mauling it straight at them down field on one touchline.

This got them out of their 22m, gave them front-foot attacking ball, and sucked in the majority of these quicker Wallabies defenders trying to stop this drive.

They did this over and over very successfully – again, the kick-offs from Cooper were all too long to be truly contestable).

The Boks then sent the ball spinning out to their full backline, spread the width of the field on the charge.

Lined up against them were Alexander, Mowen, Simmons, and Tomane. Cooper and Folau were deep to cover a possible return kick.

It was like training drill for the Bok backs to get to the outside of the slower defenders, forcing Tomane to make the mistake of coming in when he thought Kirchner was going to burn Simmons.

Instead, they cut Kirchner and had a two man overlap.

The South African backs did a fantastic job right the way across the line of running straight and preserving the overlap, which was exploited for the line break, and ultimately the try.

Was this poor individual defence?

I have read people say these forwards were “loitering” in the backs, but that was a legacy of the kick-off structure. Tomane made a defensive mistake, although you could understand why.

Mostly, though, we were undone by a very clever play from SA. They did their homework on our kick-offs, created the mismatch, and exploited it wonderfully.

They are really becoming an intelligent team.