- Video
-
Club Roar
Captured a great grassroots sporting moment? We want to see it!Content Collections
The Roar Community
- Join
- Login
First, a little bit of history. Coming from the depths of November 2013, it is probably tinged by more than a touch of nostalgia, given the current state of affairs in Australian rugby.
The end-of-year tour that year was the last time Australia took a large step forward as an attacking side, scoring 20 tries in six matches away from home, under the watchful eyes of Ewen McKenzie and his offensive coach, Jim McKay.
The average of 3.33 tries per game compared favourably with the peak under Michael Cheika thus far – the 2.83 average achieved against top-tier sides at the 2015 World Cup.
Some of the reasons why the Wallabies score more heavily away than at home has been explored in a previous article.
The key factor in the Wallabies’ scoring frenzy back in November 2013 was the presence of Australian rugby’s enfant terrible, Quade Cooper, in the number 10 jersey.
Cooper’s ability to coax his strike runners to the advantage line had always been world-class, but his game-management skills were a new development.
The impudence to take the ball right up to opponents and Medusa-like, turn them to stone (at 0:47 and 53:25); the casual sleight of hand to pass short or long in the jaws of the defence (47:50); to pull the offload out of the hat (or rather, out of the back of the hand at 18:52 and 33:05); to drop to the deck and vanish, then reappear (voilà! at 45:11) were and are all part of the magician’s box of tricks.
Against Wales, Cooper was both magus and field marshal. His kicking was just as impressive as his running and passing, forensically locating just the right square metre of space where the kick would cause Welsh fullback Leigh Halfpenny the greatest torment (at 15:25 and 50:10).
That 2013 match was one of the greatest end-of-year tour games in recent memory, and it produced one of the greatest close-range tries you will ever see (36:00-36:18) – so good I can’t resist adding it to the reel in full.
Furthermore, Quade was even allowed to stand in the 10 channel on defence without being demoted to the backfield!
Two-and-a-half years on, and the ambience around Cooper is somewhat muted by an unsuccessful stint at European club giants Toulon, in which he was often required to play fullback rather than in his preferred position of outside half.
Ironically, Cooper made his international return last weekend in the very scenario which has often proved to be his bête noir – playing against his country of birth, New Zealand, in New Zealand.
In the event, it was a qualified success and there were many more positives than negatives to report. Like fellow European returnee Will Genia, Quade was one of Australia’s better performers on the night, without being afforded the luxury of doing most of the things he loves to do on attack. He was also required to do what he (probably) hates the most defensively – spending the majority of his time at fullback!
So let’s examine how Quade operated on attack and in defence at Wellington, and what his performance could mean for the Wallabies for the rest of their crumbling season.
Ball in hand
Did Quade improve Australia’s exit strategy?
Yes. Cooper gave the Wallabies better execution in their exit strategy at Wellington – better than anything seen previously in the 2016 season.
This was particularly true in the first half, before Australia (unaccountably) began to exit off 9 and 12 in the second period and the quality of their clearances deteriorated.
Cooper sensibly opted to find touch and prevent the kick returns which had proven so effective for the All Blacks in Sydney (0:15), or to split the backfield zones with long clearances down the middle. At 4:50 he finds grass between the back three defenders, at 35:09 he splits the zone between 10 Barrett and 15 Smith, again forcing the kick back in return.
From Cooper’s exits at least, New Zealand were forced either to accept the lineout as their attacking platform, or kick the ball back to Australia.
Did the Cooper-Foley midfield axis work?
No. Michael Cheika and his coaches decided to move Bernard Foley to #12 for this game, but the combination between Foley and Cooper looked awkward and uncomfortable.
For most of the first half, Foley appeared at first receiver with Cooper relegated to the support role, and it wasn’t until the very end of the opening period that Quade started conducting the orchestra. These are a few examples of Cooper playing second fiddle:
At 5:16 Cooper is outside Foley at second receiver, in the two other instances he is tucked away behind the breakdown in a position you would typically expect a blind-side winger to occupy, again with Foley at first receiver.
The most revealing example comes at 5:34. After two lots of pick and go, Cooper and Foley find themselves standing in the same space at first receiver. Quade tries to usher Foley out of the space without success:
This was a symbolic moment in the career of the Cooper-Foley midfield axis. Although Cooper ran the show more in the second period, there was little sign of the kind of rapport enjoyed by say, Foley and Kurtley Beale for the Waratahs. Foley and Cooper appeared to be treading on each other’s toes rather than complementing each other’s skill-sets.
Is the magic still there?
Yes. Although Australia spent too much of the game on the defensive for Cooper to fully show off his wares, there were a few glimpses of the old magic – the well-placed crosskick for Israel Folau at 10:17, the sudden acceleration and call for the ball out of the forward line at 18:47, the duping of the All Black defensive front with ‘eyes away’ from the target area and the inside pass to Folau at 78:11.
Quade Cooper without the ball
In defence, Nathan Grey tucked Quade away in the backfield for the majority of the match. The game as a whole raised some critical questions for the future of his defensive structure.
Here are some of the sequences from Wellington which raised those questions:
As I indicated in a previous article way back at the start of the Super Rugby season, New Zealand sides have found definite methods to unlock Grey’s defensive pattern via the kicking game at both provincial and Test level. Wellington was no exception.
At both 31:10 and 46:08 the Kiwis were able to successfully target the soft side of the Wallaby two-deep backfield with high kicks – the side away from Folau and defended by either Foley or Cooper.
In the first example, Israel Dagg collects the ball without any interference from Foley, in the second he prises it away from Cooper in the contest.
The dropping of either Cooper or Foley into the backfield also meant that Dane Haylett-Petty had to defend in the front line, after Adam Ashley-Cooper went off injured in the 16th minute.
The All Blacks had 17 throws into the lineout, with the Wallaby defence typically looking like this:
The real-life snapshots corresponding to the diagram are as follows:
As the lineout forms at 41:42, Foley is in the tram-lines, Cooper is at blind-side wing, with Michael Hooper visible in the 10 channel. At 41:48, we can see the full back-line ranging out from Hooper to Reece Hodge, Samu Kerevi and Haylett-Petty, with Folau rotating up outside them. The last two shots show Quade doing the fullback spade-work after Folau comes up into line, covering across at 42:14 and defusing the cross-kick at 42:21.
The issues with this structure are that it delivers a natural front-line defender (Cooper or Foley) in the backfield, and a natural backfield defender (Haylett-Petty) in the line.
The reason Grey wants to implement it is because of the power it brings in the 10 channel, which is usually a weakness for the defence. He wants a push in this area that looks like this:
The flip-side is that Haylett-Petty has shown enough vulnerability in the last two games (as the line defender outside Kerevi) to make that strength irrelevant. At 46:17 Ben Smith fades wide off the pass by Beauden Barrett, at 61:24 he steps inside Haylett-Petty as he over-compensates to the outside, at 67:20 quick hands are enough when Haylett-Petty shoots straight upfield. Two of those misses resulted in tries.
So although Cooper, for the most part, did his backfield work doughtily – in the first sequence he chases back and sets up the ruck without attempting the ‘miracle ball’! – the defensive system as a whole did not work well.
The negatives can be turned into positives however, if Australia either replace Foley with Hodge at 12, and Haylett-Petty with Drew Mitchell on one wing, or replace Foley with Kerevi, bring Kuridrani into 13, and pick Hodge on the wing.
That would leave the Wallaby back-line looking like this on defence from lineout:
Or:
In both cases, Hodge can help out as the second play-maker and support boot to Cooper without treading on his toes. The partnership would be much more clearly defined as kohai (junior partner – Hodge) and senpai (senior partner – Cooper) than it was with Foley!
Either Mitchell or Hodge could work in tandem with Folau in the backfield, both with natural back-three experience behind them.
Cooper would defend from the tram-lines and become a natural line-defender after the lineout is over.
Summary
Quade Cooper has shown enough form to stay in the team and be given the reins for the remainder of the Rugby Championship. Good player that he is, Foley needs a rest and should play off the bench.
I also feel that the restoration of Cooper as the premier playmaker, with Hodge starting from either 12 or 11, will bring positive energy to the Wallabies run-on side.
Cooper will bring more aggression and variety at the advantage-line, Hodge will bring youthful exuberance and a massive boot.
With Adam Ashley-Cooper defending in line instead of Dane Haylett-Petty, and a more solid-looking backfield, the Wallabies will still be able to rescue some positives from their international season if they can win three out of their remaining four matches in the Rugby Championship.