With part one of the series under our belts, we continue with the coaches of the Wallabies, starting with Daryl Haberrecht.
DARYL HABERECHT (1978).
Famous inventor of the “up the jumper” tap penalty move. This move, which succeeded beyond expectations in securing a last minute try and win for New South Wales Country over Sydney in 1975, was flashed by TV news agencies around the world.
In 1975, Australia was a small fish in the large world pond, and rugby union was an even smaller fish, but the tap penalty move was a huge hit. The IRB outlawed it immediately as being against the spirit of the game. Killjoys!
This is how it worked, as best as I can remember. The entire team stood in a semi-circle around the halfback. They had their backs to the opposition with their hands tucked inside their jumper. When the ref blew ‘play on’, the team would turn and take off in all directions, like a starburst.
The halfback would pass it to a designated player who would immediately return it under his jumper and takeoff downfield. In the few seconds it took the defensive team to figure out who actually had the ball, it was often too late. To see it was to see something truly sublime, deemed illegal or not.
So obviously Haberecht was a deep and innovative thinker of the game. He had succeeded in making New South Wales Country the best provincial team in Australia by 1975. Better than Sydney, better than New South Wales, better than the soon to be dominant Queensland.
His first surprise when named Wallabies coach in 1978, was to appoint Tony Shaw as captain over Mark Loane. Not only was Loane the Queensland captain since 1976, he was the best rugby player in Australia.
So for Haberecht to choose Shaw over Loane was a huge call. But Shaw turned out to be an inspired choice as captain. He was a more inclusive type of leader to Loane, and a good mentor, whereas the taciturn, dogmatic but lead-by-example Loane was seen as a bit aloof (but still a hero of mine all the same).
His next action was to invite captain Shaw and vice-captain Paul McLean to Sydney where he handed both players dossiers on every Welsh touring player and to discuss strategies and game tactics. Shaw recalls that Haberecht was light years before his time in his thinking and approach to coaching.
He was doing something right because the Wallabies won both tests against the Welsh, albeit with some luck. Then it was off to New Zealand for a three test series. The Wallabies lost the first test by the odd point, with Ken Wright missing a late and awkward angle penalty that would have won the game.
The Wallabies were trounced in the mud and rain of the second test before pulling off a stunning 30-16 romp in the final test.
Before this test, Haberecht suffered a heart attack which brought his brief but spectacular coaching of the national team to an end. This final test was known as ‘Corny’s test’ when eightman Greg Cornelsen crossed for four of five Wallaby tries. Incredible to believe, but he never ran more than one metre (with ball in hand) for any of those four tries.
BOB DWYER (1982-83).
The problem with Bob Dwyer is that he wanted to change the way the Wallabies played, overnight. Dwyer’s intent was demonstrated in his selection of his first-ever Wallabies team to play Scotland in Brisbane.
He relegated form Queenslanders and local heroes Paul McLean and Roger Gould to the bench, while bringing twins Mark and Glen Ella into the starting team. But then he did a few other curious things, choosing Hawker on the wing and also chose him as goalkicker ahead of O’Connor. It was messy to say the least.
Yet, this was not as messy as the disgraceful reception the Ballymore crowd gave the Ella twins every time one of them touched the ball.
Glen particularly, suffered enormous emotional trauma, and his career was pretty well cooked even before it began.
You could be excused for thinking that Scotland was the home team, considering the disgraceful exhibition of the crowd.
The Wallabies lost narrowly 12-7, and the fact they bombed about four tries and really blew a game they should have won, added to their collective misery.
In the next test, McLean and Gould returned for the Ella twins and the Wallabies won handsomely 33-9, scoring three tries to none. McLean ended his career with a distinguished 21 points from the match.
That evening, a staggering nine leading players, soon to be ten, made themselves unavailable for the tour of NZ – Mark Loane, Tony Shaw, Paul and Peter McLean, Brendan Moon, Mick O’Connor, Tony D’Arcy, Bill Ross, Stan Pilecki and also Gary Pearse.
The fact that they were now touring again after just recently returning from a long tour of the British Isles gave many a legitimate excuse that they simply couldn’t take any more time off from work to commit to touring.
But there was great uneasiness in the fact most were Queenslanders, who were perhaps privately resentful of Dwyer’s expansive coaching style, and perceived insensitive man-management.
Bob Dwyer was an intelligent coach and a perceptive strategist. But he also lacked patience and tact, trying to change too many things too quickly. The way he wanted to play rugby – the Randwick running style – was highly admirable.
But like a new CEO in a business environment, unless you can take your people with you, make them feel part of the process, you will meet resistance. Having a great idea doesn’t mean much unless you can convince other people to be part of the process.
When Bob Dwyer returned as Wallabies coach from 1988-95, he was a wiser, more humble man (assuming that was possible for him!) and a much better, more circumspect coach.
ALAN JONES (1984-87).
I’ve often thought if it had been possible for Alan Jones and Bob Dwyer to work together, they would have made a formidable combination. They were like ying and yang, two halves of a perfect whole.
With Dwyer as head coach, Templeton as assistant coach, and Jones as manager, and the three of them as co-selectors, you pretty well have the perfect coaching/management set-up. Dwyer and Jones would each have been able to curb the excesses in each other with Tempo playing the role of moderator and peacemaker.
In any case, Jones was a brilliant coach in his own right. Apart from Rod MacQueen, no other Wallabies coach has enjoyed his record. Jones was a great motivator.
I remember this as one of his earliest quotes on assuming the national coaching position – “If you aim for the stars, you’ll get your feet off the ground. But if you aim for the floor, you won’t even get out of bed”.
Spiro Zavos has previously argued that perhaps Jones’ greatest gift was in making the right selections.
Jones has often told the story the first player he wanted in his team, when appointed national coach, was Steve Cutler.
In those days when lifting in the lineout wasn’t allowed, the giant beanpole Cutler was essential for ensuring a regular supply of lineout ball. And he could contribute around the ground too.
The next thing he did was ask the recently arrived emigrant to Australia – ex-Puma Topo Rodriguez – if he was willing to pull on the number one jersey (loose-head prop) for the Wallabies. “Si”, replied Topo!
Then there was the controversial decision to strip the captaincy from Mark Ella and hand it to Andrew Slack. While Ella has indicated his hurt in losing the captaincy, and Jones has tried to shy away from being personally responsible for the decision, it was the right decision anyway.
Slack was a wonderful leader, a man deeply respected by all for his personal qualities of integrity and character, and for his committed ability as a rugby player.
And Ella, despite what he might personally think, was a much better player unburdened by the captaincy and free to express himself as only he could.
Jones was willing to refine his coaching methods. Three things stood out from the loss of the home series against the All Blacks in 1984, a series the Wallabies could have, and probably should have won.
Firstly, there were three headstrong midfielders and personalities in Ella, Hawker and Slack, who each had their own ideas on on-field tactics.
During the series, there was too much dithering. This was solved by ensuring Slack made decisions like kicking for goal, or for touch, but Ella decided which backline moves would be used. Hawker lost his place for the next reason.
Secondly, Jones realised any international team must have a recognised goalkicker. During the All Blacks series – Ella, Campese and Gould – all part-time kickers, had mixed performances.
This was solved by promoting Lynagh into the team at the expense of Hawker.
Thirdly, Jones realised having two fetchers in Poidevin and Roche was a luxury the team couldn’t afford. They needed a fourth lineout jumper at blindside flanker. This was solved by dropping Roche and promoting Codey.
Finally, Jones brought more security to the scrumbase by promoting the chunkier Farr-Jones for the slightly built Phil Cox.
With these changes in place, the Wallabies thrilled crowds throughout England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, winning all four tests comfortably and generally with style.
When Jones lost his coaching position at the end of 1987, it was unfortunately and entirely his own fault. In early 1987, as the inaugural World Cup year was looming, Jones began a career as a radio talk show host (shock jock) that saw him become today the most listened to, most influential and by extension, the wealthiest radio personality in Australia.
But back in 1987, Jones was distracted by his new career, lacking focus on training and preparing his team for the World Cup.
The Wallabies were aware of this, and became resentful, disillusioned and fractured.
The rest of the history you mostly know – Bob Dwyer’s second coming in 1988-95; Greg Smith’s hellish illness in 1996-97; Rod MacQueen’s majestic romp from 1997-2001; Eddie Jones’ journey into darkness 2001-05; John Connolly’s bid for redemption (2006-07) and Robbie Deans’ Galahad-like quest for rugby’s holy grail (2008-11).
Below are the records of the continuous regular coaches from 1962 to the present.
Bryan Palmer (1962 and 67) – 4 tests, nil wins. 0% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 3 tests for 0 wins.
Alan Roper (1962-67) – 20 tests, 8 wins. 40% win ratio.
Versus All Blcks: 3 tests for 1 win.
Des Connor (1968-71) – 14 tests, 2 wins. 14.29% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 2 tests for 0 wins.
Bob Templeton (1971-73, 76, 79-81) – 29 tests, 13 wins. 44.83% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 6 tests for 2 wins.
Dave Brockhoff (1974-75, 79) – 15 tests, 7 wins. 46.67% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 4 tests for 1win.
Daryl Haberecht (1978) – 5 tests, 3 wins. 60% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 3 tests for 1 win.
Bob Dwyer (1982-83, 1988-95) – 73 tests, 46 wins. 63% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 20 tests for 7 wins.
Alan Jones (1984-87) – 30 tests, 21 wins. 70% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 8 tests for 3 wins.
Greg Smith (1996-97) – 19 tests, 12 wins. 63.16% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 4 tests for nil wins.
Rod MacQueen (1997-2001) – 40 tests, 32 wins. 80% win ratio!!
Versus All Blacks: 7 tests for 5 wins!
Eddie Jones (2001-05) – 57 tests, 33 wins. 57.89% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 11 tests for 5 wins.
John Connolly (2006-07) – 22 tests, 14 wins. 63.63% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 5 tests for 1win.
Robbie Deans (2008-current) – 46, 25 wins. 54.35% win ratio.
Versus All Blacks: 13 tests for 2 wins.
PeterK
Guest
Confirms to me that our best 3 coaches were McQueen, Jones and Dwyer in that order. Thanks a lot for the trip down memory lane. I have to say I now wish they had selected Alan Jones as comeback coach when he tried, he would of went a lot better than Deans IMO.
Johnno
Guest
I still think Alan Jones stuffed up our 1987 World cup team. We had a good team the ALL Blacks were not looking forwad to facing us i can tell you. And many ex players including Nick Farr-Jones, have criticised his right to run his radio program during the 1987 RWC campaign. It disrupted and distracted his full focus, his training tensions, Alan's sleep patterns, and just general tima and energy to devote to the cause. Also Alan had some test relationships with players Campo and mark Ella. Sp he obviously had some power struggles or testy issues with players of the calibre of players like campo. Maybe he tested Campos patience, or annoyed Campo or Ella, but there were issues there.
Garth Hamilton
Roar Guru
Frank and Sheek, wonderful stuff. Very interesting re Alan jones, it has always seemed to simplistic an answer that he was 'just a motivator'.
Bring Back Rucking
Guest
Hi frank It was Phillip Cox dropped for Nick FJ in 1984 mitchel was playing leaue by then
sheek
Guest
No Frank, I wouldn't select Genia as captain right now. I think there are still a few parts of his game he needs to iron out. Like finding other ways to undo the pressure that's placed on his ability to run & pass. His defensive kicking, make that all his kicking, also needs improvement. Let him sort out these little things without the burden of captaincy. Ditto Pocock. He was severely outplayed last Saturday night. Let him also fine tune his game without the burden of captaincy. Horwill's the man for the job right now. He's in form, he goes about his business unobtrusively but effectively (like Thorn), & he appears to have the respect of his team mates.
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
I can't agree more. Elsom is such an apt example. He needs to be cut out like cancer. I'd be impressed if Deans dropped Elsom. When Deans says players are playing for the world cup this weekend, I hope he's telling the truth. There are several players - Elsom, Ashley-Cooper, McCabe etc should be fighting it out for their positions, because right now they don't belong. Stephen Moore was Australia's best player on the weekend and I was one proud Aussie watching him continually drive into the All Blacks, but even his spot isn't a guarentee. TPN is a mad dog! Maybe Deans should do the Cockbain/Finegan deal that MacQueen enjoyed in 1999. Finegan was insanely good when the opposition were tired. Deans kind of shot himself in the foot chopping and changing with captains though. It would be a bad look if he said, "Well we tried Morty, Smith, Waugh (did he try Waugh, I don't remember?), and now Elsom. I want player X." A few weeks ago I felt Genia should be Wallaby captain in the future, but not now. But the more I think about it, why wait? Genia is just the heart of the Wallabies right now. Tim Horan said it and it's true, he's the most irreplaceable person in the side right now. And I agree with that. Pocock and Beale and better players, but when Genia plays bad the Wallabies play bad, when he plays well the Wallabies play well. It all hinges on him. And he was a player who actually got better with the leadership for Queensland. He seemed to enjoy it!
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
"BTW, Ray Price’s brother was DON Price." Yeah I was scratching my head over that one - "Did I get the name right?"
sheek
Guest
Frank, It's the Sheek & Frank show at the moment. I almost added to my university thesis suggestion above that a comparison between the selections of 1981 & 1984 would be helpful in understanding what did, or didn't happen in 1981. Briefly on Shaw in 1981, & how he probably shouldn't have been in the test team, this is a classic example of how one selection cascades into many other decisions. A direct comparison can be made with Rocky Elsom today. By the time Deans realises it was wrong to stick with Elsom, it will be well & truly much too late for any constructive, alternative action. BTW, Ray Price's brother was DON Price. Price only tour with the Wallabies was to Fiji in 1980. Apparently, he just missed out to Duncan Hall as Loane's backup to Argentina in 1979; & he was again pipped as Loane's backup to Britain & Ireland in 1981 by Peter Lucas. He was an excellent no.8, but perhaps suffered from having a similar abrasive personality to his older brother.
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
Herein lies the awful truth. Tony Shaw shouldn't have been selected in the 1981/82 series. The Australian backrow were fantastic in the 1981/82 series and received many plaudits for their performances. The only problem was winning ball at the back of the line-out, which was never something Loane was interested in. But Shaw couldn't win line-out ball and he was never a second rower. A great flanker. But Australia was good for flankers. In fact Australia was really good for flankers. Steve Price (Ray's brother) didn't make that tour and Ray Price got all heated in the media over that! To him it was a crime that his brother wasn't in the side. Chris Roche was a player good enough to play who, according to Michael O'Connor in his book (Roche was O'Connor's closest rugby friend), was part of the Williams/Cox/Roche gang of people not happy with Tempo because he favoured the older players. Australia just had to cull Shaw. Australia didn't have the shove in the scrum or the height in the line-out. And it wasn't until the final game against England that Templeton woke up to the fact that Shaw didn't belong in the side. Alan Jones, bless him, was cold and ruthless enough to not pick Peter Lucas for the Grand Slam tour. The Wallabies players were astounded! Alan Jones later admitted it was an incredibly ugly decision given how well Luco was playing. But Chris Roche was already selected to go on tour (and he was vice-captain at the time), and he didn't get a game. And Jonesy, again the master, didn't select Roche. You see if Tempo was the coach he would have selected Roche because he was the vice-captain. And Tempo always selected the senior players. But Jones took the captaincy off Ella and put Roche on the bench. It was harsh. Roche was better than Poidevin in some respects, but he had no height. It was impossible for Roche to gain line-out ball. Poidevin tells the story in his book where both of them realized that Jones would pick Codey for his height. They kenw Jones was obsessed with height. So they had a gentleman's agreement that they would fight it out against one another to get the Test spot. Poidevin got it because of height, and he had an amazing tour, a truly amazing tour. Poidevin told a story in his book about how things got heated between him and Roachy at training, and I think it ended with Poidevin rucking him pretty bad, and he later apologized for it. But emotions ran wild! Poor Roachy. Tempo didn't play him in 1981/82. And after he ascended to the position of vice-captain in 1983 he had it all taken from him by Jones. But it was the right call. I love the story about how Jones sent him to Wimbledon to see the Kipling piece, "If you can meet with triumph and disaster and treat those two imposters just the same." Alan Jones: "Did you see the piece?" Chris Roche: "Yeah." Alan Jones: "Did you read how it said you must treat triumph and disaster just the same." Chris Roche: "WELL WHAT IF YOU CAN'T!" Classic. But Jones, again bless him, made the right call. Dwyer made the fatal mistake of selecting Poidevin and Roche together in France in 1983. Both were good enough to be in the side, but sadly they were of similar height and the backrow was never that balanced when both of them played. Jones seized of Dwyer's mistake and ensured the backrow had the right combination, even though it meant culling Roche. Jones should be commended for culling Luco, Rochey, and making sure there was plenty of height. Man learned from the mistakes of 1981/82. Okay I seriously need to do some work now. Computer jobs... not good when The Roar is a great place to talk rugby.
sheek
Guest
Frank, Keep it coming. I reckon that 1981 tour is worth a university thesis in itself. How do you resolve having so many outstanding options? How do make the very best choice from many very good choices? But Tempo clearly got it wrong not selecting Steve Williams in the second row. I reckon he wanted to avoid the distasteful decision of who to leave out of Shaw, Poidevin & Cornelsen in the backrow. Assuming Loane was safe, & Shaw as captain was also safe, it came down to Poidevin & Cornelsen. Wow, what a choice to have to make! The of course, he had to choose between Paul McLean & Mark Ella at no.10. Another massive choice to have to make. With the right choices this would have been an outstanding team. But unfortunately, Tempo got it wrong early, & it compounded from there.
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
"Robbie Deans 15% [54%]" Good grief! Eddie Jones puts him to shame... and he had worse problems with his team! "Greg Smith 0% [63%]" My heart sank when I read that. Campo wrote in his book 'Still Entertaining' about how Smith won a famous game in 1992 against New Zealand and that was his great moment, his claim to fame. Fast forward to 1996 and reports were surfacing Smith was becomming reclusive and moody. The loss in Brisbane in 1996 (The Great Escape by New Zealand) really affected him. And the massive loss in South Africa hurt him terribly. But the players had no idea about the health problems that were effecting Smith's performance. Campo said some lovely words about the man, and how the whole ordeal with just terribly sad. It was one of those moments where you wish you knew more about the man, so you could go back and change things.
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
An interesting note: Simon Poidevin in his book back in 1991 noted that MacQueen would one day be Wallaby coach. He saw no question about it. He talked about how crucial MacQueen was for the Wallabies preparation in 1991. How all of MacQueen's backrow moves were implanted into the Wallabies strategy. How MacQueen handed the players incredibly well. He speaks about how he got the best out of players while making friends with them. He said he could get close to players to brings out their best. He especially noted how innovative and incredible it was that he asked the players for extensive feedback - "Why did you lose to Queensland last year?" "Well why don't we try this?" "Now I want you guys to add to this." "Does everybody feel comfortable with this." Poidevin noted that because the players contributed to the gameplan with MacQueen providing the skeleton, the players felt more comfortable going into games. He said players knew exactly what to do going into the game. Under MacQueen he said he was fitter and more prepared than ever. Poidevin really rated him. It's incredible how he just foresaw with certainty that MacQueen would be coach. He must have been a special coach.
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
Sorry to post again, but this is a great topic. In all sincerity, the more I watch Robbie Deans perform the more he's making Eddie Jones look good. Say what you want about Eddie Jones, but I'd like to make two points... 1) Australia had some big wins with him - Australia were tipped to lose the Bledisloe in 2002 and they just won with a Matt Burke kick. - They actually performed brilliantly in Auckland in 2003 (a game where my nemesis was in the crowd watching) after getting 50 points posted against them in Australia. They performed brilliantly in Auckland. They had to be held up twice over the line to prevent tries from being scored, and they only lost by about four points. They kept coming at Australia. - They beat New Zealand at the World Cup in 2003. Honestly, the Wallabies played very poorly up until that game. Nobody gave them a chance. They pulled that win out of no where. - They took a far superior English side to overtime in the final. People talk about the poor reffings, but England made some rookie handling errors, and Australia made some huge kicks and played. But for Wilkinson's defence on Mortlock I think Australia would have stolen it. - I sincerely mean it when I say I thought Australia were going to win that final when they got a line-out in the 78th minute. I'd seen the Wallabies back then win so many close games, and steal games by just lifting in the last five minutes, that I actually felt Australia would steal that game. - Yeah they lost in 2004, but they won one Bledisloe game, and only just lost in South Africa. That Tri Nations should have gone to Australia, but the Saffies got that last minute try. - 2005 was undoubtedly the worst year Australia has had for injuries in the 00s. Australia actually started off good that year, but once Larkham got injured that was it. Giteau was badly exposed at five-eighth (a taste of what was to come), and Mat Rogers couldn't fill that void. Latham went down with an injury. Mitchell did okay scoring that great try in New Zealand, but man did Australia miss Latham. There were several other injuries I forget about. Gregan actually talks in-depth about this game in his book, and there were a ton of injuries I'd totally forgotten about. Say what you want about Gregan, but if you're going to select him, which Connolly eventually did at the World Cup, then he's your captain. He knows how to control refs with his back chat. Mortlock wasn't it. And wasn't Mortlock injured in 2005 as well? Several Wallabies have said he's the best coach they ever had. Guys like Rod Kafer have said it, he was better than MacQueen. I have read that while he's got incredible knowledge and he's a player's coach, he's not great at getting the most out of players. I don't know about that. His match analysis' are always very entertaining though. And for all the talk about him not fixing the scrum and the Wallabies forwards declining rapidly, he did forsee this in 2003 and wanred people about it. His record is far greater than Robbie Deans', and he had worse problems than Robbie did in 2005. Honestly, Jones get knocked for stuff Deans doesn't.
sheek
Guest
Great stuff Frank, truly great stuff. Yes, I agree the 1981/82 was an embarrassment of riches, & Tempo was 'blinded' by having too many options. We often see this happening in different sports at different times. Sometimes, it's better not to have so many choices!!! I also agree it was a case of old guard versus new guard, rather than Qld vs NSW. I also believe Mark Loane, a powerful personality, who captained the last test against England, would have had a lot to say about things. Loane believed in the ABs/Boks way of playing - kicking for territory & taking your points, & only opening the game up when you had all the options in your favour. But the Wallabies in 1981/82 didn't even pick the right forwards, which made the backs job even more difficult. You can't blame Tempo for being confused. In 1980 he saw what the brilliant backline of Ella-Hawker-O'Connor was capable of, winning the series against the ABs 2-1. But he also coached Queensland to victory over the ABs in 1980, with the likes of McLean & Slack in the backs. So no wonder he was confused a year later!
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
Alan Jones... I could talk about him all day! * Changed Steve Cutler * Retained McIntye and put Topo at loosehead * Hired assistant coaches (put more infrastructure into a side than anyone before him) * Played with shape * Knew the value of a goalkicker * Sorted out leadership problems * Gave David Codey a chance he didn't regret * Introduced more height into the line-out * Saw new talent like Brian Smith * Won in New Zealand (2nd time ever for Australia) * Won the Grand Slam * Culled good players for the benefit of the side (Peter Lucas [an ugly decidion), Chris Roche) * Had information on sides three months before they played them (seriously!) * Paid for a scrum machine out of his own money and paid for it to be transported overseas etc * Gave it to the New Zealand public in 1986 for their shabby treatment of the Wallabies * Dropped two Manly players (Ross Reynolds and Mitchell Cox) on form for Farr-Jones and Tuynaman Oh I could go on... and on... and on... just a great mind. Just a great coach. So prepared. Just injected a jolt of lightning into the side. Farr-Jones said once Jones came into the side all the Wallabies could think about was working hard. It became an obsession. The Wallabies were just so professional and organized. As Jones said, "my team was professional before professionalism existed." Alan Jones, the coach of coaches!
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
MacQueen is really the only other Australian coach who was as obsessive as Jones about re-starts, only MacQueen was the opposite. He wanted short kick offs and expected that Australia could get possession on every kick off, no exceptions! Reading his book it's incredible just how much MacQueen valued possession. As far as he was concerned, as long as a team held the ball, the other team couldn't score points, so teams should work on holding the ball as long as possible. The writing was on the wall when he coaches New South Wales in 1991, and this went into overdrive in 1998 when Australia held the ball for 18 consecutive phases against New Zealand. Only once in the book does he talk about telling his team to kick. He noted that during the 1999 World Cup teams couldn't go beyond two phases without a penalty being given away, which seems sadly true rewatching some matches. So he devised a tactic whereby Matt Burke would kick the ball a lot. Seriously, I've never heard of a coach as obsessed with a team maintaining possession at all costs. People laud him for the Larkham move, and rightly so, but I'm starting to think only a bloke as obsessed with possession would think of it. People thought Larkham would be a weird five-eighth because he looked so awkward kicking the ball, but all MacQueen cared about was running and handling, and holding onto the ball, and holding onto the ball, and holding onto the ball. An interesting book, you really get a sense for what kind of mind he is!
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
On Alan Jones... Watching the Wallabies kick-offs on the weekend made me yearn for the Alan Jones days. That was a guy who had everything thought of. Now long kick-offs aren't popular these days and that's okay, but Alan Jones had them down to a tee. He'd arrange training sessions with the ball to practice chasing drills. But the players weren't aware they were training for long kick offs. Jones invented drills to get them practicing their speed for the kick off without the players knowing it. The Wallabies would kick off long and force the team to kick. Australia owned the game for the next 10 minutes after that once that happened. Cutler couldn't be beaten in line-outs. The key to the All Blacks win in 1987 was they stopped the Wallabies line-out. I don't care how better they were than Australia in every other apartment, they wouldn't have won that game 30-16 without dominating the line-outs. But Australia would win the line-outs and from there the forwards were so well-drilled by Alec Evans they wouldn't hit the floor. Jones had the Aussie forwards mauling and ripping and working together better than anybody. Australia played with shape under Jones. Everything was so structured and purposeful. And teams just couldn't do anything about it. People say he was just a motivator and a good selector, but listening to Jones you know he focused in on things the so-called more experienced coaches should be focused on. Poidevin mentions this wonderfully in his book about Jones, that he just knew what areas to focus on. Never mind Australia's defence improved heaps under him. Jones won Australia the 3rd Test in 1986 by making them do extra defence training before the game. Happily it was the one area that won them the game.
Frank O'Keeffe
Guest
Good stuff Sheek. I know you wrote about Bob Templeton in a previous post, but I'll make some comments about him here. I strongly recommend people read Michael O'Connor's autobiography 'The Best of Both Worlds' to get an idea of the problems Templeton had in 1981. The Wallabies almost had too much talent to handle, and the stories of the problems Templeton had with selections are very interesting. O'Connor said something incredibly interesting to me. He noted the divide in the Wallabies camp wasn't Queensland v NSW. It was the Old Guard v New Guard. Templeton would always choose experience. An example was when Michael O'Connor was going to play 12 but injured himself playing basketball. O'Connor said Mitchell Cox (who nobody talks about) was playing fantastically at that time, yet Templeton chose McLean to play 12 against Scotland (a game where he selected Ella at five-eighth). Ella tried to accomodate McLean by standing deeper than usual and it hurt his game. He talked about how the Aussie captain (Shaw) had a vote in selections and how it often went to older players too. It's not like Shaw was voting himself into second row, but Steve Williams was ignored that tour until the final game. Simon Poidevin wrote an interesting thing in his book too. He noted that Paul McLean was a great player, that McLean was a person he had all the time in the world for, but that Mark Ella was the most talented rugby player he ever saw. He then goes on to say that while Ella was more talented, McLean was more disciplined. Ella might run the ball in his own 22 and get caught out, while McLean never made mistakes. Poidevin was almost suggesting that there were game that Ella played where people thought McLean should play and vice versa. Templeton just couldn't catch a break. McLean was very disciplined and his style was sometimes more conducive to winning. McLean was the Porta-style five-eighth. But so many times Australia needed the Ella spark. It's one of the most facinating periods in Australian rugby to read about. There... Queensland v New South Wales Old Guard v New Guard Conservatism v Free spirited play And a heap of wrong selections. Templeton... an interesting case! Had more talent than most Australian rugby coaches, but the selections were harder for any rugby coach.
Mungehead
Guest
Great pair of articles sheek. Obviously it's hard to compare success between coaches because the playing strength of both the team and the opposition vary so wildly, but I still can't resist ordering them based on your statistics. I like the way you give success against the All Blacks as well as against all comers, and I think I'll use that. That would list them in the following order if success against the All Blacks was the prerequisite: Name Success%-Vs_ABs [Success % vs all comers] Rod MacQueen 71% [80%] Eddie Jones 45% [58%] Alan Jones 38% [70%] Bob Dwyer 35% [63%] Daryl Haberecht 33% [60%] Alan Roper 33% [40%] Bob Templeton 33% [45%] Dave Brockhoff 25% [47%] John Connolly 20% [64%] Robbie Deans 15% [54%] Greg Smith 0% [63%] Des Connor 0% [14%] Bryan Palmer 0% [0%] or ordered by success against all comers: Rod MacQueen 71% [80%] Alan Jones 38% [70%] John Connolly 20% [64%] Bob Dwyer 35% [63%] Greg Smith 0% [63%] Daryl Haberecht 33% [60%] Eddie Jones 45% [58%] Robbie Deans 15% [54%] Dave Brockhoff 25% [47%] Bob Templeton 33% [45%] Alan Roper 33% [40%] Des Connor 0% [14%] Bryan Palmer 0% [0%]