VIDEO ANALYSIS: Why Karmichael Hunt should play 12 for the Reds (and the Wallabies)

Let’s get one thing straight from the start. Karmichael Hunt is a back-three player.

However, in the current circumstances he would fit into the Reds attack best at second five-eighth (inside centre), and that Wallabies coach Michael Cheika will (rightly) consider him in this position against England in their tour this winter.

The reason Cheika can think of players like Hunt and Kurtley Beale at 12 is because of the way Nathan Grey handles the Wallabies’ defence. In his unique system, the extra playmaker at 12 never defends at inside centre from the set-piece, kick-offs or 22 drop-outs.

In their most characteristic formation over the last year, the 12 sits in the tramlines from lineout (here Matt Giteau in the World Cup match against England) with 10 Bernard Foley defending on the blind-side wing near the 22-metre line. Michael Hooper is in the 10 channel, with 11 Rob Horne next door, 13 Tevita Kuridrani beyond him and 14 Adam Ashley-Cooper as a dedicated open-side wing whether it’s right or left-sided lineout.

As play develops, Giteau stays on the edge and Foley moves into acting fullback. This means that a play-maker like Beale or Hunt can be selected as a second distributor on attack but still function largely as either part of the back three or the edge defence on D, which suits them better physically.

So why should Hunt play at 12 for Queensland? The Reds committed to the ex-Australian Schoolboys and under 20 outside-half Jake McIntyre at the start of the year. McIntyre is only 21 years old and this is first full season of Super rugby, so he needs as much support as possible while he is learning to function at this level.

The Reds have tried three different 12s outside McIntyre in the first three games – Henry Taefu against the Tahs, Hunt against the Force and Anthony Fainga’a against the Rebels on Saturday. Let’s see how it went with Hunt at 15 in the Tahs game:

The first sequence begins with a long break by Hendrik Tui with Nick Frisby on exactly the same line of support that earned him a try against the Rebels two weeks later (at 40:23). There are a number of repeated themes in the play that follows.

• Over-commitment to the breakdown. No fewer than five Reds forwards commit to the first two rucks at 40:27 and 40:37, which means the Waratahs have already won the numbers battle and reloaded successfully on D by 40:40.

• No options at first receiver. At 40:30 there is a distinct absence of options for the acting halfback Jake Schatz. Greg Holmes (3) is playing at first receiver on the left side, while McIntyre is not ready for the ball on the right. On the next phase Caderyn Neville (4) is the only realistic option to receive the ball; there is no connection between him and McIntyre standing six or so metres behind him.

• Depth at first receiver/ flat overall alignment. When McIntyre receives the ball at 40:49, we have the classic recipe for attacking failure: a first receiver (McIntyre) giving the pass 5 metres behind the ad-line within the framework of an offence that has no more than ten metres depth from the hindmost foot of the ruck to the deepest attacker (Hunt out on the right flank).

When the Reds finally regroup into line on eighth phase, at 41:05, this means that none of the attackers can change their angles on to the ball after the Reds 10 makes another pass behind the ad-line – they can only ship it on inevitably into the next tackle. When McIntyre does take the ball to the line and inject energy at 41:16, he has only Rob Simmons (4) and Ben Daley (1) in support. The attacking alignment is so flat (with Reds forwards still tracking back into midfield from previous phases) that Simmons runs straight past the ball and Daley is uprooted in the tackle area for a Tahs turnover.

• Karmichael Hunt marginalised! Hunt is as far away as he can be, on the extreme right edge of the field, at the start of the sequence. He only comes into shot at 40:50 and is never part of the attacking play thereafter. When Hunt moves hopefully into first receiver at 41:03 he isn’t even considered as an option by the halfback, and returns to the right edge at 41:15 as the Reds are turned over.

The second sequence is hardly any more successful. After a broken first phase, McIntyre runs all of 20 metres to clean out at the first ruck at 32:07 – which means he is out of the game as a playmaker for the next two phases. Again, there is no sense of a connection between the forward pod and McIntyre at 32:25, and although McIntyre and Hunt are playing in tandem at 32:31, attacking alignment has shrunk to a depth of no more than ten metres and the inside pass becomes an easy read for the defence. The result is another turnover.

The theme of a main distributor circling back to clean out just after making a pass is a consistent one in the Reds’ attack, and resulted in two actual turnovers plus one ‘should have been’ in the second match against the Force. Apart from (usually) being in a physical mismatch, the passer just doesn’t have the right angle of entry into contact in these situations.

Now let’s take a look at situations where Hunt was used at 12 or second receiver in the Western Force match.

Ironically, the first sequence occurs in the Rebels game, where Hunt started at 15.

This was one of only two occasions I could find in the matches against the Tahs and Rebels where Hunt entered the play at first receiver, or second receiver outside McIntyre. All the other instances are from the Force game.

• Hunt fast and square on the ball. McIntyre will characteristically take two or three steps before turning his body sideways to make the pass (Force at 5:00, 11:38, 11:46, 12:02*, 12:15, 39:20 & 64:41), effectively ‘leading’ the defence onto the receiver. Hunt, by contrast, squares his shoulders quickly, fixing the defenders in front of him and passing across his body to keep them honest (Force at 12:04, 32:00, 39:21 & 64:43). This has the effect of forcing the D to stop momentarily and preserves the space for the edge attack.

In other words, Hunt supplies the correctness of angle and passing technique the Reds needs outside McIntyre while he is in his developing phase.

• Keeping the balance to both sides. There are some significant occasions where halfback Nick Frisby doesn’t consider the options either way in midfield. At the Force 11:53, if Frisby looks to his left, he has Hunt at first receiver in a potential six-on-four situation to the Reds left. The situation is repeated with slightly less significance at Force 12:20.

If the Reds can introduce Hunt regularly at first receiver (and get their 9 to notice him!), they will be able to attack on both sides of a midfield ruck.

Conclusions
At the moment the Reds are making a huge number of passes (an average of 150 per game) but only creating seven line-breaks and one try per game from them. This is not an impressive ratio.

They need to get their most effective distributors closer to the ball, and Hunt – with his considerable talent and excellent technique – is the best they have got.

For all his many virtues in work rate, defence and at the breakdown, with Anthony Fainga’a playing at 12, the Reds will not get the running and distribution skills they need to support a young 10 feeling his way forward at a higher level.

The more they can get Hunt on the ball at first or second receiver, the better things will be. The attack structure won’t get better overnight, but Karmichael Hunt’s selection at 12 with Ayumu Goromaru to kick the goals from 15 will be significant steps in the right direction – for both the Reds coaching group and potentially, Michael Cheika’s Wallabies.