Is there a future for the great Folau experiment?

Finally, the great Israel Folau experiment has come to pass. The question is now twofold: is there a future for it, and at what level does that future lie?

Firstly, it is only fair to point out that Waratahs coach Daryl Gibson was doing what he thought best for the team when he selected Folau at 13.

The Tahs only have one high-quality centre in their squad, Rob Horne, and he is currently rehabilitating a long-term injury. For Gibson, the experiment was more or less forced.

For Michael Cheika it will not be, with Tevita Kuridrani and Samu Kerevi available.

How effective was Israel Folau overall? He had an important hand in both of the Tahs’ tries, using quick hands to release Jed Holloway and Reece Robinson on the outside in the 22nd minute, and then galloping home in trademark fashion ten minutes later for the NSW’s second of the night.

This was Folau doing what we know he can – reacting instinctively under pressure with good hands in the first example, finishing off the line-breaking work of Kurtley Beale and Kellaway in the second.

For the second try he is essentially set up as a fullback at 31:17 on the extreme right edge of the shot, with Foley (10), Beale (12) and Kellaway (15) as the receivers underneath him.

The Tahs also fulfilled Gibson’s promise that “we’ll still use him in the backfield to field kicks”, with Folau dropping back into his customary fullback role on five occasions during the match.

The opening kick-off saw Folau returning the exit before smashing headlong (literally) into Jordan Smiler.

What pay did the Waratahs get from Folau when he was acting specifically as an outside centre? Let’s take a look at some examples on both sides of the ball:

Folau on defence – driving maul
The first two sequences from the reel show Folau defending at outside centre from Brumbies’ driving lineouts close to the Waratahs’ goal-line. On both occasions the clips begin with the Brumbies adding an extra back to the drive – Christian Lealiifano at 48:20 and Matt Toomua at 54:46.

In the first clip, the Michael Hooper, defending the 10 channel, has just entered the maul to help stop the drive, with the defender in the 12 channel, Matt Carraro, narrowing down to guard. Carraro gets involved with the drive at 48:23, with Folau following him into the maul two seconds later.

One of the most basic disciplines of driving maul defence is keeping the balance between defence of the drive and defence in the backline outside it.. Line defenders must stay in their channels unless they have a clear and obvious shot at the ball-carrier. In this case, neither Carraro nor Folau have that shot, because as the drive splits in two (at 48:26) it turns out the ball is in the rear group of players, while Carraro and Folau have both been absorbed at the front!

With both centres out of play and only two other Tahs backs left in the line, the Brumbies are able to score an easy try out on the right hand side. So there was a clear problem of decision-making and communication associated with both of the defenders in the 12 and 13 channels.

From Gibson’s viewpoint, how the issue was recognised and addressed in the second instance will be encouraging.

From the same basic situation, the communication is much better. Hooper again joins the maul at 54:58, but Matt Carraro is gesturing at his opposite number in the line at 54:57, then signals Nick Phipps to fill in at guard at 55:00, after Hooper is absorbed.

Finally, Carraro swaps positions with Jack Dempsey, at 55:09, to get optimal push off the line as the ball emerges, and this enables Folau to pressure the ball, at 55:14, and break up the play.

Folau on defence – set-piece and open play
The importance of Carraro’s influence in developing Folau’s defensive positioning and reads was repeated from a defensive lineout in the 53rd minute. When the ball reaches Jarrad Butler (Brumbies’ 7) at first receiver, the Waratahs are in their familiar midfield defensive formation, with Hooper in the 10 channel and Carraro and Folau outside him:

As soon as the ball goes behind into the second line of attack, Carraro rushes forward on to the second receiver, Lealiifano, at 52:19, dragging Folau with him. Folau is then able to break up the play off Matt Toomua – even if the in-pass goes to hand, the play is far too deep to create a line-break.

Issues are more likely to arise when the ball goes beyond Carraro’s channel and the defensive decision-making becomes Folau’s. In the sequence from 47:03-47:13, the line looks neat and ordered at 47:03, but when the second pass is made at 47:11 and Folau chases up on to Tevita Kuridrani, all that cohesion has fragmented.

Reece Robinson (14) is looking at the wide attackers and drifting off when he should be supporting Folau and closing them down. Meanwhile, Hooper and Carraro are on two completely different running lines underneath Folau. I suspect that no call was made, and as a result all the defenders are reading off separate hymn sheets.

Another question defensively relates to Andrew Kellaway, now occupying the ‘last defender’ role that would normally be Folau’s. Would Folau have been better able to cover Joe Tomane’s inside step and prevent the try at 14:59?

Folau on attack and in contact
On attack, the Waratahs used a ‘box’ formation from set-piece, with their 10 taking the ball up and 13 running a hard ‘unders’ line to connect with him on the advantage line.

The offside wing or halfback (#14 Robinson at 44:18, #9 Phipps at 37:48) plus Beale run an outside ‘veer’ behind them, starting straight and then fading to the outside of the field.

The Tahs ran this attacking formation four times in the match, with Folau being used as a decoy on three occasions. They got some pay from the first example in the clip, with Kuridrani biting in on Phipps and allowing the offload and tackle bust by Beale. In the second half, the Brumbies’ midfield was much more circumspect, with Kuridrani sitting and drifting as the wide play unfolded at 44:19, and the Brumbies mounting a fierce contest at the first breakdown.

Israel Folau finally got the ball from this formation in the fourth quarter at 65:10. He was first held at the advantage line and then dispossessed when Foley and the two ‘veer’ attackers ran away from the breakdown, leaving replacement halfback Matt Lucas to clean out two Brumbies’ jackals.

This example indirectly raises the question of Folau’s appetite for, and competence at the ‘dog work’ at the ruck. Some of the greatest 13’s of recent times – Conrad Smith for the All Blacks, Brian O’Driscoll for Ireland, Adam Ashley-Cooper for Australia and Jonathan Davies for Wales – have offered terrific value on both sides of the breakdown. All were – or are – excellent defensive jackals, who also cleaned out with authority at attacking breakdowns. Smith was probably the best presenter of a ball at an attacking ruck worldwide.

These are skills which are not currently on Folau’s CV. For example, against the Brumbies his cleanouts could be diffident or ineffective, while his contribution to the defensive breakdown is underdeveloped.

There were a couple of situations where Folau was required to make the typical 13 decisions on attack. In the sequence from 18:23-18:25, immediately after a Tom Robertson line-break, Folau is playing at second receiver outside Bernard Foley:

As Phipps swings the ball away from the base at 18:23 and Kuridrani starts his upfield rush, Folau can either come short to Foley underneath the rush, or he can maintain his depth to exploit the overlap on the Waratahs’ right. In the event there doesn’t appear to be a call, as Folau trots tamely upfield, which forces Foley to take contact – with the opportunity lost.

A similar situation occurred later in the half after another clean break by Beale. Again, Folau is aligned at second receiver with a massive overlap visible to the right at 26:30. But instead of simply squaring up and passing to Robertson on his right, Folau runs into contact and the spare men are wasted.

Summary
Saturday was a mixed bag from Folau at 13 – as you expect from his first outing in the position.

His instinctive brilliance and athletic attributes were there in plain sight. There were also signs that he could improve quickly as a defender under Matt Carraro’s on-field mentoring, and that Andrew Kellaway could prove a more effective player than David Horwitz in the Tahs’ current back-line formation.

From the set-piece, Folau’s was simple and confrontational from the box formation. He is there to challenge the advantage line in midfield, rather than seek space outside. He appeared to understand his role and ran some solid lines.

The difficulties will come when he is required to make decisions both in attack and defence, and with his commitment to the dirty, nuts ‘n’ bolts of the game, at which the likes of Conrad Smith and Adam Ashley-Cooper were so good – hard, positive cleanouts, decisive ball placements, and defensive interference at the tackle.

Folau is by nature a superb instinctive runner and off-loader, but can he make the right decisions when to run, when to pass and when to kick? Does he have that wider picture of the game, and can he organise the players outside him?

While it will be entirely the right decision for Daryl Gibson to continue to play Israel Folau at 13 for the Waratahs, there will be too many unresolved issues for Michael Cheika to consider selecting him there against England in June, in what for him is already a position of strength.