How I changed my tune on Nathan Buckley

Last year, I questioned Collingwood’s direction and Nathan Buckley’s capacity to take the next step with the club. In the off season, for a variety of reasons, I’ve had something of a change of attitude.

One of those is Dane Swan’s autobiography My Story. Swan talks about how closely allied a number of players were to Malthouse to the point they offered to start a petition to keep him at the club, and thus delay the succession. Swan openly admits that Buckley was on a hiding to nothing taking over. This had nothing to do with Buckley; Swan says any successor would’ve fared similarly due to this core group’s allegiance to Malthouse.

So Buckley tries for two years (2012–13) to coach this group to a flag. Collingwood plays relatively listless football. They make a prelim (2012) and an elimination final (2013). Buckley decides this group isn’t capable of climbing to the top of the mountain again – arguably, a contributor to this decision was the environment Buckley experienced when he came to Collingwood as a player in 1994.

In his autobiography, All I Can Be, he cites there was an air of complacency at the club, that the players had their flag (1990) and that was it for them. Craig Kelly (Buckley’s manager, and one of the 1990 premiership players) mentions that some judicious trading could’ve possibly reinvigorated the list.

This is something Buckley and the club try now. A query remains on the wisdom of timing, given during this period the expansion clubs are monopolising the best young talent in the competition. Some of the older guys either retire (e.g. Ben Johnson, Chris Tarrant) or are ingloriously retired (e.g. Darren Jolly, Alan Didak). Others – e.g. Chris Dawes, Sharrod Wellingham, Dale Thomas, Heath Shaw, Heritier Lumumba – are traded out.

The theory is sound – get some new young talent in to be the core of your next side. It’s something Collingwood nailed in 2006 and 2007 to build the core of their 2010 premiership side. Now, in the 2012 National Draft, Collingwood take Brodie Grundy (Pick 18), Ben Kennedy (Pick 19), Tim Broomhead (Pick 20), and Jackson Ramsey (pick 38).

In the 2013 National Draft, Collingwood take Matthew Scharenberg (Pick 6), Nathan Freeman (Pick 10), Tom Langdon (Pick 65), and Jonathon Marsh (Pick 77). Some of this talent they would’ve expected to cover the outgoing players.

Grundy’s played 62 games and is on the cusp of taking the next step. Kennedy played 25 games for Collingwood (about half of them as sub) and was traded out. Broomhead has played 21 games, and Jackson Ramsey has played nine games. Scharenberg has played four games. Freeman played zero games, and has been traded out. Tom Langdon has played 46 games. Jonathon Marsh played 15 games and retired.

Collingwood’s return from these drafts (so far) is one player: Brodie Grundy. Grundy has become a lynchpin of their side. Scharenberg, Broomhead, and Ramsey – all well regarded – have been riddled with injury. Langdon has now joined that list. Freeman, Kennedy, and Marsh are gone. Obviously, you’re not going to nail every draft pick, but you’d want a decent return, especially from your higher picks – the picks where you’re banking on finding genuine class.

Compare this to the reigning premiers. From the 2012 National Draft, the Bulldogs took Jake Stringer with pick five and Jack McRae with pick six Stringer’s played 73 games and McRae 77. With pick 21 they took Nathan Hrovat (21 games, and now at North), and with pick 49 Lachie Hunter (62 games, and a premiership player).

With pick 50, they took Josh Prudden (0 games). Marcus Bontempelli was taken in the 2013 draft with pick four and has played 63 games. Matt Fuller taken at pick 49 has played 0 games, Mitch Honeychurch at pick 60 has played 11 games, and Brett Goodes at pick 84 played 22 games.

Now this isn’t a discussion on the merits of who was drafted or who should’ve been taken. It’s simply a statement to demonstrate one fundamental truth about football: you need to get games into your best prospects, and they need to take the next step if you’re to improve. That’s how modern football works – out with the old, draft youth, get games into them, move forward. The Doggies did this with their top-end picks (McRae, Stringer, and Bontempelli, with Hunter – a lower pick – a bonus).

Unfortunately, for whatever reason, Collingwood hasn’t had this luxury. Consequently, they’ve tried some patchwork free agency which largely hasn’t worked out for them either.

So this chasm has formed within the club – experienced players have gone out, a number of free agents (e.g. Quinten Lynch, Jordan Russell, Clinton Young) have misfired, and there’s been a lack of game-time – and thus development – pumped into quality prospects. What’s then left?

Take Port Adelaide’s 2016 Round 11 thumping of Collingwood at the MCG for example. Port, then placed 10th, and coming interstate, was seen as a possible win for Collingwood. Nobody expected the Pies to go down by 67 points.

Many fans were enraged. How could this happen? It must be appalling coaching. The players mustn’t understand the gameplan or be playing for their coach, or… insert your own reason.

But look at the side Collingwood fielded. The 22 included:

• Ben Sinclair (57 games)
• Jack Frost (53 games)
• Jack Crisp (51 games)
• Brodie Grundy (51 games)
• Adam Oxley (29 games)
• Jordan de Goey (27 games),
• Brayden Maynard (18 games)
• Mason Cox (seven games)
• Josh Smith (seven games)
• Ben Crocker (five games)
• Matthew Goodyear (two games)

That’s a lot of inexperience. And, with no disrespect intended to the players, Crisp, Frost, Oxley, Cox, Smith, and Goodyear were or are rookies. Crocker was pick 65. De Goey and Grundy aside, it’s not exactly top-end talent who might be better-equipped and have a greater readiness for the demands of AFL football at such a formative stage of their careers. And fans were surprised a side with not only this much inexperience, but also with this much speculative talent, struggled to maintain structures and got smashed.

Collingwood fielded a number of teams like this in their poorer performances. When they had the luxury of getting the balance right (experience and youth), their efforts generally improved.

Football is always going to be about personnel. Always. Gameplans and structures and being well-drilled is great, but it means nothing unless a team has the players to execute, they’re experienced enough to execute, and the core group have developed a synergy which only comes from systematic development.

Look at Fremantle last year. Ross Lyon is one of the most regimented coaches there is – how did he fare once Fremantle suffered injuries? How did Essendon – under the guidance of premiership coach John Worsfold – do with all their suspensions and injuries? At one stage last year, Collingwood actually had more players out than Essendon. North Melbourne started well but struggled once injuries hit. You can only cover so many absences – particularly if they’re pivotal to your side.

So I’ve mostly changed my mind. Buckley took over a list which had – through no fault of his own – a contingent that didn’t want him (and this is not a discussion about the merits of the succession plan). He tried to win a flag with them and when it didn’t work out, he traded to rejuvenate the list, but hasn’t been able to get his best players on the park, or pump experience into guys who would become the core of his next flag side, as Malthouse was able to do with Pendlebury, Thomas, Reid, Brown, Sidebottom, Beams, and Dawes.

This is compounded by injuries to gun senior players like Ben Reid and Dane Swan. Imagine a fit Reid in 2014 or 2015 – seasons where he played a handful of games.

This doesn’t mitigate all Collingwood’s poor performances under Buckley. There remains legitimate queries on him, the coaching staff, and the club in general. The side still too regularly get slashed open the counter attack, unforced errors are still too high, and what’s with the constant stream of injuries?

One or two years is bad luck. That it’s been ongoing suggests there must be a common denominator, e.g. their training regiment, and/or the surface on which they train, or is the gameplan itself too taxing? There are other questions, and they’re right to be asked. The club should be scathing in their self-examination, and fans are just in holding them accountable.

But there’s also circumstances, and although many would counter they’re just excuses, sometimes at the heart of excuses exist legitimate reasons worth considering.