More than ever, the Springboks' hopes rest on what's coming from the 10

Robbie Owen’s words of “Starting to think South Africa’s title hopes may just rest more on their first choice 10 being fit than Ireland’s” struck me to be odd at first.

After all, even though Handrè Pollard would tilt the balance with his kicking game and attacking organisation, the impression was that the architect of their attack was still Willie Le Roux, who also held a key hand in their kicking game and scramble defense, and a clear cut MVP since 2018.

Little of that has changed – Le Roux is still a brilliant fullback. But the loss to the All Blacks sparked this new theory for me. A sign of Boks playing a balanced attack is measured by Le Roux being less anchored to the openside first receiver hinge spot. And going by those metrics, 2022’s Test 1 against Wales and 2023’s Test 1 against New Zealand were key examples of blunt offensive plays.

When a fullback specialising in making key passes/kicks/runs from a strike layer midfield position behind a screen, you need your flyhalf to take charge of the operations in the flat layer. Australia saw Manie Libbok and Le Roux trade roles, as Le Roux managed the attack with the quicker Libbok with a delayed passing touch being able to make plays from deep, escaping line-speed.

If it ain’t broken, don’t fix it. One may wonder so about their option to drop Manie Libbok to the bench for the All Blacks game. It was no surprise their attack went up a notch with his entry, although the Springbok carrying patterns had to vary, relying on width and strike on offense. However, he does not have the tactical control and attacking arrangement to enable sharpness from all cylinders, seeing the machine creak although his own cog spins efficaciously.

Manie Libbok. (Photo by Sydney Seshibedi/Gallo Images/Getty Images)

The Bok attack has continued to evolve into a more fluid application of pods, and thus a floating flyhalf like Libbok could suit them better. However, they still need the DNA of their attack, to have the direct power up front-to be driven by a driving 10.

Floating flyhalves are quicker, more agile running 10s. Driving 10s are direct 10s with an elite carrying/short passing game who at a top level, use the flat options to create space for the runners under them.

To class Pollard as a driving 10 is pigeonholes him. He is crucial on and off the ball, guiding the crash units around the field, allowing flashier players around him to dazzle.

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The Guiding Gravity of Pollard

In a heavy carry team, you will need your big ball carriers to be accurately arrayed, with pre-programmed phaseplay sequences. However, you need a pair of hands and a mind to ensure things run smoothly, guiding a team around a park on and off the ball.

To show his importance, I am going to use Wales Test 3 2022, which is one of the alpha-program Springboks, an attacking evolution in its infancy, demonstrating the fundamentals of their lynchpin in a 3-3-2 attacking systems.

Here, he instructs the forwards to hit the right lines, making gains and setting up the next phase from the pocket, getting them wide to stretch the Wales defence thin, leaving a gap to carry on the inside shoulder. He slides under the pod, evolving his position in operating the crash units. He then takes the ball flat, feinting the pass and squaring up defenders to use a short pass to get a clean break for Koch.

The other variation was a 2-3-1-X, of scattered units off turnover ball.

This two phase break play has more influence from the 10 than any other player involved. He directs the forwards on each carry, and then flashing round to run an over under’s play, selling the carry and firing it wide to Le Roux and De Allende (two key ball players who act as handling options with Am as a creative strike runner), who then facilitate Kolisi’s break.

The lack of a controller in the Boks saw them caught with their pants down in the autumn series, as an over-reliance on Willie meant he was no longer able to unlock the defence from a midfield position, forced to play first receiver. Willemse was caught lacking as a pivot, and fails to act as a tactical organiser despite having the skillset and vision to act as a playmaker.

Conclusion

Manie Libbok is a brilliant Willie Le Roux role twin of a structural sorcerer, in the mould of a Finn Russell-playmakers with X factor running and passing that float into space looking to spark a break. That is excellent for the future, but he does not have the tactical control of Pollard. Kicking and defence is largely even between all three 10s, which means that tactical arrangement lies integral to having an effective 10.

Without a systemic progress, they cannot win games. Libbok relies on front foot ball. Willemse loses the plot and is absent from playmaking and organizing duties for much of the game when given the 10 jersey, albeit functioning as a high work-rate floating strike runner.

For Boks to win, Le Roux has to be in the strike area, with Pollard handling distribution from hammer(crash ball pods) to strike zones and picking the right options, to then allow his fullback to evolve the attacking shape and then put their strike runners into space.

He remains as the rock solid lynchpin that pods build around, calling lines and immediate hitter options, as well as possessing an excellent passing game to get the ball wide, making the right choices to create breaks and run the attack in default mode.

A solution to his absence must be found, or else the Boks are relying on a Leicester general that has as of late been out with injury.