The Highlanders weren't lucky, they were just better prepared

The French chemist and microbiologist Louis Pasteur once remarked that ‘chance favours the prepared mind’. This was certainly true of the quarter-final between the Brumbies and Highlanders on a wet Friday evening in Canberra.

Weather conditions can be a great leveller, which is another way of saying that it can increase the effects of chance. With the Brumbies playing one of their better games of an up-and-down season, it was always going to be a tight contest against their Kiwi opponents.

In the event, the depth and accuracy of the Highlanders’ preparation for the Brumbies lineout proved to be the decisive factor in the match. They clearly realised that the lineout was the key to the Brumbies’ attacking game-plan, that their greatest point of strength was the driving maul and the attacking repertoire they set up off the threat of Tevita Kuridrani in the backs from it.

With 6’10 lock Rory Arnold out of the starting line-up, they decided to attack that strongpoint both on the throw and on the first phase pattern beyond it.

***

Attacking the Brumbies lineout throw
Arnold’s absence left a hole in the Brumbies’ lineout as huge as his physical presence, and it encouraged the Highlanders to key on the caller Sam Carter and his first lieutenant Scott Fardy. They simply ignored Blake Enever and his replacement Tom Staniforth, and the three throws directed to Enever-Staniforth were all won with ease.

The results of the Highlanders’ prep were ‘clear and obvious’ (to coin the phrase that refs now like to use to justify their decisions), with Carter winning only four of the eight throws he called to himself – and a ninth overthrown and recovered in the 63rd minute. Scott Fardy and his replacement Mike Wells also only managed a 50 per cent return on four throws. Those four included a crucial steal on the Highlanders’ goal-line with the Brumbies primed for one of their scoring lineout drives.

So what were the main planks of the Highlanders preparation in this area?
• Creating an aggressive ‘wall of noise’ and mid-line creepage. Both as the Brumbies approached the site of the lineout throw:

And as they set up:


The Highlanders created a rolling wave of talk and finger-pointing at Sam Carter as their three biggest men (8 Liam Squire, 19 Mark Reddish and 5 Luke Whitelock) bracket all his options in mid-line. They used this wave of psychological intimidation as cover to creep wholesale across the centre line of the lineout:


And get their jumpers closer to the ball when it is delivered. In the earlier frame they are half a metre behind the 5m line, in the later one they standing right on it.

• Default to defend Sam Carter. The Highlanders began the game with a clear plan to take Sam Carter out of the lineout equation. In the lineouts at 12:05, 21:56, 32:15 and 59:13 in reel below:

The (front) lifter with a decision to make always defaults towards Carter. Luke Whitelock at 12:07, Tom Franklin at 21:57 and Elliott Dixon at 32:16 and 59:14 all turn and block up the line for the jumper directly opposite Carter and ignore the Brumbies’ fake activity to the front.

• Carter’s movement tendencies. Perhaps partly due to the prevailing weather conditions, Carter concentrated on taking the ball either straight up (15:18 and 21:56), or on a forward shuffle down towards touch (12:07), sometimes with the player ahead of him dropping out of the line to increase his room for manoeuvre (32:16 and 59:14). The Highlanders were able to compress their lineout defence around the front-middle of the lineout (32:16, 35:09, 59:14 and 61:25) knowing that Carter was not going to call back ball, and that his movement tendencies were likely to bring him firmly into their ‘kill zone’ on defence.

Attacking the Brumbies first phase pattern from lineout
The Highlanders attacked the Brumby lineout throw at source in order to stymie their driving maul and restrict their opportunities to dominate territory. They also had a plan for when the Brumbies won their own throw and employed their typical attacking pattern on first phase.

As readers will know from my previous article on the Brumbies-Bulls game back in May, the Brumbies use a characteristic set-up to establish their #13 Tevita Kuridrani as ‘king of the gain-line’ and then work a repertoire of plays off that threat.

The basic shape could be described as a ‘sliding box’:

In this picture from the Bulls match, there are two players at the top of the box: #10 Christian Leali’ifano and Kuridrani. They both stay relatively straight, with two more attackers directly behind them (the blind-side wing and inside centre, here #14 Nigel Ah Wong and #12 Robbie Coleman) who slide out towards the far corner flag as the play develops.

Basic Brumby first phase options
The following highlight reel gives an idea of the basic options available when the pattern works, as it did against the Bulls:

• Establishing Tevita Kuridrani on the gain-line. The primary need is to establish Kuridrani as a threat who holds the interest of the defence at all times. In the Bulls game, the Brumbies achieved their aim early on with Kuridrani’s run at 4:35, then reinforced it throughout the game (see 62:25). In both cases Kuridrani is targeting either the defensive #12, or the gap between the #10 and #12. In both cases he makes a ground gain of anywhere between 5-10 metres, either directly against the Bulls #12 Jan Serfontein or into the gap between Serfontein the #10 inside him (Francois Brummer/ Tian Schoeman).

• The main repertoire option – the blindside wing with Kuridrani as a ‘screen’. Once Kuridrani is established as a threat, the Brumbies like to work plays off it. They have a nice circle play with Kuridrani passing back to the #12 before contact, and the 12 looking to play wide with the blind-side wing in support/

However their most dangerous option is a screen ball with the blindside wing coming from a hidden position behind Kuridrani to take the pass off Leali’ifano. It is this option which earned the Brumbies their first try of the game in the 44th minute, with Nigel Ah Wong slicing through to score near the posts. The key ingredient in the scoring recipe is Kuridrani’s ability to hold Serfontein inside long enough for Ah Wong to penetrate the gap outside the Bulls #12.

The Highlander solution
With much more limited lineout possession, the Brumbies were still able to launch both the Kuridrani base play and the blind-side screen spin-off from it. The second half of the Highlanders defensive highlights reel (above) shows the results.

In the first example at 16:00, the Brumbies achieved a heartening success with Kuridrani busting straight through the gap between the Highlanders #10 (Lima Sopoaga) and #12 (Malakai Fekitoa). This looked to be Fekitoa’s fault, with the Highlander’s #12 drifting off Kuridrani too early and widening the gap inside him:

While the Brumbies earned a penalty from Kuridrani’s incursion, the Highlanders went one better and scored a try off interception when the Brumbies tried their blind-side option in the second half.

So why did the Highlanders succeed when the Bulls failed?
• Improved line-speed. When Leali’fano receives the ball, the Bulls and Highlanders are nearly identical in structure and line-speed.

But when the pass to Nigel Ah Wong is made, a critical difference becomes clear.

The Bulls have already stopped and are looking outside to drift, while the Highlanders backs continue to press upfield. Serfontein is two metres away from Leali’ifano while Fekitoa is level with him, Brummer stops and waits while Sopoaga bursts through the gap outside the Brumby #10!

• Perfect defensive pattern. The Highlanders have read the play perfectly in snapshot at 56:20. Fekitoa is tight and square to Kuridrani, #13 Matt Faddes is eyeing the outside option (Matt Toomua), and Sopoaga is in position to make the tackle behind the gain-line on Ah Wong even if he doesn’t make the intercept. In the event Sopoaga picked the ball off and the Highlanders scored on the next phase of play. I believe the Highlanders had also read the Brumbies’ larger tendencies perfectly as well. They knew the Brumbies would use the base play off Kuridrani first, and keep the blind-side wing option up their sleeve for use later in the game – second half in both the Bulls and Highlanders matches. So they called the press at the perfect time in the game.

***

Summary
While the Brumbies enjoyed some control in one or two departments of a match levelled by the weather, the lineout was the decisive area and the Highlanders managed it far better than their opponents.

They dug into Sam Carter’s lineout calls without the support of Rory Arnold and stole 50% of the ball thrown to Carter and Scott Fardy. This neutered the Brumbies’ favoured weapon, the driving maul.

They also had a plan to deal with the hosts’ back-line pattern on first phase, rushing up when they expected the blind-side option later in the game.

So while the Brumbies played with great gusto and emotion and no little technical skill, it was the Highlanders who identified the key areas more clearly in their preparation and attacked them more accurately on the field. When fate rolled the dice with the weather conditions, they were the team more prepared to take advantage of the chances on offer.