There are a number of Wallabies who are making the step up from Super Rugby simultaneously, and we are paying for this lack of Test match experience in key moments of games.
Simply put, we are not recognising and converting the opportunities we are creating, nor are we scrambling effectively to shut down the attack opportunities from our opposition.
Many of our players, and therefore the balance of the team as a whole, are lacking a ‘Test match mindset’ – the mindset that understands international teams are going to have their act together for the vast majority of the time, but that even the best sides are going to be outmanoeuvred at some point in the game and will present you with an opportunity to score.
In Test matches, those opportunities are rare, and so they simply must be finished off in attack, and killed off in defence.
These are the moments that define Test matches, and players/teams who have a Test match mindset instinctively realise the rest of the game is simply a feeling out process to create these moments.
It’s these moments that decide who scores a try, and who produces a try-saving tackle.
They decides who has to settle for three points, and who is too tired to get up off the ground and make a nuisance of themselves getting back in the defensive line.
So, what is it the All Blacks are doing that we are not?
It’s probably best to illustrate with actual examples from the most recent Test.
In the 26th minute of the game, the All Blacks regathered the ball from a midfield bomb, just on the Wallaby side of halfway.
They immediately cleared the ruck to a ball runner who took it strongly into contact, winning the collision and they got support players in behind quickly to secure the next ruck.
At this point, Will Genia raced back onside to cover a potential kick in behind the line towards touch, while James O’Connor stayed up flat to defend on the end of the line.
Jesse Mogg jogged back into position but strangely was not watching the play unfolding, instead his eyes were straight ahead towards his own tryline, and there was no sense of urgency.
At the same time, there were only four Wallabies defending on his side of the ruck, with eight All Blacks starting to position themselves in an even spread to the touch line.
This should be an absolute red alert for both teams – a half of a sniff that could be taken by the attackers, or snuffed out by the defenders.
The other side of the ruck found five Wallaby defending against three All Blacks, one of whom spotted the opportunity on the right and switched behind the ruck into first receiver to create a nine-on-four mismatch on the far side.
The ball was fed quickly from the ruck, the ball runners ran straight and transfered the ball and Stephen Moore missed a tackle, which forced O’Connor to come in to assist.
The ball was offloaded and Mogg, coming across in cover defence, also missed a tackle that forced Genia, as the last line of defence, to take the ball runner, leaving the winger unmarked.
A final draw and pass saw Ben Smith score the first try.
The contrast in how quickly and effectively each side responded to the opportunity that presented itself from the kick regather was stark.
With Genia racing back to cover the kick, should Mogg have taken a look at what was brewing and stayed in the line to cover the immediate threat of an overlap on his side?
On the other side of the ruck, why didn’t any of the defenders notice they were covering so few attackers and wonder where the rest of the All Blacks were?
Michael Hooper was defending in the ‘pillar’ or ‘rock’ position next to the ruck, so perhaps he had to stay put, but Matt Toomua, Christian Lealiifano and Adam Ashley-Cooper were all marking nobody, and were watching what was developing across the field without taking the initiative to get across and help.
Even with the mismatch, if Moore and Mogg had made those tackles, the combination of the initial slide defence and the two men coming up to cover from the deep could have seen this attack snuffed out.
In a game where only three tries were scored, the Wallabies clocked-off at this vital instant, while the All Blacks saw a ‘championship moment’ and made sure they took it.
The Wallabies created these moments, too.
One such opportunity was in the 56th minute, where the Wallabies won a lineout in the All Black 22m – rolled gold attacking territory. Every Wallaby should be at maximum concentration to make sure they come away with points.
Mogg was positioned back covering the sideline against an All Black clearance kick, in case New Zealand won the lineout. On winning the lineout, the Wallabies spread the ball nicely to Israel Folau, who was positioned in the midfield.
He ran a hard straight line, made a break and was pulled down a few metres short of the line, outside the right hand goal post.
Mogg, as fullback, walked across field from the sideline watching this play unfold. At the ruck, the Wallabies had two attackers on the right hand side of the field, a 20m wide short side, up against two All Black defenders.
Red alert on the short side.
Mogg watched the ruck, continued walking forward and toward the play, but was about 15-20 metres away from the ruck.
He was in the best position of anyone on the field to read what was happening, spot the mismatch on the short side, and present himself as the extra man on the far side of the field.
He didn’t.
Instead, he turned his shoulders back towards the open side where there were eight or nine Wallabies arrayed against a similar number of All Blacks in a 30m wide channel, and stopped.
He was not alone though. Surely someone else could have folded around behind the ruck to create the extra man that was needed?
The ball was fed by Genia to the short side, where the space was, but the play was covered in a two-on-two scenario and ended in Scott Fardy on the touch line getting a poor pass above his head and dropping it.
It sounds like I am targeting Mogg, but I actually think he did his primary jobs very well. I just don’t see the urgency in his game at the key moments to pop up in attack, or save something in defence, and he is not the only one.
That doesn’t hurt you much at Super level, where the Brumbies create many such attacking opportunities and the games are generally high scoring, but it proved the difference in Wellington.
So where to from here?
If McKenzie believes he has the right players in the side now, then he needs to stick with them and give them time to develop the experience at Test level, and the combinations with one another that are missing.
Nevertheless, it was the right call to bench Mogg this week. I mentioned two moments where he clocked off above, but there were more throughout the game that put others under pressure.
He is a very talented footballer, but he is still too naive for Test rugby.
He had a fabulous game under the high ball, and his kicking was very good. In these areas, he made an invaluable contribution to Australia’s performance.
However he needs to be rotated out of the starting side to learn to develop his mental hardness before allowing him to start again.
I would have stuck with Toomua again this week. His direct running game was excellent, his passes much better, and he is rock solid with his distance kicking and re-starts. He is pushing Quade Cooper to lift his game, too, which is a good thing.
Toomua also needs to recognise those big moments as they are occurring, and make sure he presents himself as the chief conductor to get us across the line. This is something that Quade does without exception.
Perhaps Quade is getting the message that his job also encompasses establishing rock solid restarts, less ‘sliced’ kicks in general play, and formidable defence.
Either way, there’s nothing like genuine competition for your spot to lift your game, and I would have made Quade sweat a little longer before giving him the number 10 again.
In summary, bringing in Nick Cummins to wing and putting Folau to fullback would have been my only personnel change for the next game.
Other than that, I think we need to let this team have time together. They are playing slightly easier teams for the next four games, so we will see how much they have learnt from the Bledisloe experience.
Mike
Guest
PeterK, if you are going to make assertions like "my original post on this", will you please tell the truth? This is your original post that I responded to: "Mike you are clearly wrong in your assertion. After the TN’s 2011 Pat McCabe was used as the 12. The game plan changed to hit ups by the not so big McCabe to get over the advantage line. Prior to this Cooper played with width looking for other runners and ball players as in the game against France. The 3 amigos ran riot. Look at the average of tries per game before and after this period (excluding the RWC games against USA and Russia since these are the only times he plays against countries this low). He average 1 try per game once he changed to crash ball. Prove to me that the style and game plan was the same throughout instead of just saying it." PeterK, the flaws in your reasoning in that post were manifest. I and others attempted to point them out to you, but you would not listen. 1. Pat McCabe was used as the Wallabies 12 DURING the 2011 TN. 2. During 2011 TN, his style of play was "crash ball", same as many other international 12s at that time (and still now). 3. Pat McCabe combined very well with Quade Cooper during 2011 TN. In one of their matches together, Wallabies scored six tries against the Springboks (sounds rather sad after last night, doesn't it?) 4. McCabe did not change his style of play after 2011 TN - he was the same player he always was. 5. The average of tries scored when McCabe plays at 12 actually goes up, not down.
Mike
Guest
PeterK, This post illustrates starkly why certain people should not be allowed near statistics. "Some stats to show this" No, the stats you have quoted don't show anything about a change in style. You are simply seizing on an explanation that you had already decided was going to be the correct one. The term is "a priori reasoning". Even if the stats you show are accurate (I have neither the time nor inclination to check them, especially as you don't explain several key parameters which you have adopted), they indicate no more than that more tries were scored per game over set periods. There could be many explanations for that, particularly as each other team is evolving. There could also be many explanations within the Wallabies, not just your extremely narrow hobby-horse. Even on the information you have given, your treatment of statistics is woeful. For example: You claim that a change occurs before RWC, yet you leave out the RWC stats (very convenient). You quietly slip in a claim that "ref interpretations" are consistent across periods, hoping it will go unnoticed - absolutely ludicrous. You slip in a number of other claims e.g. that other teams no of tries are consistent, without the slightest attempt at verification. "Instead of just repeating the styles were the same please provide evidence," How about YOU provide some evidence at all in the first place for your contention, not just a selection of numbers that you like?!
Mike
Guest
Deans was quite good at picking players and crafting a game plan around them. "So more Deans fault than the player." That's quite a climb down for PeterK - normally he places the blame entirely on Deans! "Of course if you have the correct player, which I posted a reply with, ie a Mortlock, Nonu, Roberts, SBW, Umaga it is a great ploy to use" This is also a major climb down - we have been blasted with posts by PeterK for at least the past 12 months explaining to anyone who would listen that "crash ball" was a disaster. Now he is at least admitting that others do it (after he has been told many times). ;) So now his fallback position is that it just wasn't right for MCCABE to do it .... Conveniently ignoring the times when it worked quite well!
Mike
Guest
Peter I will shortly be boarding a plane and cannot respond in detail to you now. Suffice to say that I consider your memory, statistics and quotes to be highly selective. Your sources are never quoted and the assertion that McCabe was Deans' main attacking weapon at any time is indicative of the fantasy world in which you live. Cheers.
Mike
Guest
Justin, even if that were an accurate way to put it (i can't think of a single test player in last ten years who had 'no tricks in his bag', it misses the point. I wasn't arguing that McCabe was one of the great 12s. My point was that, contrary to the arguments of some, his period at 12 did not coincide with low number of tries scored by Wallabies - rather the opposite. Having centres who don't pass much is not necessarily the end of the world.
Aussie Rugby
Guest
I still think that they should try Christian Leali’ifano at 1st five. He’s played a lot of games there so he’s not new to that position. He’s a better option than no tackle Cooper http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=19axsiLnCBQ
PeterK
Roar Guru
Mike – The Wallabies were playing a very different style prior to the RWC. Some stats to show this (and how other teams remained constant so not rule changes etc) Pre RWC (From when Deans took over to 1/10/2011) against tier 1 teams no games 35, tries for 85 tries against 77, per game ratio 2.4 tries for , 2.2 tries against against tier 2 teams no games 13, tries for 34 tries against 10, per game ratio 2.6 tries for , 0.8 tries against total (tier 1 and 2) no games 48, tries for 119 tries against 87, per game ratio 2.5 tries for , 1.8 tries against Post RWC against tier 1 teams no games 12, tries for 10 tries against 20, per game ratio 0.8 tries for , 1.7 tries against against tier 2 teams no games 10, tries for 15 tries against 12, per game ratio 1.5 tries for , 1.2 tries against total (tier 1 and 2) no games 22, tries for 25 tries against 32, per game ratio 1.1 tries for , 1.5 tries against Pre RWC (1/10/2009 – 1/10/2011 so just before RWC) against tier 1 teams no games 17, tries for 49 tries against 40, per game ratio 2.9 tries for , 2.4 tries against against tier 2 teams no games 8, tries for 18 tries against 4, per game ratio 2.3 tries for , 0.5 tries against total (tier 1 and 2) no games 25, tries for 67 tries against 44, per game ratio 2.7 tries for , 1.8 tries against The win / loss ratios are very consistent across the periods so losing games is not why the number of tries went down. Rule changes, ref interpretations are not the reason since the other teams no of tries remains far more consistent. The change was the Wallabies became very dour and conservative, playing one out crash ball via McCabe which did not work. They scored very few tries and a lot of those were the forwards. Very very different to the years before. Instead of just repeating the styles were the same please provide evidence, more than your assertion which is clearly wrong. Also explain why the number of tries is so different. They went from 2.4 tries (or 2.7 for the years just before) to 0.8 tries against tier 1 teams.
PeterK
Roar Guru
my original post on this For me it was never about win / loss ratio. For me it was if the Wallabies played well, with skills and smarts. If a team improves, plays to its strengths and away from its weaknesses is how I judge the coach. I thought Deans did well until the RWC. The team played with flair and skills and to their strengths. Then Deans went away from that. The Wallabies stopped playing with falir, with skill and smarts. Instead they played a dour conservative, limit the risk, play to not lose rugby. They did not play to their strengths and away from their weaknesses. Trundling one out rugby, crash ball rugby became the norm. Additionally once they played this style it is no wonder the main poor performances and losses occured from this point. The loss to Samoa, the loss to Ireland, the loss to Scotland. They only squeeked out wins , in the majority of cases if the margin was ever large it was because they lost ie to England and France. Tries no longer mattered. Wallabies now averaged 1 try a match. The general interest in rugby dropped. In summary Deans started fine but when he changed to a dour conservative kicking team and away from their strengths thats when the vitriol (quite rightly) started.
PeterK
Roar Guru
McCabe not McCalman BTW. It was what Deans was trying to do since he did not use tactics that suited the players at hand. He has to develop a game plan that the players can execute. So either determine the game plan and select the right players for it or with a lack of depth pick the best players and develop the corect game plan for that set of players. Deans was very poor at this. He was pig headed in his game plan, and did not have the players to execute it but would not change. So more Deans fault than the player. Of course if you have the correct player, which I posted a reply with, ie a Mortlock, Nonu, Roberts, SBW, Umaga it is a great ploy to use, mind you it can be a 13 that does crash ball ie Herbert, Mortlock or Umaga rather than 12. Works either way.
PeterK
Roar Guru
what utter rubbish Mike, utter rubbish. I was that other roarer. Stop putting words in my mouth. Point out where I stated I wanted a second five instead of an impact 12, show me the post where I stated that, you cannot since I never said it. Nor did I say that McCabe started his career during the RWC which is what you inferred which I admit was understandable. What I said was that this was when Deans changed his tactics to use crash ball at 12 and gave direction to Cooper NOT to pass it out wide. This is from an article quoting QC and his frustrations. My point was Deans changed his game plan / style to a dour , playing not to lose, conservative style which the fans hated. The number of tries plummeted to an average of 1 try per test match. You very very erroneously continue with an assertion the style never changed. My point on Deans was that he had a poor game plan and used a very poor strategy from the RWC onwards when McCabe was his attacking weapon of choice. My personal beef was not just the spectacle, it was a 1/4 of it, it was his appalling selections, game tactics, use of bench, and holding personal grudges from the RWC onwards.
Justin3
Guest
He was a great defensive 12 but attack was not up to it. He didn't have one trick in his bag...
Mike
Guest
Liam, great article, with some real substance to the analysis. Please do more.
Mike
Guest
I have to disagree. The roarer who posted that criticism of mccabe doesn't know what he is talking about, simple as that. Notice the elementary mistakes he made - not even aware that McCabe started his test career at 12 in the 2011 TN when we had our most prolific try scoring of the last six years. Australia did quite well with McCabe at 12, even though he is only an average test talent - the reason he doesn't play there now is because other players came through, particularly Ben Tapuai and Christian Lealiifano. The roarer who posted on that other thread eventually conceded that his real beef was with the spectacle - he wanted a second five instead of an impact 12.
Two Eyed Cyclop
Roar Guru
Now I understand, it wasn't what Deans was trying to do, he was just using the wrong tool to accomplish it (no offence to McCalman, just an expression). Thank you, no more questions.
Liam Ovenden
Roar Pro
With McCabe, he is a good straight runner and defender, no doubt. However at test level against bigger players, with no side step, no offloading capability in the tackle, and no threat whatsoever that he will pass it, he was mincemeat. That's why the poor guy is always injured. Saili and Nonu are also capable of getting the ball out to Conrad Smith as the circumstance demands, and both of them have good offloads after the contact. Entirely different threat.
Two Eyed Cyclop
Roar Guru
I am educated for free this morning Liam. Apologies for digressing from the main point of your argument with the following, promised I won't ask any more questions after this one. Now that simplistically I understand the role of the no 12, why was Deans criticised so heavily (and still is by Roar posters) for picking McCalman to do exactly that. I heard it described as "dour conservative crash ball, predictable, boring and de skilling the players" only yesterday. Am I missing something? As I said last question on the matter, unless I get a lot of vitriol from other posters.
Liam Ovenden
Roar Pro
You are right. I think that is the mission for most number 12s anyway, unless you are playing 2 ball players at 10 and 12. The 12 is always the go-to option for getting over the gain line. "am I being naïve or are most teams over complicating things and bamboozling their inexperienced players with too many options and permutations. It still boils down to trusting your teammates and executing the simple things well and consistently." No, you have nailed it. Hard to do in test match intensity when you have a team with a lot of new players, as the Wallabies have just found out. But if you are the ABs, and are introducing a new player into a settled lineup, that's just the sort of simplicity that you are looking for. The team around him is a well oiled machine that he can slot straight into.
peterlala
Guest
You are not being naive, Cyclops, but Saili fits into a structure; the Wallabies backs don't have structure. The instructions would be by nature more complex for an outside centre. The inside centre's job in NZ is to pass the ball or hit the line, and defend. As you say, if he does that, Saili will have done well.
Two Eyed Cyclop
Roar Guru
Liam, am I being naïve or are most teams over complicating things and bamboozling their inexperienced players with too many options and permutations. It still boils down to trusting your teammates and executing the simple things well and consistently. As a case in point, the ABs are resting Nonu this week and giving the 22 year old Saili his debut. These extracts from yesterdays NZ herald just about sum it up for me, and if true that is exactly how I would want to sent a young and inexperienced player into his first test match: “Saili’s mission – run hard, fast and break the line. The All Blacks have a non-complicated plan in mind for their second-fives – run straight, run hard, attack the inside shoulder and get over the gainline. That’s been the brief for Nonu and Sonny Bill Williams during Hansen’s reign and that will be the brief for Saili. There’s no desire to see Saili over-think things. They don’t want him to throw his long cut-out passes; they don’t want him to feel he needs to help Daniel Carter too much with the tactical direction and they don’t want Saili to feel he needs to show all his tricks during the 80 minutes. What they do want is for him to use his fast feet, his acceleration and power to attack space and break the line. If that’s Saili’s sole contribution tomorrow – Hansen and his fellow coaches won’t complain.” Also: “All Black No 12 job description • Run hard, run straight – cross the gainline. • Break the line and a) offload or b) set up for recycle. • Win all collisions.” Now I could do that, almost :-) . It sounds so simple, straight forward and leaving the youngster in no doubt about what is expected of him.
peterlala
Guest
Liam, good article. Anyone can see the Wallabies didn't match the ABs -- but the devil is in the detail, as you show. The good thing is that the problems are fixable. So, McKenzie should be optimistic.