Why didn’t Australia play smarter at Melbourne?

This time, there are no excuses. Presently, England are slightly but definitely better than the Wallabies at rugby union.

The two games were played in different parts of Australia – one on the east coast, one on the south – in very different weather conditions – one dry, one wet – and with referees appointed from both northern and southern hemispheres.

The Wallabies coaching group, led by Michael Cheika, may be well be kicking themselves for not producing a more balanced and flexible gameplan for the second Test.

Conditions underfoot were treacherous, due to the unreliable, slippery playing surface. Not only were small ramparts of soil and freshly laid turf dug up at every scrum, but the grass was wet and the ball greasy to handle.

Graham Henry was always sensitive to the climate in which the game would be played, obtaining a constant stream of weather reports in the days prior to the match, and he was quite prepared to rip up the carefully prepared gameplan if the conditions weren’t right.

The Wallabies gave the impression that they were hellbent on playing their type of game, whatever the conditions.

Delving a bit deeper, the Wallaby game in fact changes significantly according to whether they are playing home or away:

There is a big difference between the Wallabies’ performance home and away
Home games have yielded two wins out of four (50%) so far. Moreover, one of those victories was a piece of daylight robbery in the final minute of the game against South Africa in the first round of the 2015 Rugby Championship.

Away games have yielded six wins out of eight (75%), with both losses coming to the All Blacks – once on the rebound from their Rugby Championship loss in Sydney, the other at the World Cup final.

Home and away statistics (pattern)

• The Wallabies average 21 kicks, 200 passes and 121 rucks built per game at home.
• The Wallabies average 29 kicks, 127 passes and 73 rucks built per game away.
• The Wallabies average 8 fewer kicks, 73 more passes and 48 more rucks per game at home.

Home and away statistics (scoring)

• Although the Wallabies score equally well home or away – at an average of 2.75 tries per game – they concede an average of 2.25 tries per game at home, and only 1.62 tries per gahe away. This represents a significant difference of 0.63 tries per game.
• The Wallabies require an average 73 passes made and 44 rucks built to score one try at home, but only 46 passes and 27 rucks to score one away.
• Australia needed 213 passes and 157 rucks to create one try at Melbourne, and that was from a driving lineout five metres from the goalline.

The ‘stretched’ comparison with England 2016
The stats against England are even more distorted. In the current series they are building rucks at a rate of 2.5:1 compared to England, and making passes at a rate of well over 3:1.

In plain terms, Australia are currently a more efficient, flexible and balanced side away from home than they are on their own patch. Predictability kills more certainly than anything at Test level, and at home the Wallabies are just too predictable.

If we also take a look at selection for those matches, another pattern becomes clear:

Australia’s winning percentage with Matt Giteau in the starting line-up was seven out of eight (87%); with Giteau and Drew Mitchell playing at 12 and 11 respectively, it was four of five (80%), including the home win over the All Blacks.

The percentage without Giteau/Mitchell drops dramatically to one out of four (25%).

The Wallabies have had the greatest statistical success under Cheika when they have kicked the ball more – or at the very least, achieved a better balance between kicking on the one hand, and ruck-building and passing on the other.

At the World Cup they were able to spread the kicking load between Will Genia at 9 (an excellent kicker), Bernard Foley at 10, and the two left feet of Giteau and Mitchell at inside centre and on the left wing. They could get meaningful punting length off at least three of those kickers, and coverage of both sides of the field from the balance of left and right boots.

The problem against England is that the Wallabies have become totally reliant on the boot of Foley.

Cheika has been unlucky in this respect. He lost his prospective #12, Kurtley Beale, to injury, and that was crucial. As I pointed out in an earlier article, Beale was playing the best rugby of his career at 12 and had developed his ability to control a match via his kicking game. Although a natural right-footer, he could have made a big difference.

The single setback became a double-whammy when Giteau was declared unavailable due to club commitments in France, and Mitchell appeared not to be considered for the June series at all.

Giteau started for Toulon last Saturday in their Top 14 semi-final win over Montpellier. With neither of Karmichael Hunt nor Matt Toomua able to recover from injury in time for the first Test, and Christian Lealiifano on baby–watch, the die was cast.

As a result, there has been consistent pressure on Wallaby exits, and their upfield kicking game was non-existent at Melbourne in the kind of conditions that most demanded it:

At the same time, England employed an approach similar to that adopted by the Highlanders against the Waratahs, kicking the ball 15 times from ‘upfield’ positions beyond their own 40-metre line.

By my count, ten of those kicks resulted in positive outcomes for the Red Rose. The more the Wallabies ran and ran, the more England kicked and kicked, as the two teams polarised to opposite extremes of the rugby spectrum.

The constant pressure on Wallaby exits, the territorial suffocation imposed by England’s kicking game, and the complete absence of an Australian equivalent to it gave England a risk-free grip which they never truly relinquished, despite Australia’s domination of phase-play. As I concluded in the Highlanders article:

The Highlanders’ game-plan is impressive, and it may have longer term repercussions for both the Waratahs and the Wallabies employing the same systems. Players like Bernard Foley, who is rightly regarded as Australia’s first-choice outside-half, may well have to be protected from a kicking/pressure strategy which will arrive on the Wallabies’ doorstep as early as the England tour in June.

Foley’s early penalty miscue somehow anticipated the quality of Australia’s kicking game throughout. The highlight reel illustrates how:

Pressure on Foley’s exits produced either block-downs or returnable kicks
England tended to have one of their big men, typically either Maro Itoje or George Kruis, charge up in Foley’s face at every kick, and the pressure was constant because there were no alternatives. The weak exits allowed England to run back returnable kicks, from situations in which the kick returner (Mike Brown at 13:33, Jack Nowell at 25:16 and Brown again at 45:23) can advance beyond halfway risk-free and with positive momentum.

England’s upfield kicking game either created confusion in the Wallaby backfield or excellent pressure positions in the Wallaby 22
England’s kicking game was far more accurate and focused, with George Ford targeting the soft zone between the defensive line and backfield at 16:49 and 22:03. When the Wallaby backfield compressed in midfield, Ford and Ben Youngs found the edges of the field with well-weighted diagonals at 40:48 and 45:45.

The issue with the kicking game was compounded by England mostly using Mike Brown in a one-man backfield and 13 or 14 defenders in the line on defence. This is a scenario in which it is notoriously difficult for the attack to break down the defence successfully. It becomes nigh impossible to win by keeping the ball in hand at this level without the aid of the kicking game. The spaces to either side of Mike Brown could have been attacked by means of long diagonals, high balls and shorter attacking chips in behind the wings:

Cheika was clearly not helped by the unfortunate situation which developed around the #12 jersey prior to the first Test. The absence of Beale, Giteau, Toomua, Lealiifano and Hunt took away his options and left him short of both a support kicker to Foley and a second playmaker.

When the back-line with two power centres played well at Brisbane, he had little choice but to reselect them en bloc for Melbourne. Without Will Genia, the kicking game was further depleted.

Like it or not, a good kicking game was always going to be paid out in full in the conditions at Melbourne and it was Youngs, Ford, Farrell and Brown versus Foley for the entire match.

Australia’s inability to make use of the kicking game on attack, to provide a change-up to their phase-play, made life far easier than it might have been for the 13 or 14-man England defensive line.

Cheika’s brief coaching history with the Wallabies already suggests that Australia become predictable when playing at home, and that some of the efficiency and balance from that ‘away’ playing policy needs to be brought back to Australian soil.

Australia need to build up their kicking game in the backs. Beale may return for the Rugby Championship, but in the meantime Nick Frisby at 9 and Matt Toomua at 12 would be sensible choices for the final Test in Sydney.

Cheika also needs to find a solution to the ‘Highlander’ kicking game employed by England, or it will rapidly become the weapon of choice for international sides playing Australia – especially away from home!