Why the number on Israel Folau’s back doesn’t matter

Eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen. They are all numbers that have been advanced as the best position on the field for Australia’s supreme back-line athlete, Israel Folau.

The truth is, it does not matter what number Folau is wearing, because Mick Byrne and Stephen Larkham already have him playing multiple roles for Australia.

Right now, Israel Folau is the everywhere man.

If there are a lot of positives linked to the new functions the Wallaby coaching group has designed for Folau, there are also one or two dark clouds looming in the background.

That is for later. Let’s begin by trying to answer the outstanding question of this Wallaby weekend:

How did Scotland come so close to overturning an Australian side which had looked so dominant against Wales one week before?
The short answer is that Scotland defended far better at Murrayfield than Wales did at the Millennium stadium. The rock upon which Matt Taylor’s defence was built was Scotland’s ability to front up to Australia’s big inside pod runners (the two second rows and No.8 Lopeti Timani). Then they built their house on the effort to steal or disrupt ball during sequences of play where the Wallaby ‘big three’ had already been neutralised.

This defensive policy was given a leg up by the two 4th-minute substitutions, one for each side. Adam Coleman went off for Australia, to be replaced by Rob Simmons. More importantly, John Hardie subbed on for the Scotland No.8 Ryan Wilson, which gave the home side three natural 7s in the back-row.

With Alex Dunbar (another terrific jackal at the breakdown) already in place at inside centre, and a fifth man who has started rugby life on the open-side flank (Fraser Brown) coming on at hooker in the 55th minute, Scotland were loaded with natural poachers at the defensive breakdown. Where Wales had only managed to pinch two balls in this area in Cardiff, Scotland forced six turnovers in Edinburgh.

In last week’s article, I calculated the success rate of Coleman, Timani and Arnold overall at 76 per cent on those inside carries. At Murrayfield, that rate fell to 48 per cent.

The most efficient ball-carrier turned out to be Rob Simmons, who had six out of seven effective carries for an 86 per cent success rate – so the Coleman/Simmons switch was not the main issue. Timani’s figures were slightly down on his Cardiff performance and Rory Arnold was clearly below par. Neither David Pocock nor the two second half replacements (Dean Mumm and Will Skelton) were able to generate any quick ruck deliveries on ‘hard yards’ carries.

The first reel example gives a nice picture of the problem confronting the men in gold. Both of the first two rucks on Pocock and Sekope Kepu are average-to-slow, three or four-second ball. As a result, Scotland flood three defenders around the corner at both breakdowns, develop their line-speed without leaving any gaps, and match numbers when the ball goes wide at 4:12, with Dunbar in good position to take man-and-ball, or even make the intercept as Bernard Foley’s pass reaches Folau.

Likewise, the Scotland defence is already ‘winning’ when Foley’s pass reaches Arnold five metres behind the gain-line at 17:06, or finds Timani in a very similar situation at 37:51. Scotland #1 Alan Dell slows down Timani’s presentation of the ball, the Scottish defence floods around the corner and Stephen Moore is dumped five metres behind the previous ruck by John Barclay. Scotland’s three number 7s (Barclay, Hardie and Hamish Watson) combine over the ball to win the turnover.

The pattern is repeated at the very end of the opening period. Barclay slows the ball taken up by Rory Arnold right on the hooter, Moore is tackled behind the advantage line and Watson forces the turnover. Barclay was a thorn in the Wallabies’ side for all of the first hour, always on-ball and always difficult to remove in one-on-one cleanouts (33:39 with a failed cleanout attempt by Timani).

So Australia’s attacking base from Cardiff was effectively removed – and this is where the ‘everywhere man’ comes in…

I counted 16 occasions during the game where Folau was used as the second receiver outside Foley. You can call it what you will – number 12, inside centre or second five-eighth. That is the role Folau was fulfilling for Australia on attack:

The Wallabies used Folau as second receiver from lineout (12:28), from scrums (18:18 and 39:23 on second phase), on exits (14:54) and in phase play (20:03, 51:23 and 58:44).

As in the example from the forward carries reel at 4:12, in nearly all of these instances they are relying on Folau’s natural strength in contact, speed through the hole and sharp footwork to make something happen. With the depth of Foley’s positioning, Folau is receiving ball an average of eight metres behind the advantage line – at 12:29 (four metres), 51:23 (seven metres), 58:44 (eight metres), 18:18 (10 metres) and 39:24 (13 metres).

To his credit, Folau achieves positive results in all, whether they are tackle breaks, clean breaks or passes within breaking or try-scoring sequences.

In fact, the role he is playing is clearly modelled on Kurtley Beale’s role outside Foley for the Waratahs, at least before he suffered his season-ending injury. It is no different. Michael Cheika is using his experience with the Waratahs to try and replicate the link between Foley and Beale on the international stage with Folau.

At the same time, Folau is dropping back into his usual backfield role on defence – again just like Beale – and bringing the ball back successfully on kick returns (37:30), while his AFL-hones aerial skills still offer great value on short kick-off chases (40:02). Folau is everywhere, and the Wallabies are squeezing every last drop of value they can out of him.

However, some drawbacks are already becoming apparent. Perhaps aware of his burden of responsibility on attack, he began to overplay in the second half against Scotland and force the issue with the offloads at 51:29 and 58:47.

That is a minor issue, compared to the negative impact the Foley-Folau emphasis had on the connection between Foley and his ‘natural’ inside centre, Reece Hodge, at Murrayfield.

Although Hodge is nominally the Wallaby #12, in practice he spends most of his time as an attacker outside Folau, or being missed out of the pattern altogether in Folau’s highlight reel (14:54).

While there is an understandable desire within the coaching group to take the pressure off a young player who is still learning the ropes, it also means that there is little chance for a rapport to develop between Foley and Hodge:

Among these examples is ample evidence of either Hodge’s confusion about his role (32:14) or a lack of empathy when he is linked directly to Foley (49:57, 52:55 and 66:45). Hodge doesn’t look confident in these situations (70:35 and 72:00), and the 10-12 relationship isn’t a good one.

Australia will use Hodge on exits kicks and for kicking penalties into touch, but as a resource his kicking game remains under-exploited. He has excellent touch on shorter attacking kicks and on restarts, as Rebels supporters will know from their Super Rugby games last season (take a look at the Blues-Rebels match for Hodge’s feel and accuracy on kick-offs).

Summary
Australia used their end-of-year tour ‘get out of jail free’ card against Scotland. Their key ball-carrying forwards found it difficult to reproduce their Cardiff form over the weekend, against a well-organised Scotland defence bursting at the seams with natural jackals.

The Wallaby coaching group is clearly trying to get the max out of Folau by designing the same attacking role for him outside Foley that Beale fulfilled at the Waratahs.

While Folau was generally excellent in the second receiver position against the Scots, it also raised a question about Reece Hodge’s role in the back-line. He scored one very well-finished try but on several occasions the understanding between he and Foley was lacking, and the timing of plays between the pair poor.

Hodge’s kicking game, which could potentially become an outstanding asset for Australia, does not have the breathing or ‘growing’ space it needs in order to evolve as things stand.

The Wallabies may as well give Israel Folau the 12 jersey, shift Dane Haylett-Petty to fullback and make a choice between Hodge, Sefa Naivalu and Henry Speight on the wings.

Maybe the numbers on the back do matter, after all…