Is this really the Australian way?

They say that the definition of insanity is to keep doing the same thing repeatedly while expecting different results. While the result of Saturday’s match against England will not make Michael Cheika a head-case, it should provoke some serious scratching of the cranium.

Despite a stupendous start to the game, Australia ultimately lost by a bigger margin (16 points) than the average of their three Tests in the summer (10 points), and they lost the try count by four to two, compared with nine tries apiece in June.

As England also won the second half 24-5, there was a feeling towards the end that they won going away – a sentiment which was conspicuous by its absence in the eye-for-an-eye and try-for-a-try summer see-saws.

They also did it without two of the forwards considered essential to their success in June – Billy Vunipola and James Haskell.

The Wallabies under Cheika have adopted a similar approach to the Waratahs side he coached to Super Rugby triumph. They kick less than the opposition (an average of five times fewer per game than their Autumn opponents), and in the two games they lost the gap was even wider – England made nine more kicks than Australia and Ireland 14.

They want to be able to run the ball out of their own exit zone and across midfield consistently without putting boot to ball. Cheika has also suggested that this is the Australian way, but that statement needs qualification.

Look at the great Wallaby sides of the past. In 1984 Alan Jones was careful to couple Mark Ella’s running and handling genius at number 10 with Michael Lynagh’s kicking ability and strategic vision at inside centre. And they both had the siege-gun boot of Roger Gould behind them.

Bob Dwyer’s 1991 World Cup winning team had two capable kickers in the halves in Lynagh and Nick Farr-Jones, and Rod Macqueen’s great side of 1998-2001 could boast two great left boots, in Chris Latham and Joe Roff. Those two, plus George Gregan and Matt Burke, complemented a number 10 selected primarily for his handling (Stephen Larkham).

The current Wallaby team has no kickers anywhere near the class of Lynagh, Latham and Roff – except perhaps Will Genia (when he is available). Moreover, without Genia, it lacks decision-makers who understand when and where the kicking game is necessary. It is this black hole which threatens to consume all the several improvements Cheika rightly alludes to in his ‘end of term’ report.

There is a sense that the stubborn refusal to do anything but run out of their own end has a risk-reward balance which is tilted too heavily in favour of risk:

England wriggled out of their first quarter discomfort at Twickenham in a manner which was a replica of their escape from the same unease at Brisbane in the first Test of the summer series.

At 31:14 from Brisbane, when confronted by the blue zone in between the two 40-metre lines, England kick across it via their #9 Ben Youngs. There are ten chasers in white in the frame when Israel Folau passes the ball to Bernard Foley in midfield. When the ball flies over Foley’s head, England have a three-on-two advantage, with George Ford, Owen Farrell and Jonathan Joseph pushing up tight and hard in midfield. Samu Kerevi duly compounds Folau’s error and Joseph goes on to score.

At the time this happened, Australia were leading 10-9, had scored two tries to none, and were controlling the momentum of the match. In the following clip from Twickenham, at 29:00, they had scored one try, had approximated two others, and were leading 10-6.

Once again, over-ambition in the blue zone costs them dearly. Nick Phipps takes four lateral steps to his left before unloading the ball to Sekope Kepu at the worst possible moment. Kepu shovels it on instead of cleaning up Phipps’ mess and Joseph runs through to score another try that England do not have work for. At Twickenham as at Brisbane, once they hit the front they never look back.

Now observe the numbers England have packed into the defensive line – 13 at 29:02 (#14 Marland Yarde is just out of shot), 14 (with Johnny May out of shot on the left) at 46:15 in a position on the edge of the Wallaby 40m line.

Look at how England are defending at set-pieces deep in the Australia end – the open-side wing, Yarde, is already up level with Joseph at 61:31, as Phipps passes to Folau from a scrum, so there is no overlap when Sefanaia Naivalu drops the ball on the left. Yarde is again level with Joseph from a lineout just outside the Australian 22 at 73:47, which is a tip-off that the defenders will be looking to break from out-to-in and on to the ball.

The clue is ignored and the second pass is thrown ‘blind’ by David Pocock, gifting Joseph another intercept score.

In all of these situations, there has to be space in the backfield – behind Yarde from set-piece or to either side of England full-back Mike Brown in phase play – but it is not exploited by the Australian kicking game. This is the same kicking game which operated so effectively in the first half against Wales, but which does not appear to be part of the Wallabies’ ‘default setting’ under Cheika at present.

England did have a kicking game at Twickenham, and they had the game-manager who knew how and when to implement it in the shape of their scrum-half, Ben Youngs:

The first clip (15:36-16:13) exemplifies the difference between the Australian and English kicking games.

Phipps’ box kick is too long and allows Brown to take the ball into midfield before setting up Youngs for his reply at 16:02. Youngs’ kick is perfectly weighted for Yarde to win first touch ahead of Folau (an aerial match-up which by rights tilts towards Australia), and allow Chris Robshaw to take the ball on.

The sequence results in a penalty at the next ruck and a big momentum-swing for England. Youngs’ box-kicking was pinpoint-accurate from English exit positions all game (19:00).

The exit from midfield at 57:33 is a superb illustration of Youngs’ game-management skills. England are in an awkward spot in midfield and still inside their own 22. There are only three England chasers out to the right, with Robshaw a good 12 metres away from Yarde on the outside. If Youngs hoists the ball infield, Folau is lurking menacingly and will have a one-on-one in space with Yarde on the kick return.

In the event Youngs picks the only safe spot for the exit while squeezing maximum distance out of the kick. The ball crosses the touch-line only a metre or so across the whitewash, preventing the quick lineout and in the only position where Yarde can hope to defend Folau – with the touch-line protecting his right side.

Youngs picks the right kick at the right moment and shows that mind is in complete tune with body. Youngs’ ability to kick and give his chasers a target to ‘bite’ on is also impressive. Even the kicks directed downfield (58:13) or crossfield (4:42) give the chasers a chance of reclaiming the ball or completing a tackle-for-loss.

They are aggressive and they are attacking weapons. When England see the last open-side defender up level with man inside him, they do not ignore the kicking game in order to exploit the opportunity (44:25).

Youngs’ dummy on Phipps to score England’s third try in the 50th minute confirmed not just the difference between the two players, but the superiority of England’s game-management in the pivotal ‘solar plexus’ of the team.

It is only fair to tip my hat to the one occasion when Australia’s will to run back the ball from all parts of the field succeeded in quite spectacular fashion – the 16-phase, two-minute, five-second sequence, resulting in a try for Kepu:

This was the one vindication of Cheika’s vision of the Australian way during the game, but how does it weigh in the balance against the errors strewn by the road-side and the tries given up needlessly along the way?

His vision has yet to mature fully, and all-round maturity is exactly what it needs to follow worthily in the footsteps of Alan Jones, Bob Dwyer and Rod Macqueen – the great Australian coaches of the recent past.