Coach’s Corner: how the southern hemisphere teams can turn it around

Thanks to all those who contributed questions on the forum. I’ve also taken the liberty of culling some of the more important issues from columns elsewhere on The Roar.

As in last week’s article, let’s start with the war in Aotearoa, fought out between New Zealand and Ireland.

Plenty of opprobrium has been coming the way of Ian Foster and his coaching staff:

Top coaching in a series of games against the same opposition means recognising what they are doing in different areas of the game, and adjusting to it quickly and precisely. That is exactly what Ireland did in the Test at Dunedin. The New Zealand coaching staff were comprehensively out-prepped.

Ireland had understood the issues created by All Blacks loose-head prop George Bower, packing with his head so far outside the right shoulder of his opponent Tadhg Furlong:

In the second match, Furlong was far more aggressive. As soon as he felt Bower’s head moving to the outside, he fired right through the gap between the Crusaders’ loose-head and hooker Codie Taylor:

Another part of correct preparation orbits around conversations with the new referee, on aspects of the game which you want to highlight. Ireland’s coaches realized that New Zealand were pushing the envelope hard in the contact zone ta Eden Park, and they drew attention to potential ‘grey area’ infringements by the All Blacks.

They garnered two penalties from situations where Kiwi cleanout supports tackled defenders without the ball:

Dalton Papali’i is not satisfied with cleaning out Andrew Porter, he wants to tackle him to the ground well beyond the ruck perimeter, and that is illegal. Those decisions affect your aggression level, and make you think twice about your actions on approach to the breakdown.

Ireland by contrast, had upped their level of aggression at cleanout time:

Ireland drop in the third ‘safety’ cleaner as soon as they see Scott Barrett and Rieko Ioane double-dipping at the first ruck, and there is no messing about at the second, when the two Tadhgs – Furlong and Beirne – identify a major threat to the ball in Ardie Savea. They smash him out of the road.

At other times, New Zealand pushed the envelope right in front of the referee:

Right from the start, Codie Taylor clearly has no other intention but to pick up the leg of any attacking player in the Irish maul. He does it right in front of Jaco Peyper too. It is just plain dumb.

Only the fact that there were already two All Blacks off the field on cards saved him from joining Angus Ta’avao and Ofa Tu’ungasafi in the naughty chair. But Peyper’s eyes were now firmly on the All Blacks, and New Zealand had already lost the battle for the heart and mind of the official. As he said to Sam Cane after the event, “You need to have a serious chat. I am not going to back off.”

Other questions circled around the play of Beauden Barrett at number 10:

Any elite professional coach will know that Beauden Barrett does not play well in structured scenarios with ball in hand – his kicking and passing games do not pass muster at that level. If you pick Barrett at 10, you need to organize most of your attacking play off your number 9 instead.

At Eden Park, the All Blacks used the speed and accuracy of Aaron Smith’s pass to get the ball into the hands of the outside forward in their three-man pod off 9, and beyond the third defender in the line:

Smith hits the soft spot the beyond the third defender with his pass to Brodie Retallick, and there are still two Irish jerseys on the deck when Smith spies a big gap up the middle on the following play. One kick ahead later, Ardie Savea scored the try.

Ireland were much better prepared for the same tactic in Dunedin:

This time the tackler is already in Retallick’s space when he receives the ball, and that opens up the on-ball turnover opportunity for Caelan Doris.

With Smith under wraps and Ardie off the field, more and more of the play devolved on Barrett and the man outside him, number 12 Quinn Tupaea:

Especially after Bundee Aki came on to join Johnny Sexton and Robbie Henshaw in a rejigged Irish midfield, the men in green were able to use a succession of hold-up tackles to neutralize the Chiefs man in first phase carry.

The onus is now on the Kiwi coaching staff to come up with some answers, and ‘rattle the tactics box’ in round three.

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Questions about where the Wallabies need to improve most rapidly in time for the third Test at the Sydney Cricket Ground abounded. The two biggest discrepancies were in close quarter exchanges at the maul (see Wednesday’s article), and in the accuracy of the kicking game.

The Australian kicking game depends heavily on scrum-half Nic White, but at the Suncorp he lacked the support afforded to his opposite number, England debutant Jack van Poortvliet:

That is a box kick right on the money. It hits Tom Wright deep in the 5-metre channel, and that gives him no room to evade the chase by Jack Nowell, resulting in a turnover lineout throw to England.

Australia also lost most of the kicking duels in the match, taking a lot of unnecessary risks deep in their own end. Wright has kicked to Freddie Steward, and Steward returns the first ball with interest:

It’s a straightforward two-on-two in the Wallaby in-goal area, but White and Noah Lolesio look to make too many bricks with too little straw. The exit kick is finally made by Samu Kerevi, tracking back from a position more than 30 metres upfield!

The Smith-Farrell link may not be making too much progress with ball in hand, but Marcus came up with some clever touches in the kicking game. That is where the improvement Eddie Jones ascribes to him is being made:

“I think every game he’s just getting a little bit better. He’s literally out of his nappies now. And he’s got a long way to go. He’s going to be a better player each week. And we’re really pleased with how he’s developing with Owen. That combination in its infancy, but developing nicely that gives us a few different options in attack.”

Nic White is in the process of dropping into the backfield from first phase lineout when Smith angles a kick back into the space he wants to occupy, before he gets there. The outcome is another turnover, with Jonny Hill running the exit all the way back to the Australian 5-metre line. Reece Hodge’s big boot is sorely needed at the back to help White out a bit, with Wright shifting back to the right wing to complement Marika Koroibete.

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Questions arose about the composition of the Australian back row, including the bench players. As regulars will know, I was advocating a 6/2 split on the bench before the series ever began, because England’s real threat comes from their forwards, not their backs. 

The main area of interest is at the problem position of number 6, where Rob Leota has started in both Tests with Pete Samu adding punch off the bench, and Michael Hooper staying on for the full 80 minutes on the opposite flank:

A comparison of the two back rows over the first two games is quite revealing. Let’s do it by position, starting with number 7:

England have had to use a mix of Tom Curry, Sam Underhill and Lewis Ludlam at the spot with both Curry and Underhill suffering head injuries, while Michael Hooper has played throughout.

The main point of difference has been the amount of impactful ball-carrying that England have extracted from the position. Just as Josh van der Flier has been far more of a factor for Ireland against the All Blacks with ball in hand than Sam Cane, so England have gotten more work, and more breaks out of their three-man mix than Aussie have gotten out of their captain, which is an atypical outcome for the Wallaby skipper.

The ball-carrying thread continued at number 6:

• Pete Samu added value off the bench with 4 runs for 14 metres, 4 tackle busts, 8 tackles, 1 lineout take and 1.5 breakdown steals in his 23 minutes on the field. Lawes played the full 80 minutes in both games.

This represents a very clear win for England among the two starters, although Pete Samu has gone some way to balancing the account in the final quarter of both games.

Courtney Lawes has been more influential at lineout time, on the carry and at the breakdown than Rob Leota, and Dave Rennie needs to see some improvement here.

Finally, to the eighth men:

The contest at number 8 is much closer, and it is a battle between two different interpretations of the spot. Billy Vunipola is an out-and-out ball-carrier who has been able to set up his comrades off front foot ball. Bobby Valetini makes dynamic impacts, but has not been able to operate off such a stable set-piece base.

Overall, the back row represents a ‘win’ area for the men in white after two Tests. All three England backrowers have been able to get on the ball in attack far more regularly than their Wallaby opposites. Aussie have been outplayed at starting number 6 and their captain has not been able to fill in all of the gaps in work-rate as previously on the opposite flank.