Coach's corner: The combination of 'brutality and intelligence' that makes Wallabies enforcer a RWC lock

Many thanks to all those whose comments stimulated debate and more questions in the forums. It is the usual heady recipe for a welded-on Wallaby supporter: a mix of frustration at self-inflicted wounds, and pleasure in improved on-field performance from Florence to Dublin.

One of the biggest positives on the end-of-year-tour has been the performances of big Will Skelton, who has provided a unique point-of-difference in the Wallaby pack, and especially in combination with young tyro Nick Frost. Frost runs, tackles and leaps like a gazelle in the line. Skelton stops mauls, powers scrums and carries like a bulldozer. It is a combination as natural as bangers ‘n mash.

It is always a good idea to pick the players the opponent would least like to face, and Ireland would have been happy to see Skelton on the bench at the start of the match:

Wallabies Larkham commented, “Big Will’s introduction came so late, everyone knew he would be a force on the field.”

CS added, “The highlight was Big Will’s sensational run. We may have also lost it by not starting with him.”

Aiden expressed a widespread exasperation among fans of the green-and-gold: “Can all the Skelton naysayers who probably only come on to comment, and don’t watch the game, admit he has improved? I was never a fan in the past, but he has become an asset.”

In the event, big Will had to be satisfied with a 28-minute cameo. On attack, he bent the line in spectacular fashion, then immediately got back on balance with a neat tip-on pass with the defence expecting another bullocking run:

That is not one, not two, but five Irish defenders beaten, but Skelton still has the smarts to use that threat as a decoy two phases later:

With the forwards dented, the Marky Mark-Jordie P. one-two punch took advantage:

Reading the play on defence, Skelton demonstrated the same mix of brutality and intelligence:

That is big Will, deciphering the ball behind from fourth defender and crushing poor Jimmy O’Brien in an octopus-like embrace. Dave Rennie can always choose to pick Will Skelton from the start in the big World Cup matches to come in 2023, but the real tragedy is that he will not be able to field a truly monstrous tight-head side of the scrum after Taniela Tupou’s serious leg injury:

“Crushing injury for ‘Nella’ who was just getting back to his best” said Broken Shoulder, with Mzilikazi adding, “That one scrum Tupou packed in, with Skelton behind him, showed how torrid a finish it could have been for Ireland.”

This is the scrum that Mzilikazi means:

That is none other than Andrew Porter who is in retreat under pressure from Tupou, with Skelton packing behind him – and the Leinster iron-man bows the knee to no-one. The likely absence of that duo, playing together, would represent a huge blow to Australian hopes at the World Cup.

If anything, the impatience of rugby supporters with both the lack of consistency in refereeing rulings on foul play, and the Wallabies’ lack of discipline within that framework, is growing.

Scotty said, “The inconsistency with TMO involvement is frustrating and will end up deciding big games”, with Mzilikazi adding, “[Rob] Valetini could so easily have had a red card in the clash with the big Irish hooker [Dan Sheehan].”

Let’s take a look at the incident in Dublin, and compare it with another similar example from the recent Women’s World Cup final at Eden Park:

The referee Ben O’Keeffe analysed the incident as follows on the ref-mic: “So, we have a foul play issue. Do we have head contact? So, we do have head contact and we do have a foul play issue. The danger is very low for me. There is no mitigation, so I am just at penalty [no card].”

Now put that event alongside the head contact which earned England wing Lydia Thompson a red card in the Women’s World Cup final:

“For me, it is a clear head-on-head. She [Lydia Thompson] is coming at speed. It’s reckless action and I’m seeing no mitigation, so it’s a red card.” Those were the words of referee Hollie Davidson in her break-down of the incident.

Both officials see direct head-to-head contact with no mitigation for the defender, but one scenario finished with a red card and the other with a penalty. While it is true that Thompson has to make up more ground to get to the ball-carrier (Portia Woodman) than Valetini, and is therefore moving towards the target, the fundamental aim behind current law-making is to reduce the likelihood of head contact by lowering the tackler’s body height. Both tacklers are very upright when they make that contact.

Surely, we are entitled to expect more uniformity in decision-making? A yellow card for Valetini and an orange card for Thompson (20-minute card with a substitute coming off after expiry) looks and feels far more sensible.

Another aspect of the same lack of consistency emerged after the game, when Nic White was allowed to return to the field after this tackle on Mack Hansen saved a potential Ireland try:

White makes contact with his head leading, and in front of Hansen’s hip rather than behind it. When he tried to get up off the ground, he reeled backwards like a boxer wobbling back to the canvas. It made it all the more baffling how White apparently passed an HIA authored by both the Wallabies medical team and an independent doctor before returning to the fray. The Brumbies half-back has subsequently been stood down for 12 days and will miss the final tour game against Wales in Cardiff.

The ongoing issue of Australia’s lack of discipline, particularly at the breakdown, show no sign of abating:

“Wallabies have a discipline issue because the coach doesn’t see the team has a discipline issue and is doing nothing about it.” CJGP

“Perhaps a captain could feel ‘gutted about my players’ lack of discipline that we had a try wiped off, handed the opposition 10 points, blew a clutch moment that could have won us the match, and part-drained the tank having to defend with 14 and 13 players on the field’.” Ankle-Tapped Waterboy

Seven of the 12 penalties conceded by Australia in the match came at the breakdown, with four for repeated incidences of neck-rolling or neck wrenching. The final example ended with a yellow card for replacement hooker Folau Fainga’a:

This kind of play is fast becoming a typical example of over-competition at the ruck by the Wallabies. There is no need for it and it is not going to affect the play in any case, so why do it at all? It enters the ‘pool of information’ by stealth and will earn them a reputation among the top referees:

It’s just faulty technique against a pilfering threat. That left hand of Dave Porecki has to be anchored underneath Josh van der Flier’s right armpit, not around the neck. Because the defender is on his feet and upright (and wearing a red hat), the referee and his TMO will always pick up on it.

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Unusually, All Black supporters find themselves in a similar quandary to their neighbours from across the Tasman after throwing away a 25-6 lead in the final nine minutes of the match against England at Twickenham.

As Highlander suggested in his post-game synopsis, “New Zealand had total dominance at the gain-line and breakdown for the majority of this game; then, in almost a total reversal of roles, started to kick poorly, and invited England back into the contest.”

Mzilikazi added, “I have twice looked at the last 10 [minutes]… Bizarre, and deeply disturbing for all All-Blacks people. I don’t think I have ever seen a finish like that.”

In fact, the finish was not down to poor kicking by New Zealand, but poor defence on the back of a tactical error. Some average D has continued to bedevil the All Blacks of 2022, even as other areas of their game like the scrum, lineout maul and management of the breakdown have come on in leaps and bounds.

Paulo was closest to the truth when he stated, “How we are playing and the decisions, or lack thereof, are what irks most supporters. After setting up what should have been a win, there was some really poor decision-making and an inability to adapt on-field.”

What form did the poor decision-making take? The tipping point arrived after a Marcus Smith break and a Will Stuart try in the 71^st minute.

Now freeze the frame as Ben Youngs goes to pass from the base and you will get an idea how problems proliferated so quickly for the New Zealand defence:

There are only two New Zealand defenders in-line out to the right, and one is a tight forward (Brodie Retallick). They are matched up against five England attackers, with a sixth (Owen Farrell) swinging around to join them.

New Zealand are keeping two defenders in the backfield (Beauden Barrett and Richie Mo’unga) with T.J. Perenara policing the zone behind the ruck. The issue for New Zealand was that they maintained this shape even losing Barrett to a yellow card, for slowing the ball illegally in the tackle on Smith:

Freddie Steward duly scored England’s third try of the game a couple of phases later. There was no sign of adaptation by the men in black when England replaced Manu Tuilagi with Henry Slade in the 54^th minute, even though it gave them three players who could distribute effectively to the edge. With the All Blacks keeping two in the backfield and one behind the ruck, England were able to find width far more easily than New Zealand could prevent it.

Three backs standing in-line, with the other three languishing in the backfield is far too soft and compliant, and ironically it is the same tactical mistake the Red Roses made when they dropped to 14 permanently after Lydia Thompson’s red card in the Women’s World Cup final:

Emily Scarratt is the only England back defending out to the right with forwards inside her, and the backfield triangle of scrum-half, left wing and full-back are all out of play for too long to make any difference.

The Black Ferns scored a length-of-the-field try and harvested 29 points over the half hour or so when England stuck with that same defensive structure. By the time they changed, it was too late to alter the fate of the match and the destination of the World Cup trophy.