So you DID read!!! I knew you would. 😊

I will get back to you in next couple of days, after my weekend umpiring. If rained out, much sooner. 😁 😂

I’m actually gonna hafta pay that one Josh: it’s genuinely witty … in fact, I’m gonna pay you the ultimate compliment and steal it, because it will be golden to have a line like that on some of the facebook cricket pages.

It hurt his too despite nothing riding on it in the actual match situation.

That’s the strongest of all the names teams so far, by quite a bit in the bowling department.

Steve Waugh’s only remote stellar series prior to being dropped was the 1989 Ashes, and England weren’t exactly a top notch side in that series, with practically all Australia’s batsmen – even Dean Jones – scoring heavily.

From January 1991 until Steve returned to the side after missing first two tests of 1993-94 home series against South Africa due to injury, Mark was comfortably better performed than Steve. While Steve was out of the side for nigh on two years, due to simply not being good enough to be in it, Mark was comfortably Australia’s leading batsmen in the 1991 series in the Caribbean, and also, upon Steve’s recall in the return series out here in 1992-93, Mark was, once again, Australia’s best batsman, in the first three tests: Boon and Border matched him for runs, but Mark was far superior to both regarding scoring speed prior to the entire team dropping its bottle at the backend of that heartbreaking summer.

The 1993 Ashes series bears little relevance because how weak England were: both Waughs failed in the first innings of first test when conditions were at their most favourable for bowling, and both cashed in with 64 and 78 not out in a very soft 3rd innings situation. The ridiculously lop-sided 2nd and 4th tests are of zero relevance on individual batsmen’s level with the Waughs returning scores of 99, 13 not out, 52 and 157 not out. The
The 3rd test saw Boon and Mark as the only Australian batsmen to reach 50 in our first innings reply to England’s competitive 321 first up, while Steve, along with Brendan Julian both burnt up over 100 deliveries apiece when runs were irrelevant to prevent England jagging an unlikely victory on final day. This ‘rear-guard’ action by Steve doesn’t come even remotely close to Mark’s in Adelaide in late January 1998.
The 5th test saw the first major Waugh partnership in a test; even though it was a dead rubber, the fact that Australia found itself in dire straights at 4 for 80 in reply to 276 was the typical match situation for Mark to arise. He scored 137 off 219 while Steve 59 off 175 – Steve was still to fully find his feet in test cricket against legitimate opposition which is why the following home series against a pop gun NZ attack is completely irrelevant.
The first time Steve ever even performed at a genuinely high level against a major opposition, never mind outperform Mark, was in the 3rd test of the home series against South Africa in late January 1994, and the 2nd test of the follow up series in the Veldt, their scores reading:
Mark 2, 12, 42 run out, 28, and 7.
Steve 164, 1, 45 not out, 0 and 86.
As we are only looking at raw numbers without cleansing on this occasion, we will ignore the fact that Mark’s 12 and Steve’s 1 in Adelaide were in 3rd innings already bossing the game, while Mark’s 28 and Steve’s duck were in a 4th innings lost cause, having been set a target higher than what has ever been successfully chased to this very day, with also way too much time left in match to have any even remote hope of salvaging a draw.
Batting first in the 3rd test decider Mark scored 43, while Steve’s 64 was slow enough to already infringe upon Australia’s real chances in a series decider. Then when Australia were in a crisis, with a 1-2 series defeat a real possibility, Mark scored 113 not out, while Steve didn’t bat. Mark’s job was made more difficult by a well and truly over the hill Border plodding along for a mere 42 off a whopping 166 deliveries. Across the last 6 tests of his stellar career, all against a powerful South African attack, Border’s scoring speed was less than 30 runs per 100 balls faced, and he should have called it a day a year earlier after the series in New Zealand.

A new era beckoned under Taylor, and if they wanted to be legitimate world champions, they had to complete most, if not all of the following assignments:
1. Win in Pakistan
2. Continue to dominate Ashes cricket.
3. Knock the West Indies off their perch.
4. Given they narrowly failed in Objective 1 above, they had to ensure that the powerful Pakistan team of the day didn’t turn the tables on them out here in the following home summer after successfully completing Objectives 2 and 3 above.
5. Win a test in India.
6. Ensure the West Indies didn’t extract revenge for our successful completion of Objective 3 above.
7. Conquer the Veldt
8. Come from behind in an Ashes series for the first and only time during the entire 1989-2002 domination period.
9. Add a home series win against South Africa to go with the successful completion of Objective 7 above.
10. Win a test series in India.
11. Take care of the unfinished business in Objective 1 above
12. Complete another demolition of the Old Enemy.
All bar Objective 10 was completed, although in that 1998 series they did achieve the previously failed Objective 5 above, somewhat of a consolation.
I have left out the formality of smashing minnow Sri Lanka out here in 1995-96, 362 runs for one lone dismissal will obviously greatly inflate Steve’s average, while the only time of any even remote trouble all series was on the first morning of the dead rubber 3rd test in Adelaide when from 2 for 36 Boon and Mark stopped the rot with Steve joining Mark at a more comfortable 3 for 96. Mark left for 71 with the rescue mission already assured at 4 for 181, from which Steve was able to comfortably move from about 40 to 170, with the tail also easily getting amongst the runs.
Let’s see how the Waughs performed in that above outlined 12-point objective:
In Pakistan late 1994
Mark 20, 61, 68 and 71
Steve 73, 0 and 98
All scores were relevant here as Australia’s only 2nd innings in that series came into play regarding the ultimate match outcome.
1994-95 Ashes
Mark 140, 15, 71, 29, 3, 25, 39, 24, 88, 1
Steve 19, 7, 94 not out, 26 not out, 1, 0, 19, 0, 99 not out, 80
The only team 2nd innings of any relevance that series was in the 4th test in Adelaide (although Taylor and Slater’s tons in previous 3rd test in Sydney certainly were of paramount importance), but since we are not cleansing at this stage … although when it comes to calculation of ‘fusion’ I will be eliminating the benefit of red ink.
1995 in Caribbean
Mark 40, 4, 61, 2, 7, 126
Steve 65, 15, 65 not out, 63 not out, 21, 200
Steve’s slow scoring speed in the 3rd innings of 2nd test was extremely detrimental to Australia’s admittedly limited victory prospects in an eventual rain-ruined tests. I will refrain from my 135 cap of his 200 at any point in this. However, when I eliminate red ink benefits for fusion, I will also do a subsequent fusion getting rid of irrelevant 3rd and 4th innings scores, such as Mark’s 29 and Steve’s 26 not out in Melbourne test of Ashes series preceding this.
1995-96 v Pakistan
Mark 59, 88, 3, 116, 34
Steve 112 not out, 7, 29, 38, 14
Series averages without red ink benefit here are Mark 60 Steve 40 with Mark’s scoring speed well above Steve’s. While we are not capping at any stage here, it is noteworthy that Steve’s 112 was also one of those occasions he scored a ‘glorious’ ton when practically every one of the other 5 batsmen also passed 50, and when the opposition batsmen would also inevitably implode when their turn came. Mark had gone in at a comfortable 2 for 119 on a very good batting track with Steve replacing him at an even more comfortable 3 for 213.
1996-97 in India
Mark 26, 23
Steve 0, 67 not out
When I do the alternate fusions eliminating red ink as well as irrelevant 3rd and 4th innings scores, the 23 and 67 not out above will be among the ones that go. On a turning track against Kumble, Australia were zero chance of avoiding defeat faced with a lost cause deficit of 179, and an innings of 67 off 221 deliveries achieves nothing – even if he had played like Kevin Pietersen did at the Oval in 2005, and scored 167 off those exact same 221 balls he faced, the subsequent adjusted 4th innings target of 182 would still have meant ‘Advantage India’. The bottom line is that both Waughs failed here in the pivotal first innings when their team was actually still in the match.
1996-97 v West Indies
Mark 38, 57, 19, 67, 0, 19, 82, 79, 9
Steve 66, 58, 37, 26, 0, 1
When I do the alternate fusions stripping away 3rd and 4th innings padding and separating dead wood, the scores to go from here will be Mark’s 57, 67 and 9, as well as Steve’s 1 from the lost cause 3rd innings in the dead rubber 5th test in Perth. If I was employing capping, Mark’s 82 would also come down to an even 50. I will, however, eliminate Steve’s low score of 26 as it was scored when victory for Australia was already a dead set cert.
1997 in South Africa
Mark 26, 20, 116, 5, 42
Steve 160, 8, 18, 60, 67 not out
The scores to go after the overall averages are calculated for this entire Taylor era under inspection will be Mark’s 42 and Steve’s 60 not out for the exact same reasons as the previously outlined one-off test in India some six months earlier. There is no capping at any stage, but were I to do so, Steve’s 160 would be reduced to an even 100, just to let you know.
1997 Ashes
Mark 5, 1, 33, 12, 55, 8, 68, 7, 19, 1
Steve 12, 33, 0, 108, 116, 4, 75, 14, 22, 6
With later comparative fusions the scores to go will be lost cause 3rd innings 1 and 33 for Mark and Steve respectively from ill-fated first test, 33 and 0 from rain doomed 2nd test as well as their 7 and 14 from 3rd innings of deciding 5th test when Australia were already certain winners. Were I to cap, Steve’s 3rd innings 116 in 3rd test would become 55.
1997-98 v South Africa
New Zealand were comfortably more competitive than four years earlier, but in no way world beaters. In any case the only relevant scores were the first innings of first test, when both Waughs got ducks, and Australia’s only innings in deciding 2nd test when they scored 86 and 96 respectively. The 3rd test dead rubber was rain ruined from the get-go, in which Mark actually scored 81 in first innings which occupied some three days already. Against the Saffies,
Mark 0, 1, 100, 63, 115 not out
Steve 96, 17, 85, 6, 34
There is no dead wood to eliminate here, but if capping were to be employed, their 115 not out and 34 respectively would be transformed to a percentage of par number of deliveries to survive in 4th innings – runs were irrelevant as Australia were only looking to survive in order to hold onto their 1-0 lead. In this case, Mark was 3.05 x par, Steve next best at only 0.93.
1998 in India
Mark 66, 18, 10, 0, 153 not out, 33 not out
Steve 12, 27, 80, 33
Scores to go from a comparative analysis after overall raw averages are calculated will be the lost cause 4th and 3rd innings 18, 27, 0 and 33 from first two tests, as well as Mark’s 4th innings 33 not out when it had become a straight-forward mop up from 2 for 120 odd in a target of 194.
1998 in Pakistan
Mark 0, 42, 43, 26, 117
Steve 157, 1, 49 not out, 0, 28
Scores to go for comparative fusions will be the 42, 43, 1 and 49 not out from the dull, pointless mammoth scoring 2nd test. Were capping to be employed, both the 117 and 157 would be reduced to an even 100. This series represents the classic archetypal example of Steve the Front Runner and Mark the Deciding Test Maestro. Neither Waugh was inclined to go massive in high/mammoth scoring draws, though Steve has 5 or 6 such scores higher than Mark’s highest of 57, but with none higher (for Steve) than the even 100 he made against West Indies in Sydney 1992-93.
1998-99 Ashes
Mark 31, 27 not out, 36, 17 not out, 7, 51 not out, 36, 43, 121, 24
Steve 112, 16 not out, 33, 15 not out, 59, 7, 122 not out, 30 not out, 96, 8
Scores to go for comparative fusions will be the 27, 17, and 51 for Mark and 16, 15, 7 and 30 for Steve. Steve’s 30 is because it was not out and lower than any average, raw or meaningful, so it would be disadvantageous to him to include it when eliminating the benefit of red ink – and yet I get accused of manipulation.
So, to the OVERALL RAW NUMBERS, starting with percentage of innings as 50+ scores, and overall conversion to 100, based on the traditional model without taking anything else into consideration, remembering all of the 12 objectives were achieved except Number 10 (win a series in India):
Mark 33.8 and 34.6
Steve 38.0 and 29.6
When making the necessary adjustments as per the in-depth explanations along the way it is:
Mark 46.4 and 39.1
Steve 45.1 and 34.8
Whether going purely on overall raw numbers or making the necessary adjustments, it cannot be claimed that ONLY Steve was ‘the man’ during the Taylor era, and Mark was clearly better performed in the period between his debut and the resumption of tests vs South Africa three years later, the best part of two years Steve was out of the side. As already pointed out, prior to Mark’s debut, the only even remotely stellar series Steve enjoyed was the 1989 Ashes against a weakened opposition when all Australia’s batsmen cashed in big.

Now to the big moment that everyone has been waiting for, with breathless anticipation … the overall, raw, undissected averages:
Mark 49.9 Steve 54.7, remembering Steve’s average benefits from red ink in 18.1% of all innings, Mark a mere 8.6%. Reminder: TO THIS POINT, NOT A SINGLE INNINGS HAS BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE ENTIRE TAYLOR ERA, BAR THE HOME SERIES AGAINST SRI LANKA AND NEW ZEALAND IN 1993-94 AND 95-96 RESPECTIVELY AND STEVE HAS RETAINED HIS RED INK BENEFITS.
Now to factor in scoring speed with the same overall raw data in order to create a fusion, which represents not runs, but rather ‘points’ with the formula of setting a par strike rate of 50 and then SR/Par SR x average (retaining red ink benefit at this point):
Mark’s overall strike rate of 50.2 gives him a fusion of 50.1, while Steve’s overall strike rate of 46.5 gives him a fusion of 50.9.
So, we can see, even if people want to continue to go on overall raw numbers, there is literally nothing separating the respective Waugh contributions during the Taylor Era, with all those (12) important objectives achieved, bar one (Number 10 on list).

Now, let’s finish with the adjustments as per the in-depth explanations already provided along the way … their fusions now read, eliminating red ink benefits:
Mark, after culling his 17.1% non-impacting runs, now has a fusion of 56.4, while Steve, after culling his 17.2% non-impacting runs, now has a fusion of 49.5.

I think it was Socrates that said all the evidence in the world will not convince a fool (he actually used a stronger terminology). It really is time we ridded ourselves of the completely ill-informed assertion/assumption that Steve belongs among Australia’s elite test batsmen and somehow Mark supposedly doesn’t, as well as the downright offensive assertion offered by another roarer on this very same thread that Mark somehow is only to be relegated to the same rung as Matthew Hayden, who never did anything particularly stellar save for his admittedly phenomenal 2001 series in India.

I couldn’t care less whether you read or not – plenty of others will, including learned roarers such as Micko, Dwayne, David Thompson and even Matth.

Almost as bad as the overall average, an absolutely nothing stat is the conversion percentage, in its traditional form: there are occasions when a batsman doesn’t even have the opportunity to convert from 50 to 100, never mind asking oneself did the team actually even remotely need the batsman in question to do so. Examples in practice:
Trinidad 1995, Steve was not out on 63 when Australia was bowled out in its first innings.
Edgbaston 1993, Mark was not out on 62 when victory was achieved in 4th innings.
Why would we even contemplate including such innings in any MEANINGFUL conversion %? In addition to eliminating innings types such as the examples above, assessing whether a century scored was actually needed by the team or not is simply a matter of making a reasonable and educated judgment call on the likelihood of losing without it. This is not difficult to do, and the most logical starting point is to identify games Australia lost in which either Waugh was dismissed between 50 and 99 inclusive.
There are also two occasions for Steve, and one for Mark in which Australia only managed to draw a series decider that had to be won, Durban 1994 and against New Zealand in Perth as well as one occasion when Australia would have averted a massive last day crisis had Mark joined his skipper Taylor in converting in team’s first innings in Adelaide late January 1998 v South Africa.
The innings in question are:
Mark
1. 71 in Georgetown, 1991
2. 61 in Karachi, 1994
3. 79 v West Indies, Perth, 1996-97
4. 66 in Chennai, 1998
5. 67 in Kingston, 1999
6. 70 or 57 in Chennai, 2001
7. 72 at Headingly, 2001
8. 86 v New Zealand, Perth, 2001-02
Steve
1. 91 v West Indies, Perth, 1988-89
2. 64 in Durban 1994
3. 73 in Karachi, 1994
4. 58 v West Indies, Melbourne, 1996-97
5. 67 at Centurion (in South Africa), 1997
6. 80 in Kolkatta, 1998
7. 67 v New Zealand, Perth, 2001-02
There are only two occasions on the above list where both Mark and Steve ‘let Australia down’ in such a manner in the same test, Karachi 1994 and against New Zealand in Perth 2001, and that latter occasion was when both were getting well and truly past their prime, and don’t anyone be fooled by Steve beating up minnows throughout 2003 to the tune of 621 runs for 5 dismissals against West Indies, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe, or even his career prolonging ton in Sharjah late 2002 at the back end of a big team total in a runaway victory in the dead rubber 3rd test, the only time either Waugh scored a ton in a dead rubber having not reached 50 earlier in the series when still alive.

In assessing the genuine importance of their centuries, Mark retains 16 of his 20, Steve 16 of his 32 – this is not manipulated in order to come up with the same number for both, but rather sheer coincidence. The 4 of Mark’s to go are his pair of 111s v NZ Hobart 1993-94 and v SL Perth 1995-96 – both of these can simply be written off as superfluous to team needs, while Mark’s 113 not out in Durban 1994 can be considered a very important half ton, his 120 at the Oval 2001, a relatively useful one (half ton).
I won’t list all of Steve’s 16, but will cite an example: in Melbourne 1995-96 against minnow Sri Lanka, he went to the crease late on the first day at 3 for 219 following Mark’s dismissal for 61 following a rather ambitious attempt at new shot invention where he appeared to be trying to guide the ball between the leg stump and the keeper who had moved away well wide of the aforementioned leg stump to follow both the line of the ball and the batsman’s own movements – the type of dismissal that gave rise to the ridiculous nasty stereotypes throughout his (Mark’s) career, but the type of shot he would never attempt in a million years if his team was actually in any sort of genuine trouble, especially against the elite oppositions. Steve cashes in with a cool 131 not out in a comfortable declared total of 6 for 500, and this is precisely the type of innings for which Steve receives way too many kudos: if he had given it away on Mark’s own 61, Australia still have 13 wickets up their sleeve to mop up a mere 70 extra runs in 4th innings. The 540 Sri Lanka aggregated in the match on a flat pitch is a rather high aggregate for a losing team in a test.

To cut to the chase, when the 20 relevant tons for both Waughs are cleansed from a proper statistical analysis, the following is revealed:
Steve was clearly the better performed front runner, especially when team batted first. Front running is a term Renato Carini developed for a team’s first innings, whether batting first or replying, in the tests before the deciding test, or indeed series proper decider, is reached.
Mark was the deciding test maestro.
The numbers show the Waughs to be neck an’ neck overall when series were still alive; however, Mark was comfortably the better performed when a result hinged on the team’s second innings, rather than a match already all over bar the shouting at the completion of both teams’ first innings.
While the numbers also indicate that the Waughs were also neck an’ neck when considering all tests, whether series still alive or not, Steve appears to have a slight edge in dead rubbers.
While they only account for 6 of Mark’s 144 innings under consideration, and 4 of Steve’s 134, Mark towered over Steve – and his entire batting cohort – as the team’s standout star performer in ‘come from behind’ successes. This is partially a symptom of being the better performer in team’s second innings that were actually critical to match outcomes.
Above all, in terms of making runs when it mattered (in match and series contexts) on days when everybody else (including the other twin) was greatly struggling to do so, Mark has a clear edge over Steve.
The proper breakdown shows that 68.9% of Mark’s 209 test innings exerted genuine impact on a match result, or had the potential to do so in the event of failure, while for Steve it is 61.5% of his 218 (from 260) test innings – I have cut Steve’s off from the conclusion of the 2002-03 Ashes, as well as prior to the 1988 tour of Pakistan.
The actual numbers for both are as follows, with the numbers from left to right indicating: Mark’s % of innings as 50+ scores, Mark’s proper meaningful conversion, Steve’s % of innings as 50+ scores, Steve’s proper meaningful conversion:
Front running 1 (setting up) 28.2 50.0 45.9 75.0
Front running 2 (replying): 29.6 80.0 32.3 66.7
Combined 1 and 2 28.9 66.7 39.7 68.8
Deciding Tests 56.7 75.0 39.4 50.0
All ‘live’ tests 38.5 63.2 36.8 65.0
Dead Rubbers 36.4 66.7 50.0 75.0
TOTAL 38.2 66.7 38.8 69.6

Your previous claim of Mark Waugh benefitting et al is the most preposterous thing I have ever heard: in 1991 he flayed Marshall, Ambrose, Walsh and Patterson, and in the follow up home series 1992-93, he did the same in the first three tests against Ambrose, Walsh and Bishop. Later on he flayed Donald, Wasim and Waqar, not to mention Mustaq and Saqlain, and nobody did better against Kumble and Harbajan in 1998 and 2001. Also, Gough and Devon Malcolm were not that far behind Willis and Botham, and Dean Headley comfortably better when fully fit for 6 tests in 1997 and 98-99.

My endless stats? Oh PLEASE … you always inevitably go back to meaningless overall raw averages, the folly of which has long since been exposed. You need to learn the legitimacy of proper statistical cleanses, a concept every major corporation around the world puts in operation on a daily basis.

My next post will look at raw numbers throughout the Taylor era.

That is absolute rubbish. Mark’s low average is wholly and solely on account of not beating up on minnows – he only bothered on the rare days a weaker side actually had Australia in any sort of trouble, best example his 72 not out in first test in NZ 2000.
The other thing that inflates averages is collossal scores beyond 100, especially against weak bowling in runaway victories when the team is NEVER in any sort of trouble.
There is also not outs, Mark has a very low percentage of these, so do the likes of Lara, Kohli and Kevin Pietersen just to name a few. Steve’s is the highest among all elite batsmen, a whopping 16.7%.

Mark was extremely consistent when it mattered i.e., against the elilte opposition, and no, most big scores are superfluous regardless. When a batsman reaches a ton, the team need is, on average, for him to reach the 120-125 range. Two notable exceptions are actually Mark’s 153 not out 1998 and Hayden’s 203 2001, both in India. There were only two other occasions Australia needed Mark to push on significantly beyond the 100 mark, and on one of those occasions, 139 not out in Antigua 1991 he did so, only to be left stranded as in the aforementioned 153. His 116 against Pakistan in Sydney 1995-96, in theory, needed to be about 175 to facilitate a par victory by 3 wickets, but this would have required the most phenomenal outpeforming of peers and opposition batsmen in history. Given that on this occasion BOTH innings mattered, it is just as relevant to say that Australia’s only other half century scorer in the match, Taylor 59 in even game 4th innings run chase of nearly 250, needed to be about 110.

In Steve’s 200 in Kingston 1995 his runs beyond the 135-140 were always going to be superfluous to the result. It was the Waugh partnership that smashed the West Indies, not Steve’s runs beyond that aforementioned 135-140 range.

What you really need to get your head around is that it was Mark who got Steve going in that partnership, not the other way around. Mark’s scoring speed was 65 runs per 100 balls faced, the flattened out average for the rest of his batting cohort combined, 47. But get this: Steve had a strike rate of 54 while he had Mark flaying the bowling at the other end, but it dropped to a Boycott like 41 after Mark was dismissed. Also, Steve was not the dominant partner in the follow up century partnership with Greg Blewett, the later, with a strike rate of only 53 outscored him by roughly 2:1.

The West Indies were dead and buried by the time Blewett and Healy were out, with the lead already nearly 170. The tail’s collective 34 is a very tiny % to contribute in an adusted team total of 466 which already has the opposition in a complete lost cause – they knew this too, as a very large % of overs from beyond Steve’s 140 odd were bowled by part-time spinners Hooper, Artherton and Adams, with Ambrose and Walsh practically not reappearing at the bowling crease thereafter. Another learned roarer has an algortithm that gives Mark’s 126 a real value of 124, Steve’s 200, 143, so it certainly isn’t just me. As Renato Carini would put it “Steve’s runs beyond that 135-140 point were of far greater benefit to his personal stats than they were to the actual team cause.

Did you miss this bit:

” … Time and time again, when his batting cohort, including Steve, got stage fright in the big game, the series deciding test against the big guns, Mark would arise and outperform everyone else against the very bowlers that Hayden simply couldn’t cut it against in the 1990 … ”

And yet you still rate Hayden on a par with Mark, let alone not putting Mark up with those others??? Seriously?????????

The over the hill captain Waqar Younis certainly didn’t try in the dead rubber 3rd test (2002): 128 overs Australia’s only innings and he bowled a mere 17 of them, and 2 of his 4 wickets were after Australia’s total was past 300 with few wickets down, and the 4th an inconsequential innings finish offerer with Pakistan not only no chance of winning, but also little, if any, chance of salvaging a draw.

Which Waugh? There were two of them and Mark was certainly not an inferior performed test batsman than Steve. You’re not seriously suggesting Hayden was an eventual superior player to Mark right? Time and time again, when his batting cohort, including Steve, got stage fright in the big game, the series deciding test against the big guns, Mark would arise and outperform everyone else against the very bowlers that Hayden simply couldn’t cut it against in the 1990s.

Everything else you wrote was totally sound though.

My ‘version’ is the result of hours upon hours, even years of research, yours follows nothing but assumptions and halo impressions, not to mention ‘supported’ by stereotypes. I can assure you Steve was NOT the ‘only’ man as you assert. He DID NOT ‘turn it around’ with any more frequency than Mark did. Do you seriously think Steve ‘turned it around’ with innings such as 157 not out at Headingly 1993, 147 not out v NZ in Brisbane 1993-94, 131 not out v SL in Melbourne 1995-96, just to name a minute number of examples?

Steve did not even remotely master top attacks until early 1994, Mark did from his first year in test cricket, 1991.

The success of the Taylor era hinged equally on the back of Ooh Aah, Warne, BOTH Waughs, Taylor and Healy, and, as mentioned, Michael Slater against Pakistan, and in at least one Ashes battle. Also, Craig McDermott was the equal of Warne in at least one Ashes series.

I mentioned Ooh Aah re 2005. Now we’re even at missing something the other said … 😛

Maybe because J is a crooked letter? Or maybe they had a go at naughtiness and just got hooked?
(I had to google miscreant btw.)

correct ‘ed’ I meant

I stand correct: the half Monty.

Have only heard of Wood. I would stick with Gooch and Smith. Wood was really only adept at playing fast bowling and he was also one of those players who would only perform when his place in the side was in jeopardy. Not a complete failure at int level but I would stick with Gooch and Smith. Although, you could replace Yallop with him in the middle order perhaps?

I appreciate you taking the trouble Tiger – I was too lazy. I did think of Mark Wood, assuming full fitness, but I am kicking myself for not thinking of Butcher – he had Jack Fingleton/Bruce Laird type guts and had a longer career than Laird in a larger variety of contexts.

Sorry Gibbo, I missed the “arguably” no idea why … maybe thinking too much about work and not enough about cricket on the roar. My bad. 😔 😂 😁 😊 👍 🏏

Not true, Mark Waugh and Ian Healy no less important than Steve Waugh in the Taylor era. Don’t undersell Michael Slater either, bar against the West Indies and in India.

So Panesar represents the full Monty in test cricket?

Josh Mate, three years ago when I was in your camp, at best 50% of roarers regarded Hayden as a ‘great’, so your attempted put down at my expense is totally wide of the mark.

Yes, Steve is a little overrated as a captain. His teams were spectacular at smashing mid-range oppositions, as well as weak ones, into complete oblivion. By mid-range teams, I am talking about the West Indies in 1999, when Bishop was gone and Ambrose and Walsh in decline, as well as the post-1990s Pakistan and South Africa teams when Wasim, Waqar, Mustaq, Saqlain, Donald and Pollock were all either over the hill or gone from the game altogether.
Dale Steyn, for example, did not truly arrive until 2008 – in 2005-06, he was as much a raw rookie as Michael Holding had been in 1975-76, for example. Anyone who cares to dispute this, check his (Steyn’s) bowler rankings in each of the Calendar Years 2004-09. I regard the West Indies as minnows from 2000 onwards.

Steve and Ricky Ponting’s teams played genuinely top teams on 4 occasions and won 2 series and lost 2. These were Pakistan out here in 1999-00, in India 2001, India again in 2004, although Gilchrist was the one field captain in that series, and England 2005. Albeit two of the losses were super close (2001 & 2005), and in one of those (2005) Ooh Aah was either missing or not fully fit in the crucial tests.

Taylor’s teams on the hand played 8 series against top notch team and won 6 of them, with one of two losses also super close (by 1 solitary wicket). These were: two away and one home series against Pakistan, one home and away series against each of South Africa and the West Indies and in India 1998. In the just mentioned 1998 series in India, Taylor was also missing Ooh Aah for the entirety.

Only Taylor’s team managed to win a series from behind, in England 1997. Steve’s teams came from behind to draw the rubber twice, against India in his own farewell series at home in 2003 and in the Caribbean in 1999 when they led, lost the lead, fell behind and then drew level in the deciding test. Four years earlier Taylor’s team had actually managed to emerge victorious after having previously temporarily squandered their provisional series lead. That was the only occasion under Taylor they lost a series lead – temporary or permanent – whereas on the other occasion Steve’s team did, in India 2001, they actually ended up losing the series.

Ponting’s teams never once recovered from a deficit in series to either win or square the rubber, and I am only using pre-January 2007 series against him here. Like SWaugh in India 2001, in 2005 Ashes, Ponting’s team lost the lead in series and went on to lose the series.

Just to ram home all the above points, 61.5% of Taylor’s series were against elite teams, whereas between SWaugh and the aforementioned January 2007 only 14.8% were.

As a school teacher, contemporary boys names are fairly similar to when I was at school in the 1980s. Girls have changed a lot though: names from my day I don’t see much are Sandra, Rebecca, Rachel, and Ruth, while Margaret, Betty, Judy and Theresa are examples that seemed to end with my parents’ generation. This is a generation of Jasmines and Chantelles among other names not yet especially common back in my day.

A strong attack if Dilley is fully fit and conditions facilitate pace, bounce, swing as well as spin at various stages in the match. Hick was timid and underachieved, while Yallop was a FTB but Thorpe was highly accomplished, Gooch and Smith high class, and Pollock among the absolute elite.
Who are the Batting Grahams you left out?