It is the 22nd of October. Mehmet Durakovic and his Melbourne Victory squad welcome derby rivals Melbourne Heart to Etihad Stadium. The home team are fortunate to escape with a draw against the rampant Red and Whites.

A week later and it’s now the 29th of October. Arsene Wenger’s stuttering Arsenal visit Andre Villas Boas and his Chelsea squad at Stamford Bridge. A goal fest of epic proportions ensues, which results in a Van Persie hat-trick and a 5-3 loss to the Blues.

What could these two clubs, Melbourne Victory and Chelsea FC, nearly 17,000 km, hundreds of millions of pounds and a whole other English dialect apart, have in common?

Actually, quite a lot. At the basic level, both clubs don the colour blue. That’s hardly in the realms of impossibility. Try this on for size; both clubs have recently replaced managers. Again, not an uncommon occurrence in the cut throat world of football.

Okay, how about this one? Both clubs have struggled recently, due to new managers attempting to transform the predominant style of play from reactive, counter-attacking football to a pro-active, possession oriented style. Well that’s hit the nail right on the head.

There are startling similarities between the situations of both Chelsea and Victory, who experienced unprecedented dominance and success under enormously influential managers, but have experienced somewhat leaner prospects in recent times.

There are always two – a master and an apprentice:

If anyone needs reminding, Jose Mourinho was the most successful manager in Chelsea’s recent history. Mourinho won the Premier League title twice, a Community Shield, an FA Cup and two League Cups in the space of 2004-2007. Chelsea’s wealthy patron, Roman Abromavich, sacked Mourinho for failing to deliver the ultimate prize, the European Cup, and for failing to implement a positive and attractive style of play.

After a number of years, and countless pretenders, Abromavich has turned to Mourinho’s former protégé, Andre Villas Boas, to deliver on continental glory and beautiful football.

There are many similarities between Jose Mourinho and his erstwhile subordinate Villas Boas. To start with, both are quite young and Portuguese. They have worked side-by-side at some of the most prestigious clubs in world football; Porto, Chelsea and Inter Milan. They were both pupils of Sir Bobby Robson. Both are devoted to detailed, disciplined and manic preparation.

And clearly, both have spent one too many evenings taking notes from Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (I mean the first season was alright, but afterwards it became way too formulaic).

But in terms of their football philosophies, the two innovators could not be further apart. Mourinho is the foremost practitioner of the reactive school of football. His incredible managerial triumphs were built on a foundation of a direct, physical and counter-attacking style.

Do not misunderstand; Mourinho’s teams were never about thumping the ball long or assault masquerading as sport. But generally speaking, Mourinho’s preferred style was defensive; he sought to sit his team deep, break with pace and aggression, hitting his opponents on the counter attack.

One of his most famous triumphs, for contemporary audiences enraptured by the pretty patterns of Catalonia’s midfield, was his Champions League semi-final victory over Barcelona. The second leg in particular is regarded as the best display of defensive football since the turn of the century.

In other words, Mourinho stood in stark, defiant contrast to managers like Pep Guardiola and Arsene Wenger and their philosophies of possession football.

Indeed after that famous triumph, Mourinho remarked of Inter Milan’s performance; “I wanted to keep our defensive shape, so I let Barcelona have the ball”. A sentiment in direct antithesis to the creeds of Ajax, Arsenal and Barcelona, where possession of the ball is to be treasured and jealously guarded, not spurned so petulantly.

Andre Villas Boas, despite spending the better part of a decade learning at Mourinho’s knee, is actually a disciple of Guardiola. Villas Boas believes in pro-active football, savouring possession and passing the opposition to defeat. For Villas Boas, to control the ball is to control the game.

The modern incarnation of ‘total football’ has been revolutionised by Guardiola and Barcelona. Intricate passing angles, thoughtful rhythms and the magnificence of creation has been married to iron discipline and physical determination. As Pep himself said, “I know we are a horrible team without the ball. Therefore, I instruct my players to get it back immediately”. Simply put; pressing.

Win the ball back higher up the pitch, and the opposition is prevented from constructing attacks. Win the ball back faster, and there is no need to reset defensive lines. The team that imposes command of the ball has already won.

Pressing negates sitting deep as to press is to advance and apply pressure. But the whole formation must follow suit or the press is worthless. The forwards must press the opposition defenders. The midfielders must press their counterparts. And the defenders must press the opposition forwards, lest a player be left free to expose the formation. The necessity to keep the formation compact, dictates that the back-line must come high, leaving space behind that could be exploited. The security of the press therefore is underpinned by two notions; the retention of possession and the immediate pressure in the event possession is lost. Should the opposition win possession, and escape the press, there is no other protection. That is the dichotomy of Guardiola’s philosophy.

Mourinho believes the ball itself, or possession, is secondary. For Jose, space is the primary consideration. Command your defensive half, allow the opposition to keep possession. Let them pass themselves to death if they wish, but control the territory, and the opposition can never threatan his goal. And they will make mistakes – to be human is to err after all. Pounce on the mistakes, evade the press with pace and exploit the space behind. For Mourinho, possession should not be the aim; it is a means to an end. And the end is to win.

From Portugal to England, from Scotland to Australia:

Just as there are similarities between Jose Mourinho and Andre Villas Boas, so too are their similarities between the Galacticos boss, and the former foundation manager of Melbourne Victory, Ernie Merrick. Again, don’t misunderstand me.

Mourinho is a managerial genius, while poor Mr Merrick is spurned by the Victory fans, whose success was masterminded by the infamously stoic Scotsman. Both shared the letter ‘M’ as the first of their surnames. Both found their greatest successes outside of their homelands. And while Merrick was never known as a clothes horse, what he shared with Jose was a dedication to reactive, counter-attacking football and the opportunity to wield enormous, formative influence at their respective clubs.

Mourinho inherited much of his Chelsea squad, but in a very real way, he built these players all by himself; John Terry, Frank Lampard, Ashley Cole, Petr Cech, Didier Drogba, and in earlier years, Ricardo Carvalho, Arjen Robben, Joe Cole and Claude Makele. Even now, in the new decade, Mourinho’s influence at Chelsea FC runs deep.

His players have formed the foundation of every Chelsea triumph since the start of his reign, and every Chelsea triumph since his departure. But moreover, Mourinho’s direct, counter-attacking style has proven impossible to eradicate, despite the best efforts of Scolari, Grant, Hiddink and Ancelloti, all of whom found the task of transforming Chelsea’s style into pro-active, possession based football beyond them.

Merrick was in a very different, yet similar situation. The A-League had just been founded, and he had been given responsibility for building the squad for the then sole Melbourne club, the sports capital of Australia. Like Mourinho, Merrick’s preferred philosophy was of direct and counter-attacking play, prioritising shape and controlling space over possession. Like Mourinho, Merrick trusted to the principles of pace and physicality, and so he built his squad accordingly; Archie Thompson, Danny Allsopp, Grant Brebner, Fred first and then Carlos Hernandez after, and of course the brooding, fiercely aggressive and inspirational presence of Kevin Muscat.

Merrick’s preferred system alternated between a four and five-man backline, but in his heyday, featured Muscat as a sweeper, initiating the counter-attack, Fred/Hernandez as the trequartista laying on through balls, and Allsopp and Thompson in a target man/quick man strike partnership. Under Merrick, Victory always played on the counter, becoming the most lethal exponents of the art of springing an opposition backline.

If you can remember back 30-something games, the last time Ange Postecoglou’s rampant Brisbane experienced a defeat was a 3-0 loss to Merrick’s counter-attacking Navy Blues. Perhaps that was Brisbane’s “semi-final defeat” which spurned them onto even greater feats.

That then, was Merrick’s system. Sit deep, absorb pressure, pounce on a mistake, break with pace. Reactive football certainly, but also wildly successful. Just as honours fell into Mourinho’s lap in his three seasons in English football, Merrick also won two league and championship Doubles, missing out on a third to a penalty shoot-out. Was that Merrick’s ‘Moscow’ moment, the failure to cement the final triumph which would have rendered his authority unimpeachable?

All good things must come to an end:

In another parallel, both Mourinho and Merrick were sacked in questionable circumstances. Ultimately the two managers failed to deliver continental glory and attractive football; they were punished for it, despite presiding over un-paralleled domestic domination.

Both managers were ultimately succeeded by former colleagues and subordinates. Chelsea went through an exhaustive list of managers before recently settling on Jose’s former opposition scout, while the Victory board, after examining a burgeoning list of applicants, settled on their former youth coach, Mehmet Durakovic.

Again, it is not uncommon for former subordinates to replace their fallen superiors, but in this case, the newer men both held radically different philosophies to their former mentors. As noted above, Villas Boas is an exponent of pro-active, possession football, in contrast to Mourinho’s preference for a counter-attacking, reactive style. Similarly, Durakovic is clearly a man who prefers to control the ball, while his predecessor Merrick was a manager who eschewed possession for defensive shape.

This brings us full circle, to the events of the past fortnight. Chelsea had recently suffered a 5-3 loss to London rivals Arsenal, who used the pace of their forwards Gervinho and Walcott, to expose Chelsea’s high backline populated by older and slower defenders. Melbourne Victory were fortunate in the extreme to escape their derby again Heart with a draw, with the sheer speed of Williams and Dugandzic causing problems for the Navy Blues high line.

Why have Chelsea and Victory struggled to adapt to new managers?

Villas Boas was hired on the basis of rejuvenating Chelsea’s ageing squad and transforming the predominant style of play from reactive and counter-attacking to pro-active and possession based. His current senior squad is reliant on his predecessor’s players, who have aged undeniably. The fundamental reason for the recent struggles of both clubs, are that the playing philosophies of the new managers represent radical departures from what the squad, largely unchanged, are accustommed or even suited to.

For Chelsea, the change in emphasis has manifested in increased pressing and playing a higher line. The problem is Chelsea’s backline against Arsenal, made up of experienced stalwart players such as Terry, Ivanovic, Cole and Bosingwa, was exposed for lack of pace.

A similiar phenomenon is being experienced at Melbourne Victory. Vargas and Leijer, the central defensive pairing, are still adjusting to playing a high line. Where before they would sit deep and defend, now they must come high and close down.

But for the Blues of Melbourne, the issue is much more complicated. The failure to replace Kevin Muscat, and his distribution out of the backline, could prove disastrous to their prospects of a title challenge. But that was before we knew of Durakovic’s passing philosophy.

Due to that change from Merrick’s counter-attacking/reactive to Durakovic’s controlling possession/pro-active, the lack of of a passing midfielder at Victory has become ludicrously exposed. Under Merrick, when the Victory played on the counter, the emphasis wasn’t on passing; it was on speed and physicality. Under Durakovic, with an increased focus on building attacks, the emphasis on passing is much increased; indeed Durakovic is trying to make passing the central feature of his side.

How can the Victory implement a possession based style if they lack the sort of player in central midfield comfortable with or indeed even capable of retaining possession? The spine of the squad Merrick built, and the spine of the squad inherited by Durakovic are largely the same; to change the style of play so radically requires a thorough clean out, which has yet to happen.

For the Victory to be successful in the short term, will require Durakovic to revert to counter-attacking football. The best players in his squad are pacey dribblers, not dynamic midfield creators or passers like Karol Kisel at Sydney or Liam Miller at Perth. To continue to misuse the players at his disposal will almost certainly result in disaster.

On the other hand, with the advent of Ange Postecoglou’s Oranje Revolution at Brisbane, it has become clear that Australian football is rapidly modernising and leaning towards possession play. Victory need to eventually change in order to avoid being left behind by the likes of cross-town rivals Melbourne Heart.

But to facilitate this will require an almost total rebuild of an ageing squad. The key players for the Navy Blues are in their early 30’s, and clearly the pace which brought Victory so much success has gradually ebbed away. Doess Durakovic, a manager lacking in experience, possess the right temperament, knowledge and instincts to direct this period of transition? Honestly, It remains to be seen.

Just to emphasise the uncanny parallel between the two clubs’ situations; Chelsea and the Victory have recently made two trophy signings over the summer; creative left wingers in Juan Mata and Harry Kewell, and pacey finishers from a rival which has created an uncomfortable surfeit of strikers, in Fernando Torres and Jean Carlos Solorzano, who are crowding out Didier Drogba and Nicholas Anelka and Danny Allsopp and Archie Thompson. Again, Allsopp and Drogba can be broadly classed as physical target men, while Thompson and Anelka can be described as fairly versatile and speedy forwards.

There are some Australian pundits who would have you believe that the battle for football’s soul is being waged between the long ball and the short ball. They wave the term like a red flag, to stir up misplaced indignation, appealing to our baser emotions.

In truth, the three-pass theories of Mr Charles Reep were discredited a long time ago. The ideological war in football is delineated along a different, more subtle, and indeed overlapping divide; between possession and shape, between reactive and pro-active, between Josep Guardiola and Jose Mourinho, and perhaps for Australia, between the ascendant Ange Postecoglou and the departed Ernie Merrick.