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The Wallaby Project: how much more do we need to take?

Link - at the centre of a gossip-fuelled storm in Australian rugby. (Image: AFP/Patrick Hamilton)
Roar Pro
30th August, 2013
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From Bledisloe 1 to Bledisloe 2, New Zealand went from scoring 6 tries, to scoring 2. Australia went from scoring 2 tries, to scoring 1.

The game was appreciably tighter. Why did it happen, and is it really progress?

Holding the ball and making your tackles

Instinctively, you would expect that both sides, and particularly Australia, must have tackled better in Bledisloe 2. However, Australia’s tackle effectiveness remained pretty much the same across both games – 84% in Sydney, and 85% in Wellington. NZ’s tackle effectiveness only improved marginally, from 86% to 89%.

As far as total possession goes, NZ actually had more of the ball than in game one (44%, up from 40%), so overall possession was not a factor in the drop in tries either.

Where you gain possession matters

Statistically, very few tries are scored from outside the attacking 40m zone. So, having possession in good field position tips the odds of scoring tries dramatically in your favour. Gaining primary possession in good field position further increases your chances.

Primary possession comes from:
Kick-offs/22 drops
Kicks in play
Scrum
Lineout
Penalties
Turnovers (drop balls, intercepts, ruck steals, strips)

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Primary Possession Opportunities

The All Blacks Scrum and Lineout performance lifted appreciably from game 1 to game 2. No doubt, this really hurt Australia’s attack, as they particularly looked to the lineout as a potential try scoring platform. However, despite the advantage, the All Blacks could not convert their own dominance into a try scoring platform for themselves.

As has been discussed elsewhere, Australia’s performance at the breakdown improved markedly, with turnovers conceded reducing from 17 in Sydney, to 9 in Wellington. NZ remained steady, conceding 8 and 9 turnovers in the first 2 games respectively. This improvement was a major factor in keeping the All Blacks attack in check, and I would call it a draw, as is reflected in the identical number of turnovers.

All of which brings us to the kicking game. This is the area that changed the dynamic of the game from Bledisloe 1 to Bledisloe 2. Let’s look at how it played out.

Australia conceded 16 penalties to NZs 9. NZ converted this advantage into 15 points from kicks at goal, and 6 kicks for touch that averaged a 23m territory gain and the throw in each time. Australia converted their penalties into 9 points, 4 kicks for touch that averaged 19.5m in length and gave a lineout throw in, and 1 kick that failed to find touch. Clear advantage to NZ, and statistically relevant to the final score.

As far as restarts are concerned, Australia improved significantly again in game 2, on what was a solid performance in Sydney. The Wallabies comfortably secured 100% of kick off receptions, most with no pressure. On the other side of the ball, they regained 3 of their 9 kicks, and greatly pressured the All Blacks on a further 3. Again, improvement in this facet of play reduced attack opportunities for the All Blacks.

Clearing kicks and exiting the 22m was another area where Australia improved greatly in game 2. The All Blacks were efficient, as usual, successfully exiting the 22m zone (through either finding touch outside the 22m or forcing a kick reception from the opposition on the other side of half way) on 10 from 10 occasions.

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The Wallabies achieved this 6 times out of 8, one of which was a charge down (Genia), and the other a kick fielded by the ABs on the attacking 40m line. Slight advantage to NZ, but it certainly dried up the opportunities they feasted on in Sydney, where the Wallabies could only manage 50% of exits successfully, 4 of which led to AB tries.

The All Blacks attempted 19 clearing kicks. 58% found touch, for an average gain of 27m. They kicked 2 out on the full (outside 22m). The remaining 32% of clearing kicks that did not find touch, gained an average of 46m.

The Wallabies tried 16 clearing kicks. 19% found touch, averaging 38m gained. One was kicked out on the full, and one was charged down (mentioned above). The other 69% were not out, and gained an average of 57m.

So the Wallabies long kicking game was good, and actually gained more distance per kick. However, in the details like charge downs and finding touch, the All Blacks prevailed. Slight advantage to ABs, but a solid performance from WBs, and their proficiency here further limited the NZ try scoring opportunities.

Finally, the biggest discrepancy occurred in attacking kicks/high kicks. Last week, Australia did not use them at all, attempting to run the ball everywhere outside of their 22m while the All Blacks high-kicked all but 1 piece of possession between the 22 and half way. This week, NZ continued that strategy, and Australia went some way down that track as well, as Ewen had intimated during the week.

NZ put up 17 attacking kicks. They regained 24%, or 4, of those kicks. They converted this primary possession into 2 tries in the 26th and 39th minutes. The first try came 1 phase after the regather, while the second went through 5 phases before scoring. Regaining an attacking kick usually gives you primary possession around midfield, against a disorganised defence who are trying to transition quickly and are more likely to make bad decisions.

The All Blacks always accelerate their pace in this scenario to keep the defence disoriented as long as possible, not worrying about being “set” in attack but rather keeping things moving with speed and aggression, even if it is only one-out running.

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Australia used this tactic on 9 occasions. Twice, they had kicks charged down, twice they found touch deep in AB territory, and twice they regathered possession. Of the 3 occasions that the opposition caught the ball, only once did the WBs allow them an unpressured catch. So, a mixed performance, but more good than bad in that it delivered territory and took away further opportunities for NZ to use their “pressure” game at our end. Interestingly, all of these kicks occurred in the first half. What was the message at half-time?

So, in the attacking/high-kick stakes, a clear advantage to NZ that ultimately yielded 2 tries to nil. Nevertheless, by using this tactic more, Australia played a little less football in their half and made the ABs work harder for their point scoring opportunities than in Sydney.

How is the Ewen McKenzie Project progressing?

McKenzie’s game plan this week emphasised more kicking, thereby playing with less possession, but denying the opposition cheap turnover ball in vulnerable field position. This was a good move. The question is why they did not persist with this in the second half?
McKenzie’s selection of Mogg and Toomua despite average performances in Sydney gave us long-kicking expertise, and faultless kick-off execution (it even rubbed off on Cooper, whose kick offs were also pinpoint).

I give a further thumbs up to Ewen on this one (although, in a forthcoming article I will outline why I would rotate Mogg out of the side for the moment).

Whether it was the introduction of Fardy or not, Australia markedly improved their breakdown performance. A tick to McKenzie again.

On the downside, Line out and scrum both went backwards from last week. Get used to more of this type of roller-coastering until the new coaching staff settle on their best combinations and establish their ideas with the group. A cross on this one.

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How do we bridge the gap?

As a new coach, I believe all that Ewen could hope to do in these 2 games was to pick a side to play a game plan that would create point scoring opportunities for us, and limit them for the opposition. After that, he would just have hoped that through ability, instinct (thus picking combinations of Brumbies and Reds) and some luck, we would convert more of ours than they do. Unfortunately, the All Blacks are very efficient at quashing hopes and dreams.

As McKenzie has more time with the group, his influence on how the WBs convert their opportunities, and prevent the other side capitalising on their chances, will be expected to grow.

The former is about structure and selection. I think he is getting that right, piece by piece.

The latter is about instinct, belief, collective understanding, skills executed under pressure, and a “test match” mindset. This is where the All Blacks are still lightyears ahead of us at the moment.

The good news is we are doing less to beat ourselves as of last week. In my next article I will look at how we can learn from the All Blacks in converting more of our chances and killing off those of the other side.

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