Rugby players, especially those involved in the international teams, are well known for their determined personas. The ability to dig in with the mindset of a bulldog, dig its teeth in and never let go, through the sheer power of stubbornness.

This mindset is often prized. It has been shown time and time again as a very powerful tool that drives teams to victory, usually through a colossal defensive effort with heart and determination, after which the correspondence of said country will shower its team with praise on its indomitable spirit.

Two examples are the Australian effort in Rugby World Cup 2015 against Wales when they were defending on their line or the England game against Australia in the second Test of the Cook Cup series. Both of our countries’ papers lauded the spirit and stubborn mind to never give in. No matter what was thrown at the line. The line held.

What isn’t talked about as such, is the intelligence and composure behind said defensive efforts. What looks like fierce and anarchic chaos on the screen is actually a highly structured and organised effort; the rush-up tackle by Adam Ashley-Cooper in the Wales game that won Australia arguably the match-winning penalty, the fringe tackle on Nick Phipps by Ben Youngs that led to the knock on at the end of the first half of the second Test. Both of these little effects were well taken and judged risks that got their sides out of trouble.

This was achieved with crystal communication between players and their units and the ability to make key decisions at crucial times. What is shown in these moments and what more people would do well to see is the balance of intelligence, composure and willpower, rather than just sheer stubbornness.

Sheer stubbornness in a team and in a coaching staff can be a bad thing. Warren’s Gatland’s Wales are my example.

They have started to evolve their game plan to a certain degree, trying to play a more fluid, open 15-man game that would harken back to the glory days of Gareth Edwards, Barry Johns, and the 1970s Lions team. It’s what the Welsh have come to love as a romantic vision, what they envision to be their brand of rugby.

Warrenball; developed by Gatland and refined in the year of the 2009 British and Irish Lions tour to South Africa, could not be further from the style espoused by those greats.

It won Six Nations titles, it won Grand Slams, and it was, at its time, an intelligent concept. Based on and designed to take full advantage of the referees’ interpretation of the laws at that time. It was based on a dominant set piece, an iron defence, a physical, powerful backline, and a world-class kicker.

Referees at the time of the late 2000s generally favoured the defensive team in terms of penalty allocations. This is what led to the aerial ping pong of Test matches that infuriated many of the rugby romantics out there. Full backs, naturally wanting to run but scared of being pinged, kicked the ball to and fro, daring the other team to run at them until a chase was effective enough to deny the time to make the kick.

In defence, Wales would kick the ball long and rush up in a blitz, using their physicality to force mistakes and drive the opposition back with their big men. Penalties used to come thick and fast for them, and with the metronomic boot of Leigh Halfpenny, they would build up the scoreboard through defensive pressure.

In attack, their focal point was Jamie Roberts, their hard running, hard hitting number 12. The man, running full tilt at the 10-12 channel, usually gets over the gain line and if he doesn’t, it is because more men have been allocated to said channel to stop him. This was followed up by the other key part of Wales’ attack. Quick ball.

With the opposition defence constricted at the 10-12 channel, you get one of two things, as long as you can generate quick ball from the first-phase charge:

1. Mismatches on the openside due to back row players being assigned to the 10-12 channel;
2. Space on the outside for your big wingers to run at and utilise.

All in all, it’s quite an effective, albeit very predictable, pattern, considering as it was and is a wide – wide pattern, with the forwards playing peel around the corner and one pass off the ruck on the return across the pitch, all the while the backs would be lining up for their next attack.

But it has grown old. The laws have changed to suit and favour the attacking team, and yet Gatland never changed his plan. It continued to work against Northern Hemisphere side, due to the underperformance of many teams in those years.

However, it never yielded much success against the Southern Hemisphere. In particular, the All Blacks. The reason behind this is simple. The big three are far more effective in attack. The players of the Wallabies, All Blacks, Springboks and now the Pumas are hardened, fit, running Super Rugby veterans, a competition where the offloading, handling, running, support lines, and distribution is far more comparable to the Lions of 1974 than the Wales of today.

It is still my genuine belief that, no matter how good your defence is, the big three at their peak will score tries. You cannot beat this with penalties alone, which is why I am so keen on George Ford retaining his place as England’s leading fly half over Owen Farrell.

Kicking aimlessly to the back three of the likes of New Zealand and asking them to run back at you is rugby suicide, yet, for lack of ideas, it is exactly what happened in the third Test of the series between Wales and New Zealand this summer. They reverted to Warrenball, and with Jamie Roberts playing at 12, they always had it in the back of their minds.

You don’t usually get penalties for your defence in said case, you get tries scored against you. Which is where I come to my title point.

What does this have to do with fitness and efficiency?

The way I see it, the All Blacks have two trump cards over all other teams in the world. They are the fittest team in the world who can play for the full 80 minutes, and their decision-making is top notch.

I sincerely believe that, while they are the fittest team in the world, their decision-making is such that it never truly needs to be tested.

Ninety per cent of the time they take the right option. If a line break is made, they get support runners to the ball carrier immediately. Their offloading is such that they can usually get the try on the same phase. If not, on the second phase they almost always get the ball onto the side with the most space, regardless of whether it’s the open or the blind.

This decision-making and their alignment differs from that of many other teams in the world. Let’s say, for argument’s sake, that this attack we’ve just described doesn’t get a try, but gets to within five metres of the try line and the opposition team is penalised for holding on, and they take the points. You could also argue they get a man sent to the bin.

Another team may have made the break but not had the communication or situational awareness to get players in a position where they could receive the offload. This is already a loss of momentum and metres gained for said team. They may make use of the space created from the initial line break on the second phase by passing into the space, but instead of going all the way to the try line, they may only be able to get to the 22.

They then may have another five to ten phases to go to breach the line again, or win a penalty that will get them the same net result that the All Blacks come away with. If we look at this as a purely energy expenditure exercise:

The All Blacks scored three points after two phases of attack, while the opposition team gets the same net gain with anywhere between 7-12 phases.

This is why I believe that the All Blacks can go into this magical fifth gear in the last 20 minutes of games, whereas other teams usually flounder at this period. Not only are the All Blacks already fitter, but they made better use of their time on the ball earlier in the game, as such, they have conserved more energy with which to go into overdrive in the last period, to finish off with nothing left at all.

I’m no statistician, but let’s liken it to this.

Let’s say one team has 150 rucks in them, and the All Blacks, with their superior fitness, have 200 rucks in them before they tire (I know it’s a lot more than the normal number, but bear with me).

Now, to the creativity and skill sets of the All Blacks. Let’s say they create 1.5 try-scoring opportunities to every one created by the opposition, with this increasing to two chances when playing against fatigued opposition, whose own scoring opportunities will also decrease, due to the loss of morale, raise in New Zealand’s intensity and so on.

Let’s say the opposition tires at the 60-minute mark, usually when the All Blacks go into that magical gear where they finish teams off.

If the opposition has created eight scoring opportunities, and each time came away with three points, that would mean they have gathered 24 points. Each three points cost the team an average of 20 phases (ten phases of the own team, plus phases after initial line break illustrated above).

This equates to 160 rucks that the opposition team has to use before the 60-minute mark.

So, going by the 1.0:1.5 ratio, the AB’s have created 12 opportunities. For fairness (even though this is highly unlikely) let’s assume all are three pointers. This creates a score of 36 points to 24. They have spent an average of 13 phases per three points, meaning they have spent 156 phases generating a third more of the points than the opposition would have in 160 phases.

I am aware this is a very rough guide and all numbers are thoroughly made up in my head. I know also it doesn’t take into account defensive efforts and systems, individual player skill and time spent without the ball, but the point hopefully comes across.

The All Blacks, through sheer efficiency, have conserved more energy with their rucks and through superior decision making, spent less time and therefore fewer phases accumulating their points in the first 60 minutes. With players like Beauden Barrett, Julian Savea, Ben Smith and countless others, they are also far more likely to create line breaks than other teams at this time.

This leads us to the last 20 minutes. The opposition, having gone over their 150 rucks, are already tired by the 60-minute mark. A perfect example of this is the Argentina versus All Blacks game. The Pumas were gone by 60 minutes. They had been physical, aggressive, and played some great rugby, yet not accumulated enough points through error and lack of correct decision making. They were tired.

The All Blacks still had 44 rucks left of energy. They went into overdrive. And here is where they make you pay. They finish off the opposition in the last 20 in most of their matches, as shown against Argentina. This energy surplus is not created through sheer fitness training, though it does have a part, but making the most of every single opportunity that comes their way.

They save as much energy as possible for the grand finale, when other teams, already having thrown the kitchen sink at them, are done and dusted.

The way to beat this for me? It’s simple, yet easier said than done:

1. Teams have to get more functionally fit on the rugby field to deal with, and employ, a running game.
2. Teams must improve and work on their distribution across all 15 players in order to maximise opportunity in space.
3. Team wide processes must be developed in order to clearly and quickly identify and maximise chances of scoring

Point three for me is a real stickler. As a coach myself, I intentionally throw in drop ball calls in training in our defensive 22 and in attack to ensure the team are comfortable with operating under pressure.

An example of this is the wasting of overlaps after a break. 15 players simply scanning the field, and identifying where the space is should be enough to get the tactical decision makers to move the ball into that area, yet many players get white line fever and reason goes out the window.

I like to drill certain processes and checks into the game that, if they aren’t followed in training, result in burpees. They tend to be a massive motivator.

The military used standard operating procedures that are so ingrained into the actions of every soldier that they can perform actions competently and accurately while under extreme stress. These actions save their lives. The same processes and outlook could be extended to rugby players. Ingraining the basics to a high degree with constant repetition and implementing processes that make players more aware of the game around them, combined with an emphasis on running and mobility over speed is exactly what could deny the All Blacks their superb final 20 minutes.

To play an 80-minute game at such intensity is hard but, with accurate decision making, teams trying to take the AB’s crown can make it far easier.

Note: My numbers are not accurate nor taken from any realistic or gathered data. They are just a means to emphasise my views on this subject.