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Last week, an article on the Roarum (my cheeky name for The Roar‘s comments section) raised the issue of who should run the Wallaby lineout against England in June, arguing for Adam Coleman, the Western Force lineout captain, against the claims of the incumbent, Rob Simmons.
It’s fair to say that it provoked a lively debate.
Given Coleman and Simmons have already played a game in direct opposition to one another, in Round 2 of the Super Rugby tournament, there is plenty of ammunition with which to compare the two.
The overall lineout win percentages up to and including Week 5 look like this:
| Callers | Own ball win percentage | Per cent takeaways opposition ball |
| Reds (Simmons) | 91 | 21.8 |
| Force (Coleman) | 90 | 2.9 |
Both Simmons and Coleman have been among the best in the competition on their own ball, but there is a huge difference in the threat they present to the opposition throw, with the Reds lineout picking off one in five throws. The Force defensive lineout achieves a ratio of more like one in 50 takeaways.
So what happened when the Force clashed with the Reds?
| Throw | Clean | Pressured | Lost |
| Reds (Simmons) | 11 | 2 | 1 |
| Force (Coleman) | 9 | 1 | 4 |
The Reds won 93 per cent of their own lineout throw, usually without pressure, and the one lineout they lost came after winning first touch. The Force only won 71 per cent of their ball and were under constant pressure throughout the game.
The table below (with wins, then losses in brackets) illustrates how the influence of the Reds defensive lineout forced Coleman into some negative adjustments.
Coleman called a far higher percentage of lineouts to the front than Simmons, and called five short four or five-man lineouts in midfield.
| Throw | Front | Middle | Back |
| Reds (Simmons) | 2 | 9 (1) | 3 |
| Force (Coleman) | 7 (2) | 3 (1) | 4 (1 +1*) |
Compared to Simmons’ more even distribution, half of Coleman’s calls went to the front of the lineout.
Front ball is generally the most difficult ball to use. The defence can use the sideline as an extra defender against the drive, and typically it takes an extra pass to shift the ball into midfield, giving the opponent time to react or build speed on to the ball.
Unless you have a monster ball-carrying back-row, calling short lineouts in midfield tends to compromise the attack by increasing traffic in that area. The attacking side loses or dilutes the unique ‘backs-on-backs in space’ signature which only exists at first-phase lineouts and scrums.
So while the Reds’ calling pattern showed nice balance, the Force were probably pressured into calling a higher number of balls to the front, and more short lineouts in midfield than they would have liked.
Let’s take a look at some of the specifics of the lineout calling during the game.
Firstly, how did Rob Simmons and Reds teammates put pressure on the Force throw?
Force at 7:35 and 17:50 – Simmons making correct decisions
The Reds are set up early as Coleman and the Force enter the lineout (fashionably) late at 7:35. Cadeyrn Neville is covering ball to the back in a pod with Jake Schatz and Curtis Browning. Simmons at front and centre is a ‘hinge’ who can either jump himself, or support Hendrik Tui as a back-lifter.
The hinge has to be able to react quickly to movement around him as this is a key decision-making position, and on both occasions Simmons makes the right decision to support Tui at the front, make the assist, and steal Force ball.
Force at 26:00 and 29:55 – Coleman calling risky back ball
Misjudgement? Perhaps the early losses at the front and middle persuaded Coleman to call to himself at the back on the second occasion the Force entered the red zone, but this is not generally recommended policy when you have an attacking position close to the opposition line.
Also, Force hooker Nathan Charles did not look particularly comfortable throwing long. His first throw at 26:04 hit Coleman on his left or outside shoulder for ‘not straight’, while the second at 30:08 sailed right over the top of him. Even though Matt Hodgson is first to react for the Force, this was not a deliberate ploy.
The other point of interest in the 30:08 example is that Cadeyrn Neville, at 2.02 metres tall, gets both better elevation and ‘hangtime’ in the air than Coleman at 2.04 metres. Although Coleman gets into the air first, it is Neville who achieves more height off the ground and stays in the air for longer. This impression was confirmed on the Reds’ throw at 76:20 in the second half, and leads to the question of whether Coleman is too much of a heavy lift at 122 kilograms?
Force at 55:20 – over-complication
The final Force lineout from the clip package at 55:20 shows the short formation Coleman used throughout the match – four-man with everyone sliding down to the front. It also underlines a typical fault in a young lineout caller who is feeling the pressure from four previous turnovers – over-complication!
Despite the small numbers, there are two separate ‘fakes’ – a jump on five himself, then another on 19 at the tail – before Coleman swings around to try and take a dart near the tram-lines. Three movements before the throw heaps pressure on the accuracy and timing of the operation, and here both are lacking.
Now let’s compare Simmons’ decision-making when the Reds had the throw:
Reds at 8:46 – lack of defensive organisation
Comparing the Reds’ organisation at defensive lineout with that of the Force, the Reds certainly looked more disciplined. At 8:48 the Force have under-numbered (six against seven) and although Coleman is signalling for a player to re-join the lineout as his back-lifter, there is no response! The result is an easy Queensland win within their own exit zone, a situation in which the Force should have been looking to turn up the heat.
Coleman in the one-on-one contest
There were a number of other examples where Coleman read the situation right and got a shot off against his immediate opponent – but failed to effect the steal. In the Reds lineouts at 15:56, 41:21 and 76:20 the reads are good and his lifters have put Coleman in A1 poaching position. However in all three instances against both Neville at 15:56 and 76:20, and Curtis Browning at 41:21, Coleman does not make the impact you might expect, and Queensland win the ball comfortably.
Once again, Coleman is on the wrong end of the elevation and hang-time equation against Neville, which leads me to believe he might be better positioned at Wallaby level as a support jumper rather than lineout leader.
Reds at 50:15, 51:10 and 59:28 – closing the ‘seam’
In the longer, six or seven-man lineouts, the Force set up with two defensive pods: one on 4 Steve Mafi at the front and middle, and the second on 5, Coleman at the back.
One of the techniques used by teams confronted by this formation is to throw into the ‘seam’ between the pods, the area where there are often two non-jumpers back-to-back and standing together. Rob Simmons called seven throws into this area during the match, and did a good job of mixing it up to keep the Force off-balance – for example the throw to the front over the ‘loose man’, the prop at the front at 50:18.
It was only on the fifth repetition that the Force’s two pods managed to squeeze the space and make a meaningful contest in the seam; at 51:10, with Coleman managing to rip the ball away after the catch has been made by Simmons for his one turnover of the day. This didn’t prevent Simmons coming back to the seam throw a couple more times before the end of the match (for example at 59:29), so this area was another overall win for him.
Conclusions
The Force-Reds game was a win hands-down for Rob Simmons over Adam Coleman as a lineout leader. Simmons shows more mature calling judgement on both sides of the ball and gets his unit better organised. At this stage of his career, Coleman does not react as quickly to lineout trends and the signs are that he will not be in top class in the one-on-one contests in the air defensively.
England will come over in June with the lineout based around George Kruis and Maro Itoje as one of the aces in their hand. For that series, it is clear that Simmons should be the Wallabies’ lineout caller, while Coleman (along with Rory Arnold, Sam Carter and Kane Douglas if fit) should be considered as his partner at lock – not as a rival for the lineout leadership spot.